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Foreword
After the Flesh
by Catherine Malabou
Translated by Mark Allan Ohm and Joel Andrepont
The body becomes worthy of philosophical examination when it is no longer 
a question of the body but of my body. Husserl introduces a fundamental 
distinction between Körper, the objective, anatomico-physiological body, and 
Leib, one’s own body [le corps propre], the living body, the place of sensations 
and emotions, the “flesh.” This distinction marks a decisive development in 
his thinking and saves the body from being merely an object of conceptual 
devaluation. By rejecting the methods of descriptive psychology in order to 
establish a transcendental phenomenology, Husserl grants a constitutive role 
to the “flesh” as lived body. My body must be considered in its individuality, 
its incarnation or embodiment (Verleiblichung), which amounts to considering 
the living corporeal body [le vécu corporel] in the purity of its manifestation. 
My body is a token of my own immediate worldly presence; it presents to 
the mind what Husserl calls hyletic data (the body’s perceptual, sensory 
content, like touch, look, voice, kinaesthesia). In this way, the body becomes 
the worldly presence of an intentional subject’s mental life.
The phenomenological body stands in the sphere of immanence (the 
sensation that I have of my body’s immediate presence in the world), a 
sphere which, after the epoché, is reduced to the presence of the thing itself. 
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Sensation means that the thing reveals itself in the flesh and stands there 
before our eyes as something given to itself and in actuality.
The Husserlian analyses of the living corporeal body once again mark 
a major advancement in the history of philosophy. As a result of these 
analyses, the body, quite simply, acquires a value equal to that of the mind. 
The mind is no longer separable from the flesh that it animates and which 
gives it corporeal spatiality.
We can therefore ask whether it is possible to go further in 
this recognition of the essential status of the incarnate body than 
phenomenology does. It seems not. Even researchers in the cognitive 
sciences and the philosophy of mind still draw from Husserl: Francisco 
Varela, Alva Noë, Evan Thompson, and Shaun Gallagher, to name but a 
few, situate their work within his direct lineage. Is the phenomenological 
approach to the body impossible to overcome?
In an incredibly daring gesture, Tom Sparrow responds in the negative, 
and attempts to clear the way for nothing less than a post-phenomenological 
approach to the body.
Sparrow is clearly well aware of the considerable debt that continental 
philosophy owes to phenomenology. Phenomenology made possible 
several claims about the body: that it is not the case that the body is the 
tomb of the soul, as Plato claimed; that it is not the case that the body is a 
neutral extension caught in the movement which animates it, as Descartes 
showed; and that the body is much more than the place of sensibility, as 
Kant defined it. In fact, the senses always grasp things as they are for the 
consciousness that perceives them. It is in this way that corporeal space 
acquires its identity within the general realm of extension [l’étendue générale]. 
Thus there is no a priori spatial body. Despite all of this, Sparrow writes: 
“I attempt to build a theory of embodiment that could only come after 
phenomenology.”
Why must we distance ourselves from the phenomenological approach 
to the body? Isn’t the notion of embodiment essential? Hasn’t it been used 
since in all the human sciences? Nonetheless, Sparrow maintains that we 
now need a “post-phenomenological perspective.” “By this,” he writes, “I 
mean a perspective which is not simply anti-phenomenological, but one 
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which has gone through phenomenology and retained its kernel of truth, 
even if this kernel proves to be non-phenomenological in nature.”
The problem is the following: I just said that the phenomenological 
conception of the Leib made possible the de-objectification of the body. 
But this necessary de-objectification has been clearly accompanied by a 
de-materialization. If the flesh was essential as the future of the physical 
body, now we need to question the future of the flesh. For this reason, 
the materiality of the body must be rethought. Sparrow argues that the 
phenomenological flesh in fact lacks matter. We need to reconceptualize 
matter. How can we avoid lapsing into both the naturalization and 
neutrality of the body? How can we conceive of matter without reverting to 
mechanism? In order to properly distinguish matter from mechanism, we 
will call this post-phenomenological materiality plasticity. Plasticity is thus 
defined as that which comes after the flesh.
The task is therefore to rethink the union between the material and the 
meaningful, which “does not necessarily entail the reduction of the mind 
to the brain, or consciousness to synaptic/neural activity.” Nevertheless, it 
involves a rematerialization; sensation is the key to the process and will aid 
us in our understanding.
But first let us insist on an intermediary path. In order to examine 
the insufficiencies of the phenomenological concept of the flesh, Sparrow 
begins by pluralizing the theories of embodiment. In an entirely unexpected 
manner, he confronts the two extremes of the phenomenological specter: 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. They also criticized Husserl in their own way 
in the name of a certain materiality: “I see the aesthetics of Levinas and 
Merleau-Ponty as indispensable for reconciling a pluralistic conception 
of embodiment, even if ultimately the two thinkers hold incompatible 
metaphysical positions.” Comparing these two philosophers allows us to 
understand what their critiques of classical phenomenology fail to do in 
order to become a materialist phenomenology, a philosophical undertaking 
Sparrow proposes to provide the grounds for: “My own view of the body as 
plastic emerges through an exploration of the phenomenologies of Merleau-
Ponty and Levinas, with whom I travel up to the point at which they no 
longer pursue the questions that I would like answered by a theory of 
embodiment.”
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Merleau-Ponty and “Reversible Bodies”
Husserl insisted that the models of Euclidean geometry were incompatible 
with the perception of the reality of one’s own body insofar as things are 
only represented in perception in the context of a geometry of surfaces. 
We can perceive neither the six faces of a cube nor the totality of our own 
body. Husserl argues that human perception includes the supplementary 
dimension of the infinite, including time in the perception of space 
(Riemannian space). In this way, the dynamics of a spatial body is integrated 
into perception itself. Thus, there is a perceptual creation of a dynamic 
image of the body, adding kinesthetic variations of the body of the thing 
to the dynamic image of our own movement in the spatial encounter. For 
example, if I walk toward a tree which is in my spatial field, the tree moves 
toward me just as much as I move toward it. We can therefore contrast this 
phenomenon, called a Riemannian image, with Euclidean perception.
For Merleau-Ponty, however, Husserl does not go far enough in grasping 
the interaction between body and world. Merleau-Ponty believes that 
his conception of the corporeal schema makes up for this lacuna. In the 
Phenomenology of Perception in particular, Merleau-Ponty himself makes use 
of the notion of plasticity. Plasticity is directly linked to being-in-the-world 
and to how the body develops its mediating role in the world. “[T]he…
subject penetrates into the object by perception, assimilating its structure 
into his substance, and through this body the object directly regulates his 
movements.”1 Composed of habits, circuits, and sensorimotor scheme 
organized through sensory and comportmental experience, the corporeal 
schema already materializes the living body inasmuch as the latter can no 
longer distinguish its own flesh from that of the world.
The “reversible body” is both touching and touched, and the limit that 
separates a body from the world as well as from other bodies is, precisely, 
a plastic limit, that is, a malleable and pliable limit. Sparrow reminds us 
that: “By ‘reversible’ Merleau-Ponty means that at any moment the one 
who sees can become the one seen, or the one who touches can become the 
touched.” Merleau-Ponty completes the material liberation of the concept 
of intersubjectivity, which Husserl still considers in relation to one’s own 
selfhood [égoïté].
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Despite all this, Sparrow argues that the corporeal schema still remains 
too personal [individuel], too anchored in an identity which can evolve, but 
which nevertheless remains what it is. In both Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, 
the integrity of one’s own body in a sense resists its transformation through 
the materiality of the world. Examples from pathology demonstrate this 
resistance. For Merleau-Ponty, illness engenders a loss of identity, that is, a 
loss rather than a transformation of plasticity: “In the patient the perceptual 
field has lost this plasticity. … The world in its entirety no longer suggests 
any meaning to him and conversely the meanings which occur to him are 
not embodied any longer in the given world.”2 The loss of plasticity entails a 
modification of the corporeal schema, this “system of equivalents…whereby 
the different motor tasks are instantaneously transferable.”3 Of course, this 
loss is at least partially compensated for in the illness. But, for Merleau-
Ponty, it is clear that compensating plasticity is not as strong as the primary 
formative plasticity of being-in-the-world. The meaning that it confers is an 
accidental meaning, without autonomy, which effectively initiates no new 
modality of being-in-the-world. “Illness,” writes Merleau-Ponty,
is a complete form of existence and the procedures which 
it employs to replace normal functions which have been 
destroyed are equally pathological phenomena. It is impossible 
to deduce the normal from the pathological, deficiencies from 
the substitute functions, by a mere change of the sign. We 
must take substitutions as substitutions, as allusions to some 
fundamental function that they are striving to make good, and 
the direct image of which they fail to furnish.4
Plasticity can thus be lost, and with it the integrity of the schema.
Levinas and “Susceptible Bodies”
Perhaps it is necessary to think that I am not in my body. Perhaps my 
body does not first say I, but you. Perhaps it characterizes itself in the 
first place by an absolute passivity through which the alterity of the flesh 
manifests itself to itself. Levinas maintains that “the subject cannot stay 
identical to itself.”
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Let us begin from Levinas’s critique of Husserl. Sparrow writes that 
“Levinas’s objection to phenomenological method is straightforward: if the 
objectifying acts of theoretical consciousness, what Husserl calls meaning-
giving (Sinngebung) acts, are our primary mode of access to things, then 
those things can only appear to us as representations whose content is 
predetermined by the representing subject. In short, phenomenology 
becomes a modified transcendental idealism.”
It is therefore a matter of breaking with representation. For Levinas, 
the distinction between the body and objects of the world tends to blur, 
but also opens up a material dimension to sensation. For him, there is no 
corporeal schema strictly speaking, but a dwelling in others. In my home, 
I am in the home of another. My furniture is hers. I am nourished by her 
presence, which is simultaneously inexhaustible. Passive joy [la jouissance de 
la passivité] is established on the horizon of desire. We could not know how 
to praise the striking beauty of the analysis of everydayness in Totality and 
Infinity, where nourishment, dwelling, and ornaments are described with as 
much ethical care and attention as are individuals. Everything is infinitely 
susceptible, and consequently, there is no totality [tout] but an infinity 
of encounters.
Nonetheless, Levinas rejects the concept of plasticity. The other, he 
writes, is never what “appear[s] in plastic form as an image, a portrait.” Its 
beauty is this “supreme presence … breaking through its plastic form with 
youth,”5 which is why the other resists. Plasticity remains confined to the 
sculptural domain, bound to its function of embodiment or figuration in 
general, an enduring [attardée] function, always older than the face. The 
face, precisely, is not plastic; on the contrary, it can only “break through 
its own plastic image,”6  “break up form.”7 It stands beyond form. It is a 
pure trace: “This existence abandoned by all and by itself, a trace of itself, 
imposed on me, assigns me in my last refuge with an incomparable force 
of assignation, inconvertible into forms [which] would give me at once a 
countenance.”8
While the appearance of the face, its “epiphany” always provokes an 
emotional and sensible overturning (for another as well as for me), this 
overturning is not based on a transformation but on an abrupt break [écart 
brusque] without material or physiological genesis: “The face of the Other 
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at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me….”9 
And this destruction is unimpeded [sans procès]: “The absolute experience 
is not disclosure but revelation: a coinciding of the expressed with him 
who expresses, which is the privileged manifestation of the Other, the 
manifestation of a face over and beyond form. Form— incessantly betraying 
its own manifestation, congealing into a plastic form, for it is adequate to the 
same—alienates the exteriority of the other.”10
Is not this denial of plasticity Levinas’s admission of resistance to the 
materiality that he continually celebrates elsewhere? Behind this denial isn’t 
there the reaffirmation of the fleshly [charnel] character of the face, in the 
phenomenological sense of the term, with all the authenticity, spirituality, 
and invariability that this fleshly character entails?
Plasticity as the Future of the Flesh
Sparrow claims that “what is missing in [these views] is the practical or 
embodied dimension of sensation, or affirmation that it is sensation that 
delivers the materiality of the world to sensibility.” And later he writes that 
“instead of reversibility and susceptibility, my view features the plasticity 
of the body and argues that the dynamism of plasticity is more true to 
the aesthetic dimension of existence as well as the transactional nature of 
intercorporeal encounters.”
How can we understand this new plasticity? How can we simultaneously 
understand this new “aesthetics,” which is presented here as both a theory 
of sensation and a theory of beauty?
In order to understand plasticity, we must begin from the plastic material, 
since it is plasticity which first necessitated its name. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
reversibility of touching-touched alludes to elasticity more than plasticity. 
“Plastic” refers to a material that cannot retrieve its original form once 
sculpted or molded. The plastic material retains the trace of its deformation. 
In this sense, plasticity inhibits reversibility. It also inhibits Levinasian 
susceptibility in the sense that the plastic is also an explosive material, which 
suspends the face-to-face encounter and assures its destructive violence of 
all alterity.
Of course, the flesh of the body and the flesh of the world are one. 
Nevertheless, this unity owes as much to the matter of things of the world 
20 Catherine Malabou
as to the intentionality of the animate or incarnate body. Matter is also 
what destroys. Matter is also what has no body. Matter is also what forms 
the body precisely by contrasting the body with its objectality. Sparrow’s 
analyses of the body-matter couple are extraordinary in their beauty, 
evocative power, and precision.
A case in point is his analysis of architecture. Sparrow draws from 
Juhani Pallasmaa’s work, according to which “bodies adopt the structures 
of buildings in their skeletal structure and bodily sensations.” Another 
astonishing passage draws from Yukio Mishima, who described his 
experience of bodybuilding in Sun and Steel: “His body lives from, 
metabolizes the steel no less than the sun. His body engages organic and 
inorganic matter and, enacting an unnatural participation, converts both 
into muscle. … The idea that Mishima metabolizes sun and steel is more 
than metaphor. His body is sculpted and polished by repetitive exposure to 
metal and solar energy. Sun and steel territorialize his body and augment 
his vitality.”
By taking up Merleau-Ponty’s notion of habit, staying in tune with 
Levinas’s hospitality, and recalling Husserl’s fascinating pages in Ideen II, 
Sparrow clears his own path, which consists in inserting mechanical parts, 
shards of metal, stones, and machines into the body of phenomenology. 
Its plasticity delineates the space of a sensation and a sensibility that 
objectivizes the world by constructing it as one creates a work of art, a 
performance, an installation, or as one takes flight. Halfway between Husserl 
and Simondon, Merleau-Ponty and James, Levinas, Deleuze, and Dewey, 
Sparrow invites us to question this new dimension where the body is no 
longer the flesh. Plastic disembodiment is presented as a new economy of 
the sensible.
Here is not just another rehashing of the traditional division between 
the integrity of the phenomenological body, on the one hand, and its 
deconstruction, on the other. The incorporeal materials are neither signs 
nor symptoms nor immaterial things. We are beyond the difference between 
presence and the critique of metaphysics. It is no longer a matter of deciding 
between autoaffected and deterritorialized bodies.
The materialist phenomenology presented here is a rupture. A 
conservative rupture, of course, but a rupture nonetheless. A rupture in 
formation, like our bodies are.
Introduction
This is a book about embodiment, one of the cardinal themes of 
contemporary philosophy. This is also a book about phenomenology, 
which has done more than any other school to bring the body to the 
center of philosophical analysis. But this is not a book of phenomenology. 
While it draws liberally from the resources of phenomenology, the idea of 
embodiment assembled in its pages is quite often at odds with the first-
person orientation of the phenomenological method. It is therefore as much 
about the limits of phenomenology as it is about the limits of the body. 
In the last analysis it is really about how we might rebuild the somewhat 
unfashionable concept of sensation following the rescue attempts made by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas.
Phenomenology is a natural place to begin this project, but not the 
right place to end it. This is because sensation, as I understand it here, is 
unsuitable for proper phenomenological investigation. It does not present 
itself phenomenally as an object of consciousness, or as what Husserl 
calls an intentional object. Sensation is something that happens below the 
phenomenal level, so at best it is a mediated datum of consciousness. Both 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas recognized this. How, then, can we speak of 
this non-phenomenal sensation? My contention is that we experience it 
primarily through its effects and can thereby think it on the basis of these 
effects. Perception, passion, cognition, consciousness, identity, and freedom 
are some of these effects. These are indeed accessed phenomenally, but as 
products of sensation. This is not to say that sensation is their efficient cause, 
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however. It is to say that sensation is their necessary condition. Sensation is 
thus an object as well-suited for speculation as it is for empirical analysis. 
Both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas explicitly opposed the latter, naturalistic, 
approach to sensation from the perspective of the former, and it is their 
perspective that I try to radicalize in this book.  To be clear: I am not 
attempting a phenomenology of sensation, and neither were Merleau-
Ponty and Levinas. What I do is to take up their speculative remarks about 
sensation and develop these into a novel theory of embodiment, but one 
markedly more speculative than phenomenological. If I had to give a name 
to this project, I would call it a speculative aesthetics, although it certainly falls 
short of a comprehensive treatise. If its speculative dimension seems too 
programmatic, consider it a promise of future work. As it stands, it provides 
a constructive reading of the phenomenology of the body, but in the service 
of a non-phenomenological metaphysics.
Sensation is thus approached from two perspectives, the 
phenomenological and the speculative. A simple twofold argument is 
presented: sensation is the basic material of subjectivity; as such, sensation is 
responsible in a non-trivial way for the subject’s power to exist. In question 
throughout the text is the function and constitution of the aesthetic 
dimension of embodiment, specifically the autonomous reality of sensation 
(aisthesis) and the materiality of aesthetics. Insofar as this materiality 
operates on the body below the level of conscious reflection, which is to say, 
imperceptibly, it resists phenomenological analysis. Phenomenology indeed 
has much to teach us about what it is like to live through sensations, but 
a hybrid method that draws upon phenomenology while simultaneously 
exceeding it is required to circumscribe the concept of sensation. 
Methodologically speaking, I approach phenomenology historically, not 
as a practitioner. I do not proceed from the epoché or phenomenological 
reduction, nor do I adhere to any specific phenomenological principles 
or its correlationism. It seems to me that if one claims to be doing 
phenomenology, then there must be at least some principles (the reductions, 
eidetic variation, for instance) guiding one’s investigation. Otherwise, 
in what sense is it a method? As I have not identified and implemented 
any specific phenomenological principles, I cannot say that my view is 
the product of the phenomenological method. Instead, phenomenology 
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appears here as an object of historical investigation and a tool for conceptual 
engineering.
Since I am primarily interested in how phenomenology fits into the 
history of embodiment, I do not conduct an exhaustive reading of the 
oeuvres of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, nor do I perform a reconstruction 
of what their philosophies really strive to accomplish. The texts of 
phenomenology are taken up with the express aim of developing a theory 
of embodiment which takes sensation as its leading concept, something 
that cannot be done without looking carefully at the aesthetics of 
phenomenology. This entails an ambivalent reading of Merleau-Ponty. On 
the one hand, I draw liberally from his phenomenology of perception and 
the immense contribution he makes to the philosophy of embodiment and 
aesthetic theory. On the other hand, I insist on the basic immaterialism 
and anthropocentrism of his philosophy, which I attribute to his allegiances 
to phenomenology and non-Cartesian dualist ontology. As for Levinas, I 
admittedly read his work heretically. This simply means that I downplay 
his ethical program—which is, for many Levinasians, the essence of his 
philosophy—and emphasize instead his contribution to the metaphysics of 
embodiment, which is often overshadowed in the literature. Merleau-Ponty 
and Levinas set the stage for this book precisely because they inaugurate 
a renewal of the concept of sensation. But this renewal is not just the 
work of phenomenology; or, it cannot be completed by phenomenology. 
Both thinkers are also metaphysicians, and it is necessary to see how 
their respective (and in many ways univocal) responses to the history of 
philosophy square with what comes before and after them. My justification 
for calling them metaphysicians derives from the fact that they often make 
speculative claims that lack phenomenological evidence. Instead of seeing 
these claims simply as a breach of method, I take them as gestures toward 
an emergent philosophy of the body.
Naturally, it will be asked why I bother working through phenomenology 
at all. The reason is again historical. It is certainly true that the 
presuppositions—or purported lack thereof—of phenomenology and the 
other currents of twentieth-century philosophy diverge significantly. There 
are, however, more points of contact between phenomenology and, say, 
Deleuze and Spinoza, than usually acknowledged by partisan readings of 
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the history of twentieth-century French philosophy. While I do think that 
readers must at the end of the day make some decisions about the relative 
merits of Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, or Levinas and Deleuze, to see their 
respective projects as mutually exclusive is to ignore the common history of 
their inquiries and to simplify a complex relationship.
The kind of philosophy undertaken here could not have occurred before 
phenomenology turned to the body. Philosophers were thinking about 
and analyzing bodies before the twentieth century, of course, but their 
concerns were often quite different from those debated in the last century. 
For instance, where early modern philosophers like Leibniz and Spinoza 
were eager to determine the metaphysical constitution of individual bodies 
and, indeed, ask whether or not individuals actually exist, contemporary 
thinkers of embodiment are primarily concerned with how the body informs 
knowledge acquisition, gender and racial identity, or intersubjectivity. 
Embodiment is now thoroughly incorporated into almost all the human 
sciences and phenomenology has been integral to this incorporation. It 
has even gained ground with analytic philosophers. What is called for 
now, however, is a post-phenomenological perspective. By this I mean a 
perspective which is not simply anti-phenomenological, but one which has 
gone through phenomenology and retained its kernel of truth, even if this 
kernel proves to be non-phenomenological in nature. For me, this is the 
truth of plasticity.
Therefore, I attempt to build a theory of embodiment that could only 
come after phenomenology. But I also retrieve a pre-phenomenological, 
occasionally pre-critical perspective, one which draws liberally from the 
materialist and empiricist traditions to see what effects they can produce 
today. In this respect it is a work of metaphysics. It does not claim to 
have invented a brand new theory of the body, but to have mobilized 
several philosophical traditions and rebuilt the body using a diverse team 
of thinkers.
Chapter 1
Post-dualist Embodiment, with Some Theses on Sensation
Like a clever thief hidden inside a house, breathing quietly, 
waiting until everyone’s asleep. I have looked deep inside 
myself, trying to detect something that might be there. 
But just as our consciousness is a maze, so too is our body. 
Everywhere you turn there’s darkness, and a blind spot. 
Everywhere you find silent hints, everywhere a surprise is 
waiting for you.
Murakami, What I Talk About When I Talk About Running
Problem and Method
Most of us experience our bodies daily as supported and resisted by the 
features of our environment—the solid earth, the smooth surfaces of our 
homes, the climate-controlled rooms we work and play in. A wooden chair 
supports my weight as I type, a woolen duvet insulates me while I sleep. This 
point can be put in grander terms, as Glen Mazis has: “On an immediate 
level, we feel as though the earth is still. On a deeper level, we feel held 
by an embracing earth. It actively holds onto us, giving us the weight to 
walk, work, and love. The earth is not just inert, but a protector actively 
engaged with us.”11 Occasionally we are given over to the realization that 
the spaces we move through possess the power to overwhelm or destroy us. 
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The violence may surface from within as an untamed passion, or as a chance 
affliction or retraction of the environment’s material support. César Aira’s 
An Episode in the Life of a Landscape Painter allegorizes the possibility in this 
description of a lightning strike:
What happened next bypassed his senses and went straight 
into his nervous system. In other words, it was over very 
quickly; it was pure action, a wild concatenation of events. 
The storm broke suddenly with a spectacular lightning bolt 
that traced a zig-zag arc clear across the sky. … The thunder 
crashing down impossibly enveloped him in millions of 
vibrations. The horse began to turn beneath him. It was still 
turning when a lightning bolt struck him on the head. Like a 
nickel statue, man and beast were lit up with electricity. For 
one horrific moment, regrettably to be repeated, Rugendas 
witnessed the spectacle of his body shining.12
Certain bodily transformations never present themselves phenomenally. Or 
they do, but only after they have happened, like an afterimage whose original 
image is forever lost. They affect us unwittingly, spontaneously causing a 
malfunction or disablement of the body that consciousness never directly 
witnesses. Common among these events is death, which, as Epicurus 
teaches, “is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and 
that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.”13 Epicurus may be right about 
our experience of death, but I hope to show that he is wrong about corpses. 
Sensation, I will claim, is something undergone by animate and inanimate 
bodies alike, but it is undergone in such a way that we tend to forget it ever 
happened or that it is happening at every moment. Death, too, is happening 
at this very moment—for most of us, so imperceptibly that we only regard 
ourselves as living bodies.
No one will deny that environments impact identities. Home, school, 
work, and travel accumulate in us. The familiar, the public, the common 
becomes us. That we are where we come from is a truth readily affirmed by 
everyone. How does this happen? The present book provides a response to 
this question by investigating the promises and limits of phenomenology for 
conceptualizing the nature of bodies and their relation to the environment. 
Principally it asks: What individuates a body? What constitutes its structural 
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integrity? Of what is the body capable? These questions are answered both 
indirectly and directly through collaborative and critical engagements 
with Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, both of whom offer in their analyses 
of sensation and sensibility directives rooted in, and gesturing beyond, 
the subjectivity of the “lived body.” Since sensation is not often featured 
in phenomenological discussions, and because sensation, I contend, is 
necessary for conceiving both the activity and passivity of the body, its 
legitimacy as a philosophical concept is also defended. The turn to sensation 
in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas marks a significant departure from the 
residual idealism of Husserlian phenomenology—indeed, from the history 
of philosophy after Kant. In a sense, then, what I attempt here is a rescue 
of sensation from its devastation at the hands of the Critical philosophy. 
Phenomenology, I try to demonstrate, gets this rescue off the ground.
Sensation’s revitalization has ontological and practical consequences 
that are nascent in phenomenology, but which cannot be fully captured by 
phenomenological analyses beholden to constructivist epistemology and 
aligned with anti-realist metaphysics. Therefore, I will eventually break with 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas to deploy a realist metaphysics of sensation, 
one which thinks the body as a shining spectacle charged with forces 
uncontrived by eye or mind.
The movement beyond phenomenology raises ethical and political 
questions about how we should and should not comport our bodies toward 
others; it also poses questions about how we impact and structure our 
environments. But these derive from the more fundamental question of 
bodily relations. The problem of how we as individuals actually relate to 
other individuals, or how it is possible for one person to interact with, act 
upon, or know another individual must be addressed before we can draw 
up prescriptions. The relation question is epistemological and ontological; 
traditionally it has manifested as the problem of other minds or, more 
recently, the problem of intersubjectivity. These problems underlie 
the ongoing discussion of corporeal difference and its ethico-political 
consequences in contemporary continental philosophy. The saliency of 
these specific problems, however, only makes obvious sense in a dualist’s 
metaphysical framework. It is of course possible to see the ethical and 
ontological as articulated or collapsed into each other, as in the monism 
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of Spinoza. One of the principal challenges for post-dualist philosophy, 
Spinozist or other, is how to come to terms with this collapse.
Non-dualists like Spinoza must first explain how individuals emerge as 
individuals. Only then can they trouble themselves with how individuals 
can and should interact. The problem of individuation fascinated early 
modern philosophers as much as it is resurgent in contemporary thinkers 
like Simondon, Deleuze, DeLanda, Badiou and others. The dualist’s 
problem of how I come to know the mind of another person, when all I 
perceive is the behavior of that person, only arises if he actually encounters 
another as an individual and believes that beyond his or her body there lies 
an ontologically unique thing called a mind. This is of course the ontology 
of Descartes, but it is also the ontology of Kant, who sees personhood as 
constituted by the hybrid of extended human body/non-extended, rational, 
and self-legislating ego.
From a practical viewpoint dualist ontology is a brilliant way to 
safeguard the freedom and, consequently, responsibility of the individual, 
because dualism acknowledges the body’s subjection to causal laws while 
at the same time placing the mind/soul/ego/person at an infinite remove 
from the causal sphere. That is, outside the genesis of history. So, for 
instance, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which is not primarily a work in 
practical philosophy, makes the point of specifying the dual nature of the 
self in order to protect the freedom of the will from the determinations of 
causality.14 The body suffers in the empirical world while the ego enjoys its 
isolation in the transcendental sphere; the integrity (moral and structural) 
of the person transcends, in a sense structures, the corporeal world. Some 
consequences entailed in this distinction permit Kant to refer his ethical 
and political philosophy back to his epistemological, ontological, and 
aesthetic philosophies. These provide a strategic ontological foundation for 
his critique of practical reason and metaphysics of morals.15 By entwining, 
without collapsing, the practical and ontological in the transcendental 
sphere, Kant can then assert in the Critique of Judgment that it is possible 
for aesthetic judgment of the dynamically sublime to “consider nature as a 
might that has no dominance over us” and, consequently, to awaken “in our 
power of reason, a different and nonsensible standard” derived from “the 
superiority [of the mind] over nature itself in its immensity.”16 Since the 
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Kantian subject sits outside of natural events, it is able to feel pleasure in 
the face of terrifying spectacles like natural disasters, and even exploit such 
events to reassert its intellectual power over, and freedom from, the material 
effects of nature.17 Ironically, the feeling of powerlessness generated in the 
subject in the face of the sublime gets translated into a moral sentiment that 
then triggers the supersensible moral command which, as Kant phrases it, 
“obligates absolutely”18 and evinces the moral superiority of humans over 
nature. As Paul Guyer puts it, “[the spectacle of the dynamical sublime] 
gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the physical power of 
nature and, in so doing, reveals the imperviousness of our purely moral 
character to threats from nature.”19 The systematic link between aesthetics 
and morality is possible, for Kant, because the subject is essentially 
conceived as an intellectual being with “unlimited freedom,”20 not a 
corporeal being susceptible to the directives of the natural world.
The remarkable strength of the dualist position on subjectivity rests on 
how it logically reinforces the metaphysical with the practical, and vice versa, 
while leaving the intellectual or interior world uncontaminated by concrete 
events. Moreover, it opens an ethical space in which the sensible is subject 
to the judgments of the supersensible, while the sensible as such is afforded 
no inherent practical value. The capability and freedom of the individual are 
effectively immunized from the corporeality of other individuals as well the 
influences of the material world.
The embodied view of subjectivity that I will draw out of Merleau-
Ponty and Levinas, among others, contests the dualist dichotomy along 
with its ethical and political implications. It not only assigns itself the 
task of accounting for the emergence of the subject, it also raises the 
difficulty of deriving a non-formal ethical imperative from the sensible 
realm without committing the naturalistic fallacy.21 My conclusion argues 
that the formality of Kant’s practical philosophy neglects the aesthetics of 
embodiment we find in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, and that this neglect 
results from a difference of ontology. From the perspective of embodied 
subjectivity, we cannot maintain a basic distinction between our aesthetic 
and moral sensibilities, as though they belong to two distinct capacities 
or “faculties.” We cannot concur with Kant that our moral sensibility 
operates in a space that cannot be traversed by the directives of corporeal 
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life, or rather, that ultimately our affective life is at best the servant of our 
intellectual judgment. Instead, the material form of our moral sensibility 
and its ethical imperatives must be submitted as a replacement for the 
Kantian model.
Of course, the monist and materialist traditions, from Democritus to 
Hobbes, Spinoza, Marx and beyond have always contested the dualist’s 
ontology and resolved the intersubjective problem in various ways. But, 
at least since Hegel, the dualist framework has been under attack from a 
perspective that can generally be called non-dualism or, perhaps, post-
dualism. Hegel responds to Kant’s partitioning of the world into noumenal 
and phenomenal regions by insisting on the superfluity of the noumenal. 
The Phenomenology of Spirit effectively demonstrates that the noumenal 
realm is unnecessary for explaining the movement of thought or history, 
and cannot be legitimately garnered from the Kantian critical project. Yet it 
would seem odd to apply the monist label to Hegel’s philosophy. Likewise, 
it is not necessarily a materialism because it allows for the existence of 
forces (Spirit, Concept) that are neither physical in nature nor subject to 
causal laws. Bergson’s élan vital would be an analogous force, one which 
shifts his non-dualist philosophy away from materialism and into vitalism. 
Nietzsche, too, could also be considered a non-dualist, yet non-materialist, 
philosopher. Nietzsche is too much of a psychoanalyst to be an eliminativist, 
and his philosophy of the body displays a complex understanding of both 
the quantitative and qualitative, physical and cosmological, as well as 
the aleatory dimensions of experience. And yet, he is more than willing 
to (almost) reduce consciousness to a dynamism of forces.22 What is the 
metaphysical status of these immaterial elements or their counterparts in 
the phenomenological tradition, which worries more about overcoming 
dualism than it does about fending off charges of monism? If they are 
neither physical nor spiritual, where do we situate Hegel’s Spirit, Nietzsche’s 
force, or Bergson’s élan? A central challenge for post-dualism is to overcome 
dualism without arresting motion, that is, without reducing animation to 
mechanism. The attempt at a non-reductive post-dualist ontology is alive in 
both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. This is one of their primary attractions.
I acknowledge that it is problematic to place phenomenologists like 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas into classical categories. But why, for instance, 
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does Merleau-Ponty’s late notion of “the flesh” (la chair) not result in a 
monist ontology, a monism of the flesh? Or, why does the identification of 
the self with the body not admit of a monism, as is sometimes contended?23 
Commentators prefer to cast what would otherwise be his monism as 
Merleau-Ponty’s “philosophy of immanence,” but it remains necessary to 
understand why this distinction is not merely nominal. The primacy of 
perception thesis—that is, the thesis that the world of perception is borne 
of perception—paradoxically holds that bodies and things are individuated 
prior to my perception and that subject and object are internally related and 
originate in my perception. This avoids the standard version of dualism, 
but it also implies a contradiction. The apparent contradiction dissolves 
when we see that from the perspective of perception subject and object 
emerge together (idealism), but from the ontological perspective objects exist 
independently of the human perceiver (realism). Nevertheless, both subject 
and object belong to a single flesh, the sensible as such, whose purpose as a 
concept is to deflate the quarrel between idealism and realism about subjects 
and objects. Still, there is a pervasive conceptual dualism in Merleau-Ponty’s 
texts, as Renaud Barbaras has catalogued: “clearly in the final analysis of 
the body in terms of sensing and sensed, touching and touched, subject of 
the world and part of the world. Such conceptual pairs are just so many 
displaced modalities of the duality of consciousness and object”24
The ontological situation is no less conflicted in Levinas. Why should 
we not consider Levinas’s elemental philosophy in Totality and Infinity 
a monism? And the question of the transcendence of the human Other 
(autrui) as a reformulation of the problem of other minds? What makes 
these two thinkers post-dualist? What resources do they offer us for building 
theories of subjectivity and intersubjectivity that genuinely challenge the 
Cartesian and Kantian legacies? I contend that it is their phenomenological 
ontology of the body and its tendency to draw conclusions that transgress 
the bounds of phenomenological method that make the French 
phenomenologists allies of post-dualism. Additionally, at times we find 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas reluctant to commit fully to the centrality of 
the body for fear that such a commitment would result in a fully immanent 
ontology inhospitable to the transcendence of the phenomenon, in Merleau-
Ponty’s case, and the Other, in Levinas’s. Advances in contemporary 
32 Chapter 1
philosophies of immanence give us more and more reason to see this fear 
as unfounded.
Using Kant as a contrastive perspective throughout, I will defend a 
corporeal ontology assembled from and against the phenomenological 
resources of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. Corporeal ontology signifies a 
view of the subject as embedded in, immanent to, extended throughout, 
continuous with, and generated by its material environment and every 
one of the other bodies that populate it. This is not an endorsement of 
reductionism. On the contrary, it is partly a phenomenological thesis, and 
I will use phenomenological evidence to support it. I insist, however, that 
we need to move beyond the phenomenological perspective in order to 
account for the elements of embodied subjectivity that phenomenology’s 
agent-centered methodology often disregards or puts out of play. This 
requires a careful articulation of the materiality of the body and its genesis, 
one which staves off reductionism and ventures certain speculative remarks 
about the life of the body. In short, the phenomenology of the body requires 
a non-phenomenological supplement in order to provide a comprehensive 
account of embodiment. I provide this supplement by attending to the 
sensitive/sensory25 life of the body, by reworking the concept of sensation, 
and by enlisting a number of critics of phenomenology to build a theory of 
embodiment that remains forever nascent in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas.
In recent decades contemporary philosophy witnessed a turn to 
the body that threatened the dominance of dualist ontologies along 
with the dualist practical philosophies they generate. The literature of 
feminist, race, and queer theory attests to this. As does the literature of 
deconstruction.26 The corporeal turn constitutes one of the most recent 
attempts to develop the post-dualist project and complicate our pictures 
of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and community. This is because the body 
is now largely regarded as the locus of all aspects of subjectivity, not just 
the practical. The mind is no longer conceived as independent from, and 
thus invulnerable to, the operations of its material environment.27 Indeed, 
it is dependent upon and, for some, identical to the environment. More on 
this later. When the subject is conceived as a body, as identical to its body, 
the problems as well as the solutions entailed in dualism begin to wither 
away; the problem of how the mind interacts with the body disappears. 
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But the post-dualist framework also raises a number of new questions, 
particularly about the nature of the subject and the workings of its mind, 
its will, and its freedom to act. These are questions we will address along 
the way, and provide a closer look at in the concluding chapter. Moreover, 
we see the epistemological problem of other minds morph into the 
ontological problems of alterity and individuation. Intercorporeity, rather 
than intersubjectivity, more accurately describes the new problematic. Now, 
instead of asking how we know other beings, we are led to ask how it is 
possible for other beings to be other. What constitutes their difference and 
what makes possible our interaction with them? What is the nature of this 
interaction and is it possible to avoid violence as I engage the other? How, if 
individuals actually exist, does an individual become autonomous?
In the post-dualist framework the ontological and practical aspects of 
these questions cannot be separated. Because the subject is always already 
embedded in a practical environment and is in every way a historical 
product of that environment, what the subject does must be seen as identical 
to what the subject is. Ethics, politics, and ontology must be regarded 
as enmeshed at the most basic level. The remarks that follow attempt to 
stake out a position on this new terrain and to situate this position in both 
contemporary and historical contexts.
The Permanence of the Problem of Embodiment
Evidence that the embodied subject is currently enjoying great success, 
and will most likely continue to do so in the future, can be gleaned from 
the proliferation of works in feminist philosophy, critical race theory, and 
environmental philosophy, to name just a few of the places where the body 
is at the center of analysis. The continuing interest in the work of Merleau-
Ponty and the emphatic return of Spinoza in disparate disciplines from 
political philosophy (Negri, Balibar) to neuroscience (Damasio), as well as 
recent attempts to retrieve the embodied dimension of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, 
and Heidegger lend further credence to the claim that the embodied subject 
is uprooting its Cartesian counterpart.28 This suggests that the recurrent 
narrative which laments the forgetting or denigration of the body in the 
Western philosophical tradition is losing its timeliness. This is a promising, 
if modest, victory over entrenched philosophical prejudices. Perhaps 
34 Chapter 1
even more suggestive is the fact that the body has gained momentum in 
the philosophy of mind, particularly in studies of the embodied mind, a 
movement driven by thinkers like George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Andy 
Clark, Alva Noë, Evan Thompson, Shaun Gallagher, Francisco Varela, 
Bernard Andrieu, Antonio Damasio, and Eugene Gendlin. This movement 
seeks to provide a non-dualist, post-Cartesian solution to the mind-body 
problem that not only takes seriously the progress of cognitive science, but 
also honors the first-person phenomenological perspective.
As Lakoff and Johnson acknowledge in their popular Philosophy in 
the Flesh, the embodied mind program owes a tremendous debt to the 
researches of pragmatism, especially the work of John Dewey, as well as 
the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. “We want to honor the two greatest 
philosophers of the embodied mind,” write Lakoff and Johnson.
John Dewey, no less than Merleau-Ponty, saw that our bodily 
experience is the primal basis for everything we can mean, 
think, know, and communicate. He understood the full 
richness, complexity, and philosophical importance of bodily 
experience.29
Although the challenge to Western dualism expounded in their text restricts 
its engagement with Dewey and Merleau-Ponty to introductory remarks, 
Johnson’s more recent book, The Meaning of the Body, delves further into the 
philosophical debt incurred by embodiment theorists working alongside or 
as cognitive scientists.
The increased visibility of the body in the study of consciousness and 
subjectivity does not necessarily entail the reduction of the mind to the 
brain, or consciousness to synaptic/neural activity, although this is one 
possible outcome.30 The interrogation of the body has produced a fertile 
variety of approaches, which have in turn yielded a range of unforeseeable 
problems and possibilities for rethinking the constitution of the body, its 
relations, and its place in the order of things, concepts, and meanings. 
Many of these approaches can be called materialist, but we must be 
careful not to assume that the embodied perspective always implies 
physicalism or positivism. As Johnson insists: “The brain is not the mind. 
The brain is one key part of the entire pattern of embodied organism-
environment interaction that is the proper locus of mind and meaning.”31 
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This interaction is comprised of several irreducible dimensions: the 
biological, social, ecological, cultural, and phenomenological.32 Indeed, 
Johnson offers a naturalistic thesis that is difficult to construe as reductive: 
“Meaning,” he writes, 
is not just a matter of concepts and propositions, but also 
reaches down into the images, sensorimotor schemas, feelings, 
qualities, and emotions that constitute our meaningful 
encounter with our world. Any adequate account of meaning 
must be built around the aesthetic dimensions that give our 
experience its distinctive character and significance.33
It would seem that a balanced union of the material and meaningful 
remains a live option for both analytic and continental philosophers. As it 
should, if we desire a comprehensive account of experience. Like Johnson, I 
think this balance is best struck in the aesthetic dimension.
In my view one of the most important efforts made by the embodied 
mind folks is their attempt to undo the prejudice which says that our 
qualitative, imaginative, affective, and aesthetic experiences are merely 
subjective. This prejudice, as I have already indicated, only holds up in 
an ontology that sees subject and object, body and world, as inhabiting 
two distinct ontological realms, one internal and one external. What 
contemporary cognitive science is showing, however, is that the subjective 
(internal) and objective (external) worlds are actually continuous with 
each other.34 The mind, in short, is extended throughout the environment 
and the environment permeates the mind just as much. Such evidence 
has consequences—which I will try to elucidate throughout—for how 
we conceive the structure of subjectivity as well as individuality and 
relationality. It suggests that “there is no Cartesian dualistic person” and 
that “there exists no Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute 
freedom and a transcendent reason that correctly dictates what is and isn’t 
moral.”35 Given that the post-dualist perspective undermines the basic 
distinction between internal psychic life and external corporeal life, theories 
of subjectivity are forced to acknowledge the essentially liminal nature 
of experience: all experience is a product of the body’s transactions with 
environmental infrastructure and the other bodies that populate it. To quote 
Johnson again,
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meaningful form comes from the nature of our bodies and 
the patterns of interaction we have with our environment, and 
it is therefore shaped by our values, interests, and purposes 
as active agents. As Dewey insisted—and cognitive science 
confirms—thought is never wholly divorced from feeling, 
value, and the aesthetics of our embodied experience.36
Merleau-Ponty likewise advocates a transactional view of embodiment 
that we will explore in the following two chapters. For now it is enough 
to note that the classical dualist position not only proves itself prejudicial, 
since its terms have lost their reference it has become literally senseless. In 
order to foster the post-dualist perspective we have to unpack the carnal 
life of the body in its liminal aspects, at its points of intersection with other 
bodies, and once again see the aesthetics of embodiment as integral to 
subjectivity. Note that aesthetics here denotes the comprehensive sensory life 
of the body, including works of fine art and the qualities of everyday life. 
Throughout this book I am understanding aesthetics in an expanded sense 
that includes everything from the mundane to the fine, the participatory 
to the spectacular. Aesthetic events can be contemplative or deliberate, 
automatic or reactionary. Following Yuriko Saito, “the aesthetic” for me 
includes “any reactions we form toward the sensuous and/or design qualities 
of any object, phenomenon, or activity.”37 But it also includes active 
responses, as well as—and especially—those that we do not consciously 
form. Concomitantly, sensation denotes the currency with which these body-
world transactions take place.
At least since Heidegger phenomenology has defended a non-dualist 
thesis as it struggled against the prejudices of objectivism and dualism. 
There are, of course, countless non-phenomenological precursors to 
this general perspective: Parmenides and Anaximander; the atomists 
Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius; Hobbes and Spinoza; Marx and 
Nietzsche; the American pragmatists. While the philosophers working 
on embodied mind acknowledge and cite from some of these historical 
resources, the fruits of their labors are often attributed to the latest research 
in cognitive science, cognitive linguistics, or emotion theory. This not only 
obscures the history of the problem of embodiment, it also passes over a 
rich and conflicted body of literature which has much to contribute to the 
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contemporary scientific debate. Such methodological decisions tend to 
reinforce the view that phenomenology is only valuable as a speculative, 
or merely theoretical, supplement to the sciences of the mind and that it 
lacks rigor or legitimacy when conducted on its own terms. Thus, Johnson 
admits that “phenomenology leads us to the primacy of movement, but 
it alone is not enough to prove the case. What is required additionally is 
empirical research from the cognitive sciences of the embodied mind.”38 
While I do feel that phenomenology is best practiced synthetically, that is, 
in conjunction with the human and natural sciences, I think we need to be 
careful not to place it in the role of science’s servant, or to underestimate/
reduce its contribution to embodiment research.39 Thus the necessity, 
assumed here, of excavating the history of French phenomenology to 
reveal the affinities and disparities between Levinas’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
contributions to twentieth-century philosophy of the body, as well as 
their relevance to contemporary embodiment studies. When considered 
on their own terms I see the aesthetics of Levinas and Merleau-Ponty as 
indispensable for reconciling a pluralistic conception of embodiment, even if 
ultimately the two thinkers hold incompatible metaphysical positions.
A promising route opened up by the corporeal turn in philosophy 
offers the chance to rethink concepts that have been criticized right out 
of theoretical discourse. One of these concepts is sensation. Sensation is 
a concept with a confused history and a shifting, equivocal identity.40 It is 
often conflated with or subsumed by perception, as exemplified in the term 
“sense-perception.” It is often relegated to the realm of internal, mental 
states or reduced to physical stimulation. It is a concept that has been left 
behind because it belongs to a surpassed ontological and epistemological 
model, a simplistic causal theory of perception. The installation of the 
body at the center of the theory of subjectivity and the apparent collapse 
of the subject-object divide effected by Kant and post-Kantian idealism, 
however, has forced us to produce new ontologies and to attend to the 
new philosophical problems which result from this shift in perspective. 
Therefore, I would like to keep open the following question: What happens 
when our bodies interact with their sensory (aesthetic) environment? Entailed in 
this question is a series of ontological considerations that bear on the nature, 
power, and constitution of the body; the problem of corporeal individuation; 
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the natural-artificial and human-nonhuman distinctions; the ethics of 
intercorporeal interaction; the reality of violence and death; as well as the 
problem of how to conceive sensation vis-à-vis perception and cognition. If 
sensation cannot be comprehended adequately by dualism, the possibilities 
for revitalizing sensation in the post-dualist landscape are multiple.
Situated at the intersection of the philosophy and science of the body, 
the fecundity of embodied mind theories would be enough to warrant a 
closer inspection of the history of the problem of the body. At the same 
time, given the promise of such research it is important to catalogue the 
nuances of the philosophical history of the body, and to raise and respond to 
the metaphysical questions it poses for contemporary studies. That is what 
this book does.
General Thesis
Phenomenology provides numerous resources for addressing the problem of 
sensation and for thinking through its place in corporeal ontology. Indeed, 
sensation constitutes the material basis of this ontology. The narrative I 
will weave about sensation tells how the return of the body has enabled the 
retrieval of sensation as a philosophically rich concept. Claiming Levinas 
and Merleau-Ponty as allies, I defend the thesis that sensation forms the 
basis of our intentional and intercorporeal experience. It immanently orients 
and integrates our bodies. It is pre-perceptual, pre-conceptual, and pre-
personal, and its diachrony introduces a fundamental instability into the 
world of perception.
Phenomenology relies on a certain distance between perceiver and 
perceived, a distance which posits “phenomena” as the objects intended by 
subjects. Consciousness, for phenomenology, is always already polarized 
in this way; it is the point of departure for any phenomenological analysis. 
But if the body is constituted immanently, which is to say, generated by 
the material world, then the polarization of consciousness must itself 
be explained. When and how is the gap between subject and object 
introduced, ontologically speaking? Phenomenology does not ask this 
question. The primary relation between body and world maintained by 
phenomenology becomes methodologically problematic to explain for 
phenomenology as such. Without the distance afforded by intentionality, 
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which opens up and sutures the gap between perceiver and perceived, it 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, for phenomena to be apprehended 
as proper objects of reflection. I contend that the immanence of 
sensation bypasses the intentional gap, and therefore evades any possible 
phenomenological intuition.
Sensation lacks the transcendence necessary for the phenomenological 
observer to figure it against a background; it thus never rises to the level of 
explicit attention. As soon as it does it becomes perception, an afterimage 
of itself. Sensation’s contours are never entirely defined or apparent and 
sensations transpire as non-phenomenal/non-intentional events. This notion 
contests Merleau-Ponty’s crucial thesis that “a figure on a background is 
the simplest sense-given [la donnée sensible] available to us….”41 Against 
his thesis I maintain that sensation makes sense (sens) and gives direction 
(sens) to our bodies at a pre-intentional level. To make good on this counter-
claim and to unpack the dimensions of sensation, my view of embodiment 
synthesizes phenomenological and non-phenomenological perspectives that 
yield a metaphysical realism about sensation. This synthetic view impels us 
to build an ethics and politics that cultivate our aesthetic environment in 
enabling and affirmative ways.
Kant’s Aesthetics and Critique of Sensibility
For historical context it is instructive to start with the Kantian legacy 
that remains so powerful in contemporary philosophy. Kant carries out 
an analysis of the aesthetic capacity of the subject in the early parts of the 
Critique of Pure Reason. His analysis marks a turning point in the history 
of the concept of sensation and exemplifies an attitude which still holds 
considerable influence today. To summarize Kant’s impact it is fair to say 
that after him the legitimacy of sensation—as a unit of experience—becomes 
suspect; today it is permissible to lay claim to perceptions (composed, 
understood sensations), but sensations themselves are relegated to an 
amorphous, inaccessible, and ultimately unspeakable ontological plane that 
is never accessed by perception or cognition. Kant cannot afford to discard 
sensation completely, however, or else he would run the double risk of (1) 
succumbing to the absolute and subjective idealisms he argues against and 
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(2) admitting that our representations correspond to nothing that actually 
presents itself to us.
The Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason lays out 
both the a priori and empirical components of sensibility. It radically claims 
that space and time, the so-called pure forms of intuition, are contributed 
to experience by the subject, they are not objective realities as in Newton’s 
model. It also claims that the content of our intuitions, sensation, is 
provided by the objects we directly intuit in the world. In this respect Kant is 
an externalist about sensation. In his account of the subject-object relation, 
as well as his understanding of the subject as agent of thought and action, 
Kant is Cartesian in spirit; but he decisively advances beyond the Cartesian 
view by endowing the subject with the power to constitute the form of its 
world. Following Kant, Hegel will deploy a brand of phenomenology to 
criticize Kant’s residual dualism, but Hegel also sacrifices the autonomy of 
objects along with the reality of sensations.
What is missing in all three of these views (Descartes, Kant, Hegel) is 
the practical or embodied dimension of sensation, or affirmation that it 
is sensation that delivers the materiality of the world to sensibility. Such 
affirmation can be traced back to the ancient atomists as well as Aristotle 
and later empiricists. It seems that Kant and Hegel, and to a lesser degree 
Descartes, are concerned only with the epistemological or logical value of 
sensation, a fact which leads them to minimize the ontological consequences 
of the sensory encounter that takes place between the world and the body 
of the observer.42 Put otherwise, what they lack is a sense of the volatility 
attending sensibility and its function as immanent interface between sensing 
subject and aesthetic environment. A brief look at Kant’s Transcendental 
Aesthetic in the first Critique reveals a failure to acknowledge the potential 
ontological disruption or diachrony harbored by sensibility. Davide Panagia 
aptly reminds us, however, that the immediacy of aesthetic experience 
(i.e., sensation) in Kant’s third Critique “ungrounds our subjectivity.” But 
Panagia explicitly means the subject as an agent of interestedness, judgment, 
and classification. Thus, what is ungrounded by sensation is the control the 
subject wields over the sensible, not the subject itself.43 Entailed in Kant’s 
oversight is the question of the legitimacy of his epistemological claim 
that sensory content is given unsynthesized by objects, that an object’s 
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qualitative unity is the product of subjective synthesis. Interrogating 
Kant on this point provides a bridge to the tacit idealism of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, against which both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas launch 
their philosophical programs.
The Copernican revolution effected by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
ripples throughout contemporary philosophy. Its impact on modern and 
postmodern European philosophy, that is, the continental tradition, is 
nothing short of foundational. Indeed, it is not inaccurate to cite the 
Critical philosophy of Kant as the very origin of continental philosophy.44 
Given Kant’s general importance in this history and his influence on the 
phenomenological movement in particular, it is necessary to delineate a 
few key points contained in his view. I will focus exclusively here on his 
view of sensation and his theory of sensibility since these are the theoretical 
objects under immediate consideration. This will enable us to draw a parallel 
between Kant and Husserl in order to connect the Kantian revolution, or 
what might be called the institution of constructivist epistemology,45 to the 
institution of phenomenology. Much contemporary philosophy regards 
Kant’s suturing together of subject and object to be nearly incontestable. 
Subject and object are codependent terms; their real distinction has 
collapsed. Against this claim I submit evidence that subjects and objects 
retain a kind of autonomy even if this autonomy is always caught up in 
relations. This is an idea that both Kant and I endorse, but there is evidence 
in Kant’s own texts to suggest that his endorsement is not consistent with 
his constructivism, but akin to a metaphysical breach of his critical method. 
The burden falls on me to unpack this allegation.
The power and impact of Kant’s irrevocable fusion of subject and object 
institutes our contemporary episteme, the era of what Quentin Meillassoux 
calls “correlationism.” Correlationism is shorthand for the entrenched post-
critical viewpoint which “consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible 
to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one 
another.” On this account, it may be legitimate to speculate about objects 
in themselves, but it is impossible to either think or know them. This view 
pervades so much philosophy after Kant that Meillassoux is compelled to 
conclude that “the central notion of modern philosophy since Kant seems to 
be that of correlation.” Meillassoux continues:
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By “correlation” we mean the idea according to which we only 
ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, 
and never to either term considered apart from the other. We 
will henceforth call correlationism any current of thought which 
maintains the unsurpassable character of the correlation so 
defined. Consequently, it becomes possible to say that every 
philosophy which disavows naïve realism has become a variant 
of correlationism.46
Phenomenology, as the philosophy/science which studies phenomena 
as they appear to consciousness, is by definition correlationism. One might 
even say that the subject-object correlation is the proper object of 
phenomenological analysis. This does not mean, however, that everything 
a phenomenologist writes reinforces or supports correlationism. I will try 
to make the correlationism of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas clear, as well as 
highlight the points at which their philosophies contest the primacy of the 
correlation. The remarkable tenacity of correlationism poses an obstacle to 
any metaphysical realism, including the one I espouse here. Constructivism 
is usually the default position of contemporary philosophy; its truth seems 
uncontestable.
Kant’s revolutionary position, which holds that the objects of perception 
receive their form from—and so must conform to—our cognition, rather 
than our cognition to objects,47 takes root, as noted, in the first Critique’s 
Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant is concerned there not with a theory of the 
beautiful or a philosophy of art, but with the subject’s capacity to receive 
sensory input from the external world. Sensibility is our capacity to be 
affected by objects; it is how objects are given to us.48 He offers a theory of 
sensibility which is formulated in part as a response to classical empiricist 
accounts of sense experience, particularly those of the British empiricists, 
Hume and Hutcheson, for example. Kant agrees with the empiricists that 
cognition must begin with the experience of some object, but he contests 
the claim that all our knowledge is built up from what is given empirically, 
that is, from sensations. “There can be no doubt that all our cognition 
begins with experience,” writes Kant. “But,” he adds, “even though all our 
cognition starts with experience, that does not mean that all of it arises 
from experience.”49 He makes this distinction to set up a refutation of 
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empiricism, but also because he understands “experience” to be a composite 
phenomenon assembled from impressions received by the intellect. Once 
impressions are received the intellect applies concepts, either subsequently 
or simultaneously, to produce experience. Outside this production, which 
occurs within the subject-object correlation, there is nothing to experience. 
Ordinarily we believe the content of experience is given externally. But, 
says Kant, “long practice has made us attentive to [the cognitive element 
of all experience] and skilled in separating it from the basic material,” 
provided by sense impressions.50 Since experience is always more than 
the reception of sensory content, the given is never received in basic, raw 
form. That is, sensations are never received as sensations. How can Kant 
claim that they are given, then? Or rather, if sensations are always already 
worked up by the cognitive apparatus, what apart from linguistic necessity 
allows Kant to claim that anything like pure, unsynthesized sensory 
content exists at all? His schematic requires the concept of sensation, or the 
sensory manifold, to account for the content of experience, but beyond its 
basic architectonic value sensation seems to play no formative role in the 
constitution of experience. Nor does it have any influence on our capacity to 
constitute experience.
The empiricist position involves what Merleau-Ponty calls the “prejudice 
of the objective world.” The Phenomenology of Perception thoroughly criticizes 
and opposes this prejudice with a non-Kantian alternative which maintains 
that knowledge of the world arises out of firsthand acquaintance with 
objects in themselves. Kant maintains that there is an objective (noumenal) 
world in itself beyond the (phenomenal) reach of perception, but that 
this noumenal world is unknowable. Merleau-Ponty eschews the notion 
of an objective realm that exists apart from the phenomenal, in favor of 
a theory which posits that the objects we perceive just are the objects of 
the noumenal world. These objects are constituted and individuated in 
perception, our only means of knowing them. He follows Kant to a degree, 
then, but transfers the constitutive power of Kant’s transcendental subject 
to the body’s capacity for “practical synthesis.” Merleau-Ponty writes, “It 
is not through an intellectual synthesis which would freely posit the total 
object that I am led from what is given to what is not actually given; that 
I am given, together with the visible sides of the object, the invisible sides 
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as well. It is, rather, a kind of practical synthesis.”51 The act of synthesis, 
or the individuation of objects, is said to occur through the body’s 
commerce with things (Merleau-Ponty) rather than in the understanding 
or imagination (Kant).52 For both thinkers, however, it is sense impressions 
that are purportedly synthesized. To see why this is true of Merleau-
Ponty, who is often read as championing the priority of objects over sense 
impressions, we will eventually have to look closely at his concept of “sense 
experience” (sentir).
Kant’s epistemological treatment of sensation has a clear ontological 
significance which contrasts with the view that sensations are purely internal 
events. Sensation denotes the material to be processed into experience by 
the understanding, and in this respect they are external or objective content. 
They are what instigate the production of experience. Kant writes: “The 
effect of an object on our capacity for [re]presentation, insofar as we are 
affected by the object, is sensation.”53 The material of sensation is provided 
to the subject from outside; it emanates from the objects which reside in the 
noumenal realm, the things in themselves. But Kant’s epistemology, as is 
well known, has an uneasy time establishing the ontological divide between 
subjective and objective, phenomenon and noumenon, nor can he justify 
any causal interaction between these pairs.54 His constructivism should 
prohibit any reference to things in themselves, as things are only knowable 
through phenomenal experience understood in a composite sense of the 
following sort:
Sensations + Concepts = Experience
This makes Kant’s account of the givenness of sensation either speculative 
fantasy (something the critical project aims to quell) or what Hegel calls a 
formal, “lifeless schema.”55 In either case, Kant undermines the volatility of 
sensation by situating it in a space inaccessible to the cognitive machinery of 
the transcendental subject—the noumenal. This is effectively what Samuel 
Todes argues in his somewhat neglected Body and World when he advances 
the thesis that Kant “imaginizes” perception and the ego and thereby 
underplays the materiality of subjectivity.56 Todes’s argument assembles 
roughly phenomenological evidence against Kant that is meant to show 
that the subject is not a disembodied, transcendental synthesizer of sensory 
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content, but is itself a product of that content. Todes’s thesis is worth 
revitalizing.
Todes argues for a pre-Kantian thesis, but from a post-Kantian/
phenomenological perspective. Against the Copernican revolution, he 
reasserts the idea that knowledge must conform to objects; more than 
that, he contends that the subject itself must also conform.57 This is a 
consequence of the fact that perception is fundamentally practical, while 
only secondarily conceptual or imaginative. “On our view,” writes Todes, 
“imagination presupposes practical perception because we must first 
become somebody by practical experience in the given world, before we can 
achieve self-expression and self-discovery by making a world of our own.”58 
Our worldly productions, whether intellectual or material, are initiated in 
response to the world as it is found and as it demands to be handled. It is 
in the handling that we come know that this world is something other than 
what we make it.
Kant believes that he can ascertain from experience some a priori 
knowledge of the world, such as the pure forms of intuition: space and time. 
But a priori knowledge cannot guarantee that any content exists outside 
of experience and its transcendental conditions, only that when content 
is represented the form of its presentation is contributed by the subject. 
Consequently, it becomes difficult to explain how the subject could come 
into contact with, let alone find itself shaped by, truly autonomous objects 
or sensory content. For Todes, it is in the practical field of perception where 
objects await our interaction, yet even this lends no certainty about the 
reality of objects.59 The phenomenal evidence of the perceptual field, writes 
Todes, determines the incorrigible existence of any given object “by way of 
some effective response to that object, and culminates by determining it as 
circumstantially outside us. This response, however, determines not merely 
the perceptual object upon which it is directed, but also the percipient 
from which it issues.”60 Only the dialogical interaction that occurs between 
the body and objects, so central to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
perception, can evince the material existence of these two terms. For Todes 
as much as Merleau-Ponty, this dialogism gives the subject and object 
their particular form. It is not the spontaneous synthesis of the ego which 
performs this feat, it is the responsiveness of the active body with all its 
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specific determinations: upright posture,61 front-back asymmetry,62 physical 
disability, gravitational attunement, institutional orientation, and so forth. 
This may not be enough to establish the autonomous reality of things, but 
it shifts attention away from the idea that space, time, and object-unity are 
products of the mind. The body is instead brought into focus, specifically as 
dependent upon what is outside it.
Todes raises a now common criticism of the Kantian subject when he 
claims that Kant “has no sense of how practice makes the practitioner.”63 For 
Kant, the world is but a reflection of our constitutive (imaginative, cognitive) 
capacities and we come to know ourselves only by first generating this world 
in experience. This puts him in the difficult position of accounting for how 
the material world is capable of shaping us at the most fundamental level. 
Against Kant, Todes aligns himself with many contemporary exponents 
of embodiment, both phenomenological and materialist, who insist that 
subjects are produced as they explore and interact bodily with their 
environment, not before.64
It is possible to argue that Kant does not completely absent the body 
from his account of subjectivity. Angelica Nuzzo maintains that the body is 
far from missing in Kant’s equation. If we look to the Critique of Judgment, 
for instance, we see the embodied dimension of sensibility highlighted by 
Kant. The experience of pleasure and displeasure in the face of aesthetic 
phenomena, notes Nuzzo, allow us to “feel ourselves a part of living (i.e., 
sensible) nature.”65 This pivotal feeling is basically corporeal. She concludes 
that “[Kant’s] general aim is to attribute to human sensibility a new 
central place in philosophy, thereby steering the philosophical focus from 
the metaphysics of a ‘disembodied soul’ to the inquiry into an ‘embodied 
mind’.” In sum, Kant’s modern view of sensibility is broad enough to 
encompass “the entire realm of the sensual: affections, intuition, sensation, 
feeling, and imagination.”66
In her book Ideal Embodiment Nuzzo contends that Kant’s theory 
of sensibility is actually a theory of embodied sensibility and that 
“transcendentally, the knowing subject of Kant’s epistemology, the moral 
agent of his pure ethics, and the evaluating subject of his aesthetic theory 
of judgment is a rational embodied being.”67 Specifically, for Kant, the 
transcendental field is governed by a left/right asymmetry that corresponds 
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to the asymmetry of our hands, and thus the a priori form of space (the 
formal aspect of sensible intuition) has the comportment of the body 
built right into it.68 More than an empirical fact, this asymmetry is a 
transcendental condition of any possible experience.
Nuzzo gives plenty of evidence for the embodied dimension of Kant’s 
transcendental sensibility in her analysis of his aesthetic theory.69 She 
shows that Kant’s innovative moment arrives when he makes the body 
a transcendental condition for aesthetics, a condition which is “formal” 
and “ideal,” but at the same time corporeal.70 We find Levinas eventually 
pursuing something analogous but less formal. For Kant, sensibility is 
the active reception of objects given and is “responsible for the fact that 
we are able to confront the reality of given objects.”71 But sensibility’s 
activity extends further, since it also produces representations of objects 
and does so immediately, unlike thought, which is always mediated by 
sensibility. Sensibility guarantees that sensations received are never without 
form. Since Kant distinguishes between intuition and sensation he can 
designate intuitions as having objective content while assigning sensations 
a representational/subjective role as the formal effect of objects on our 
sensibility.
Nuzzo’s attempt to display the embodied element of Kantian cognition 
is emblematic of the broader concern with embodiment in contemporary 
philosophy. One of a plethora of recent attempts to retrieve the body, it 
testifies to the inadequacy of the now-familiar narrative which laments 
the Western philosophical tradition’s neglect of the body. I hesitate to 
contest Nuzzo’s reading of Kant because she provides a compelling 
reading of Kant’s aesthetics. Indeed, I do not think we are forced to either 
acknowledge the body in Kant or lament its absence. The question of 
Kantian embodiment is instead a matter of degree. Despite the embodied 
elements of Kantian cognition pinpointed by Nuzzo, the receptive function 
of sensibility must remain subservient to sensibility’s formal aspect, as well 
as the activity of the understanding, in his philosophy. Consequently, Kant 
provides us with an account of sensing that tames sensation by reducing it 
to a logical placeholder in his diagram of aesthetic experience.72 In other 
words, sensations are inferred from experience, not encountered in it. They 
can be conceived, but not perceived.
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The question remains: How does the transcendental ego/body make 
contact with the material world? Looking to the first Critique, it would have 
to be through sensibility, since all rational judgment must pass through 
the senses. We have already seen, however, the problem with considering 
objects and sensations as given corporeally on the Kantian model. Kant 
distinguishes between intuition and sensation. Whereas sensation is simply 
empirical, or objectively given, intuition is simultaneously transcendental 
and empirical. Since we only ever intuit the appearance of objects, and 
therefore apprehend objects only through an a priori formality that provides 
them with the space and time in which they reside, we are prevented from 
claiming that sensation actually comes from somewhere, let alone that it is 
given materially. In other words, if sensations come from objects, but these 
objects cannot exist without the spatiotemporal conditions contributed by 
the subject, then objects cannot be an external source of sensations.
The tension I am trying to bring into relief is roughly this. Kant wants 
to give sensation a non-ideal source, namely, the objects of experience. 
This is to avoid the subjectivist view that when we sense we only ever sense 
our own ideas or ideal content. But the spatiotemporal conditions of these 
objects are provided by the subject. So, if we subtract these conditions, 
what is left is pure sensory qualities without spatial or temporal coordinates, 
something difficult to imagine as anything other than a pure abstraction. If 
Kant’s epistemology cannot actually establish that sensation has a material 
reality, this means that sensation, on his view, cannot be objectively given to 
sensibility, cannot instigate sensing, and cannot give form to the subject.
While the first Critique excludes sensation from the transcendental to 
affirm its non-ideal materiality, the third Critique opens up the embodied 
dimension of sensibility through an analysis of the feeling of pleasure 
and displeasure.73 His analysis identifies the condition—affective (non-
conceptual) intuition—that makes it possible for us to feel our participation 
with sensible nature. Despite Kant’s discussion of affective intuition, I do 
not think he “[strengthens] the connection between sensation and feeling” 
at the ontological level, as Nuzzo suggests.74 Read alongside the Critique 
of Pure Reason the recasting of sensibility in the Critique of Judgment does 
not quite resolve the problem of how to either establish or bridge the gap 
between supposedly objective source of sensation and the subjective feeling 
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of pleasure or displeasure. How can we be confident that our pleasurable 
aesthetic experience is a pleasure taken in something that is other than 
our own representation? Are we permitted on Kant’s view to hold that 
aesthetic pleasure, which is an embodied response to aesthetic phenomena, 
is brought about by sensibility’s reception of real sensations from real 
objects? If it is problematic to claim that sensibility actually receives 
material sensations from outside itself, it is problematic to claim that the 
corporeality of pleasure actually results from the corporeality of sensation. 
Without establishing the corporeality of sensation it is difficult to conceive 
aesthetic experience as an embodied, not just intellectual, response. What 
prevents Kant from achieving this, I suggest, is a wavering commitment 
to correlationism. In other words, his critical project is at once committed 
to the primacy of the subject-object correlation, but he nevertheless wants 
to claim that objects and subjects and objects do enjoy some kind of 
independence from each other. The independence claim finds little if any 
support in Kant’s Critique, however.
Rather than reaching a decisive verdict I simply want to reiterate that 
Kant has effectively, and quite influentially, tamed the effects of sensation by 
insulating the transcendental subject from the material content of cognition. 
Accordingly, Kant’s subject-object dualism, despite its tensions, prohibits 
sensation from actively constituting the subject. Now, I would not dispute 
that Kant has a transcendental view of embodiment, for Nuzzo gives a 
persuasive account. It fails to reunite the body of the subject to the material 
world, however, and this is because her argument explicitly resists such 
a reunion. As a result, the Kantian subject’s identity remains beyond the 
reach of other bodies and material objects. Other bodies, moreover, must 
always be regarded as themselves constituted by the subject’s sensibility 
and understanding. This has two ontological and practical implications 
that call for response. First, it is impossible for the subject’s identity to 
be either formed or deformed by sensation. Second, the otherness of 
the material environment is reduced to the sameness of the subject’s 
representational capacity.
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Taming Sensation With Hegel and Husserl
Kant’s pacification of sensation is ramified in Hegel’s phenomenology. In the 
“Sense-Certainty” section of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel addresses 
the problem of the given by rejecting the existence of a noumenal realm 
that provides the sensory input for cognition to process into workable 
knowledge. Hegel’s refusal to infer the existence of pure sensory content 
eliminates the objectivity of sensation altogether, for it situates this content 
exclusively in subjective representations. This is because there is nowhere 
else to put it. In a sense, the symbiotic relation of subject and object 
disappears for Hegel because the object has become a concept—an ever-
shifting and elusive concept, but a concept nonetheless. Since, for Hegel, 
the world is just the phenomenal appearance of human conceptuality, the 
sensory material of intuition qua non-ideal material becomes superfluous for 
thought. The subject-world correlation retains its primacy, with the result 
that the Hegelian object, more severely than the Kantian, is evacuated of 
its autonomy.
Hegel sees sensation as a prejudicial empiricist concept, one we use to 
explain the phenomena of experience without really comprehending the 
rationality of these phenomena. Sensation only makes sense as a concept 
in one of the infinite succession of appearances that make up the history 
of spirit. These appearances, whose shape derives from the conceptual 
framework used to make sense of phenomena are, as conceptual, presented 
to consciousness by consciousness.75 Hegel’s phenomenology tracks the 
transformation and interplay between these shapes. In the process, the 
sensible world becomes a fable for Hegel. The Phenomenology quickly 
sublates the empiricist prejudice of sense-certainty in its dialectic, replacing 
it with perception as a more advanced order of rationality. What the 
empiricist believes to be the direct apprehension of a singular sensory object 
reveals its truth as the comprehension of an object endowed with universal 
qualities: “So it is in fact the universal that is the true [content] of sense-
certainty,” Hegel says.76 “I have this certainty through something else, viz. 
the thing; and it, similarly, is in sense-certainty through something else, viz. 
through the ‘I’.”77 In Hegel the mediation of the world by the mind becomes 
a total mediation, further ensuring that the alterity and foreignness of the 
world can always be recuperated by the dialectic. Hegel foreshadows that, 
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“In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will arrive at a 
point at which it gets rid of its semblance of being burdened with something 
alien, with what is only for it, and some sort of ‘other’, at a point where 
appearance becomes identical with essence, so that its exposition will 
coincide at just this point with the authentic Science of Spirit.”78
Hegel’s discontent with the formalism of Kant’s portrait of cognition 
induces him to “put flesh on Kant’s architectonic.”79 Hegel’s gripe is 
basically existentialist in character, in that he thinks that Kant is trying to 
understand experience before actually experiencing something.80 This is 
why he begins the Phenomenology with sense experience, a move equivalent 
to jumping right into the stream of consciousness and letting oneself get 
tossed around in its waves, rather than trying to deduce the fluid dynamics 
of these waves from the shore. But it is also telling that he regards sense 
experience as something already shot through with universals, and so 
neither formless nor immediate at all. The stream of consciousness is, in 
effect, shown to be given through perception, not sensation. Such a tactic 
is standard not only for Hegel’s phenomenology, but also for Husserl and 
his followers. Phenomenology of all stripes begins from the premise that we 
do not first experience sense impressions, formless qualities, but perceptual 
objects. The difference is that Hegel does not allow for the transcendence 
of the object; the object is a concept, not a substance existing in the 
material world. If anything, its transcendence is always a transcendence in 
immanence,81 a notion endorsed by both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.82 
Absolute transcendence of the object is prohibited by the methodological 
correlationism of all three thinkers. Just as in Kant, the form of the Hegelian 
object is the product of the conscious subject. But unlike Kant, this object 
has no other truth than the one bestowed upon it by the conceptual eye/I of 
the observer.83
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s ontological dualism targets sensation as a 
source of knowledge, specifically, as the origin of our representations. This 
is a reformulation of the Cartesian criticism of empiricism, demonstrated 
by the wax example in the Meditations, where Descartes shows that what 
we actually perceive in an object as it undergoes myriad qualitative changes 
is nothing sensible—which can only lead to skepticism—but an idea or 
representation. Hegel’s critique of sensation goes further than Cartesian 
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skepticism, however. It leads to the abandonment of the concept of 
sensation as such. Although necessary to recount the odyssey of spirit, 
sensation is just a rudimentary form of experience that bears no certain 
knowledge and can easily be seen as simply prejudicial.
If we turn aside from Hegel’s explicitly epistemological criticism, 
however, it becomes possible to see sensation as something other than a 
means to certainty. What we find in the empiricists, as well as Kant, is the 
idea that sensation is the instigator of experience. As such it possesses a 
certain kind of agency, one that eludes the subject’s power of representation 
and which occasionally threatens its representational capacity. This sense 
of sensation vanishes in the Hegelian dialectic, and it the sense that we are 
trying to recover here.
The material dimension of sensation drops out of Hegel’s 
phenomenology, but not the post-Hegelian phenomenologies of the 
twentieth century, which uncover a different ontology of sensation. In his 
account of subjectivity, Levinas, for instance, revives the affective aspect of 
embodiment and champions sensation as a kind of element that nourishes 
the life of the body. Sensation also eludes and disrupts any attempt to 
fix in a system of representation. There is nothing like this in Hegelian 
phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty, like Levinas, is not interested in working 
through the old epistemological debate. He instead constructs a new 
framework for thinking the correlation of body and world, but one which 
retains a vestige of the materiality of sensation. Neither Merleau-Ponty’s 
nor Levinas’s conception of sensation can be circumscribed older models, 
but their novel character is, I think, most striking when refracted through 
those models.84
At stake when breaking with the idealist model that culminates in Hegel 
is not only an embodied conception of the subject, but also a rehabilitation 
of the concept of sensation and a practical philosophy that is founded in the 
aesthetic life of the body, not rooted at the intellectual level, like the Kantian 
imperative. An embodied imperative issues from the site where bodies 
interact with other bodies, where bodily transactions, yields, absorptions, 
resistances, and collisions occur. This is the place where sensations give and 
receive their form. Sensation is at the heart of all encounters, constituting 
and reconstituting the bodies involved. The concept of plasticity, developed 
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as much by the American pragmatists as Catherine Malabou, will be the key 
to understanding this process.
Before turning to his French descendants, it is necessary to note the 
influence of the German idealists on Husserl’s phenomenology. Merleau-
Ponty and Levinas explicitly resist this aspect of Husserl’s heritage. A 
common target is his sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit, idealism, 
which harbors important remnants of both Kant and Hegel. Those who 
would defend Husserl against this charge always seem to be fighting an 
uphill battle. This is because, as Tom Rockmore has shown, Husserl’s 
“position is in constant dialogue with Kant’s critical philosophy, to which 
he comes increasingly closer through the evolution of this position from 
descriptive phenomenology to transcendental idealism.”85 The call back to 
the things themselves has a Kantian ring to it, but for Husserl it is actually 
more like an Hegelian principle: to return not to mind-independent objects, 
but to the immediate phenomena of perceptual experience; proceed with 
reflection from there, without prejudging the matter at hand.86 Despite 
his allegiance to the phenomena as such, however, Husserl retains a basic 
dualism that aligns him with Kant. Mark Rowlands frames the position, 
accurately I think, in these terms:
Whereas for Kant, phenomena, experienceable things, are 
ultimately grounded in a noumenal reality, a reality of non-
experienceable things, Husserl denies that phenomena require 
such grounding. There may or may not exist a transcendent, 
noumenal world, but if there is one we can neither know nor 
say anything at all about it. The physical world of which we 
can speak is not a transcendent world but one that must be 
understood in terms of actual and possible experiences. As 
such, it cannot exist independently of consciousness.87
The famous bracketing of the natural world which initiates the 
phenomenological method remains neutral about the things themselves and 
focuses the phenomenologist’s attention solely on the given as it is given.88 
This means that Husserl—in a gesture of realist solidarity— does not 
discard the thing in itself, like Hegel, but, as a committed phenomenologist 
and with more restraint than Kant, refuses to speak about it. Only natural 
scientists and ordinary folks believe that when they talk about things 
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they talk about the things themselves. But such talk is suspended by the 
phenomenological reduction, which drives a wedge between things in 
themselves and “what is really given in the phenomenological elements of 
representations.”89 Without fully rejecting their reality, Husserl leaves the 
things in themselves to the empirical investigators, and turns his attention to 
“intentional objects,” the proper focus of phenomenological epistemology.
The given for Husserl, then, is not what comes from “outside” us. 
It is what is presented to intentional consciousness within the subject-
object correlation. This includes the sensory material which, for Kant, 
remains a formal abstraction about the external world. So, on the one 
hand, Husserl tacitly retains the noumenon-phenomenon duality, but in a 
neutralized form, while at the same time situating the origin of the given 
in consciousness, and thereby forging another tacit alliance with objective 
idealism. This is the case in Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations, although 
the story is complicated by Husserl’s turn to the body in Ideas II. As for 
objects and their sensible features, Logical Investigations complicates the 
matter further by offering a version of the sensible that is at odds with the 
idealism of Ideas I.
We saw that Kant’s relegation of the material of sensation to the 
noumenal realm, oddly enough, disqualified him from claiming its 
objectivity. Consequently, his dualism has the effect of immunizing the 
subject from the instigation of sensation. Husserl’s idealism, at least in Ideas 
I, has a similar effect: he once again domesticates sensation and mitigates its 
material dimension by subjectivizing it.90 Like Kant and Hegel before him, 
he sees the subject as animating sensory content,91 whereas I would argue, 
alongside Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, that it is sensory content (sensations) 
that animates us. We might pose this point of contrast in terms of what 
could be called the “principle of animation:” against the view which holds 
that the principle of animation is ideal or mental I offer the view that the 
principle of animation originates in the material environment, which means 
that subjects are constituted, practitioners are made, as a corporeal events. 
Phenomenological idealism keeps the materiality of sensation at a distance, 
protects the subject from what would threaten its transcendental privileges. 
It conceives sensibility too intellectually and, consequently, the corporeal 
aspect of experience is drastically compromised.
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It is not easy to figure out the sensory/material or so-called “hyletic” 
layer in Husserl’s image of consciousness. As James Dodd has noted, “it is 
perhaps the most volatile concept in [Husserl’s] corpus.”92 Ideas I explains 
that the notion of a hyletic layer is meant to replace what he called “primary 
contents” in Logical Investigations. Husserl describes primary contents as 
what “would be the contents of ‘external’ sensibility,” although he is quick 
to point out that this does not refer to “some metaphysical distinction of 
outward and inward.” At the level of phenomenological representation, 
then, these primary contents are the intuited ground upon which reflection 
is founded.93 They include all the sensory content given in concrete 
experience, such as color and texture as well as the “sensile impressions 
of pleasure, pain, tickling, etc.”94 Primary contents no longer works as a 
concept in Ideas I so Husserl decides there to speak of “hyle” instead. In 
both cases Husserl is reconstituting what would otherwise be referred to 
as sensation: “sensation is hyle, that is, matter waiting to be charged with 
animating sense, awaiting an apprehension that will give it meaning.”95 
The shift to the language of hyle allows him to emphasize the fact that the 
“sensuous stuff” of consciousness is immanent to, not independent of, 
consciousness.
Ideas I operates with a hylomorphism roughly Kantian in structure: what 
Husserl calls hyletic data are analogous to the first Critique’s sensory given.96 
Intentional acts give form to this data in the same way that the forms of 
intuition operate for Kant, even though Husserl refuses to proclaim that 
hyletic data are subject to an “animating synthesis” and even questions 
whether they play a constitutive role in intentionality.97 The objectivity of 
the hyletic layer must be, as in Kant, inferred from perception: it is never 
experienced in its pure form or given to consciousness, since it is always 
filtered and formed by intentionality. Dodd even suggests that Husserl’s 
idealism is stronger than Kant’s: “Husserl’s strategy is to claim that the 
sources of knowledge are not hidden, but ‘are’ only within an ‘experience’ 
that itself is a unity given in reflection—this is against Kant.”98 The inference 
to a mind-independent hyle is without phenomenological confirmation; it 
is without phenomenological evidence. Just as in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty, 
perception is the most basic mode of access to the given: “The object-giving 
(or dator) intuition of the first, ‘natural’ sphere of knowledge and of all 
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its sciences is natural experience, and the primordial dator experience is 
perception in the ordinary sense of the term,” writes Husserl.99 Nevertheless, 
hyle serves as the ground of constitutive (noetic) acts of consciousness. 
Husserl locates hyle in something posited as non-subjective, the noematic 
nucleus (object essence), which provides the ideal limit of phenomenological 
intuition. The noematic nucleus is what persists throughout all of the 
adumbrations of any given intentional object.100 It is, on Husserl’s view, 
not the product of subjective constitution, but what is revealed through 
phenomenological intuition. Its role is merely formal, simply necessary to 
explain the intentional object’s identity and the source of sensory intuition. 
The fact remains that for Husserl every object, even the “objective” 
noematic nucleus, is a correlate of consciousness.101
A tension similar to the one we noted in Kant is now apparent. If 
the hyletic layer is situated on the side of the subject, a layer of human 
consciousness, but is supposed to provide the non-subjective, non-ideal 
ground of noetic acts, what are we to make of the ontological status of the 
hyletic layer? Husserl is forced to postulate the reality of a non-intentional 
source of hyletic material in order to avoid idealism, but this can only 
occur through a betrayal of his allegiance to the evidence of the given (“the 
principle of principles”). A betrayal of this sort would carry him into the 
kind of realist metaphysics phenomenology wishes to suspend, but at the 
cost of his method’s integrity.
Husserl distinguishes sensibility from the hyle which functions as 
the material basis of meaning-giving acts of consciousness.102 He further 
distinguishes sensibility and hyle from the animating acts of consciousness, 
or noeses. He regards the hyletic layer, both formally and functionally, as 
“objective” while designating the phenomenal data of sensibility as the 
“subjective” manifestation of hyletic material. He writes: 
Both [hyle and sensibility] together compelled the old transfer 
of the originally narrower meaning of sensibility to the spheres 
of sentiment and will, to the intentional experiences, namely, 
in which sensory data of the spheres here indicated play their 
part as functioning “materials.”103
He concludes that “we need a new term which shall express the whole 
group through its unity of function and its contrast with the formative 
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characters….” This new term is “hyle,” and it circumscribes both 
the affective and sensuous material that is formed by intentional acts 
and instilled with meaning by consciousness.104 The formative acts of 
consciousness are designated as “psychical” in order to distinguish 
them from the corporeal and sensory,105 but Husserl also emphasizes in 
response to Brentano’s psychologism that both the noetic (Brentano’s 
“psychical”) and the material (Brentano’s “physical”) fall within “the 
stream of phenomenological being.”106 In short, both the matter and form of 
perception are located fully within consciousness. Sensation is stripped of its 
non-ideal, objective dimension.107
Because Ideas I is primarily concerned with the correlation of intentional 
acts and intentional objects, insofar as this correlation can be given a 
transcendental sense, the investigation of sensory material for its own sake 
remains subordinate to the project of transcendental phenomenology. In 
Husserl’s words, an engagement with sensory material as such, or a “pure 
hyletics,” “wins significance from the fact that it furnishes a woof that can 
enter into the intentional tissue, material that can enter into intentional 
formations.”108 Ideas I is then not the best place to find Husserl engaged 
with the corporeality of sensation, even if it is representative of his nascent 
philosophical perspective. It is better to look at Ideas II, where sensation 
(Empfindung) is dealt with explicitly with respect to the body and where 
the hylomorphic structure of consciousness—which regards sensation as 
amorphous and innocuous—is contested.109
Since Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the lived body (corps propre) is an 
extension Husserl’s lived body (Leib) in Ideas II, it suffices to indicate here 
that Husserl’s account of sensation in this text is quite different than the 
theory of hyle in Ideas I or primary contents in Logical Investigations. As Alia 
Al-Saji reads it, the second book of Ideas shows Husserl focusing “on the 
way the lived Body is constituted through the localization of … sensings 
[Empfindnisse], i.e., the particular lived spatiality of the Body.”110 This is 
the prototypical concept of sensation I will try to elicit from the works of 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, as well as defend as the concept most faithful 
to the aesthetic life of our bodies. It is one which attends to the affective 
and kinaesthetic life of the body and, perhaps most importantly, reveals the 
materiality of sensation and the subject’s reliance on this materiality.111
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Sense Data and the Aesthetics of Embodiment
We have sketched some of the problematic aspects of the idealist and/or 
constructivist treatment of sensation, focusing specifically on where it locates 
sensation vis-à-vis the subject. In the case of Kant, sensation is found on 
the far side of cognition among the things in themselves. For the Husserl of 
Ideas I, sensation as hyle appears within consciousness, and merely functions 
as the “external” layer of intentional acts. In both cases, sensation is cut off 
from the body allowed to neither enable nor threaten the constitution of the 
subject as such. By contrast, classical analytic philosophers sympathetic to 
empirical realism, Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer, for example, often speak 
of sensations (as opposed to sense data) as internal or subjective signs for 
something objectively given. Here is Russell: “Let us give the name ‘sense-
data’ to the things that are immediately known in sensation,” like color, 
texture, and so on. “We shall give the name ‘sensation’ to the experience of 
being immediately aware of these things.”112 With this distinction Russell 
draws the conclusion that we can infer the existence of objects which 
might cause our sensations, but these do not appear directly to the mind. 
Russell continues: 
Thus the various sensations due to various pressures or 
various parts of the body cannot be supposed to reveal directly 
any definite property of the table, but at most to be signs of 
some property which perhaps causes all the sensations, but is 
not actually apparent in any of them.113
This view of sensation is articulated within a realist ontology that posits 
discrete, fully formed objects existing outside the mind. Epistemologically 
speaking, these objects are made known to us through the sense data they 
transmit to consciousness. The process of perceiving and knowing thus 
begins in the object. Our minds subsequently reconstitute this data into 
the objects we perceive as outside us. When our reconstitutions correspond 
to the object in itself, we can claim knowledge of the object as it really is. 
Merleau-Ponty thoroughly criticizes this model under the name of the 
“constancy hypothesis” (PP 7-12/13-19) and in so doing steps through the 
door, opened by Husserl’s Ideas II, to an embodied view of sensation.114 The 
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other trouble with Russell’s view, and the empiricist view more generally, is 
well-documented by the idealist and constructivist response to empiricism.
My sympathy for the empiricist view is greater than Merleau-Ponty’s. 
Despite its epistemological difficulties, the metaphysical realist in me likes 
that empiricism affirms the autonomous existence and qualitative unity of 
objects. Russell’s sense data hypothesis, however, is problematic for at least 
a couple reasons. I think it is wrong to conceive sensation as internal, or as 
some kind of epiphenomenon of the mind. It is more than just a feeling or 
the subjective correlate of a physiological stimulus. Sensation provides a 
direct link to the world of objects, animals, people, and qualities. They are 
what transmit objects to the body, and to which objects respond, whether 
practically, intellectually, or aesthetically. This transmission is, however, a 
bidirectional communication and exchange. On this construal sensations 
are seen as in some way external to the mind; however, this exteriority is not 
the whole story. If it were, then an unbridgeable ontological chasm would 
open between sensing subjects and the sensible world, replacing the equally 
objectionable subject-world correlation. There must be some bridge between 
external sensory content and sensibility. Sensation is that bridge.
Sensations travel. Every object possesses a unified sensory identity 
that can be apprehended or received by other objects. Its identity is 
transmittable, which is why it is possible to sense objects. Since sensing 
is not the literal consumption of an object, we might say that sensing is 
the reception, or taking in, of the object’s sensory identity. There must be 
some way, then, that the object’s qualities are detached and dispatched 
to our sensibility. There is, of course, a physical explanation for how this 
happens. Instead, what I am interested in exploring is the metaphysical 
aspect of sensation, for there are elements of sensation and sensing that 
are not accounted for by causal, mechanical, or even phenomenological 
models. Consequently, given the metaphysical nature of my project, I 
do not offer this text as a contribution to the embodied mind/embodied 
cognition literature, nor do I engage that literature at any great length. I do 
borrow from it at times. So, while it has much to say about the dynamics 
of sensation and perception, it aspires to be scientific to the degree that my 
account is philosophical and speculative. This is why a thorough discussion 
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of the latest cognitive science and embodied mind research is absent 
from this book.
Some Theses On Sensation
The empirical realist has no problem positing objects as external to the 
mind. This is what realism does. Sensation is another story. In my view, 
sensations must be given some external status in order to preserve their 
objectivity and to explain their effectiveness on the body. Such objectivity 
is required to explain how bodies are responsive to sensations. So, two 
points that I take from realism: (1) objects and their qualitative unity 
exist independently of human subjects; (2) this objectivism leverages an 
externalist view of sensation.115 The idealist critique of objectivism still 
holds: if it is the case that we never experience an object in itself, let alone 
raw sensory material; and that we can only ever know the world through 
the secondary qualities we perceive (à la Berkeley), then talk about 
mind-independent reality must be speculative. But it need not be merely 
speculative. Speculation becomes necessary to account for how our minds 
and bodies are affected by what is other—their dependence, vulnerability, 
activity, and destruction. One could object that this begs the question by 
assuming the existence of mind-independent bodies in order to argue for 
the reality of mind-independent bodies. On the contrary, if we do not posit 
the existence of autonomous bodies it becomes difficult to explain things 
like the constitution of the body, its responsive nature, as well as its eventual 
disintegration. We are forced to conclude, quite absurdly, that death is not a 
real event, but just an event for us.
The constitution of the world may be explicable by transcendental 
idealism, but it is difficult to see how such a view can explain the dissolution 
of the world. Kant gives us the conditions for the possibility of experience, 
but he never gives us the conditions for the impossibility of experience. In 
a word, if nothing other than the mind or consciousness or intentional 
objects exist, then what delivers violence and death to the subject? The 
materiality of the subject, that is, its corporeal engagement with a world of 
autonomous bodies, as well as its means of communication with this world, 
must be accounted for at both the physical and metaphysical levels. I think 
a revitalized realism about sensation, one which risks some speculative 
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remarks, can do this. As speculative this realism must go beyond the 
correlationism of Kantian and post-Kantian critical philosophy as well as 
phenomenology.
We should avoid posing the question of sensation in terms of a false 
dichotomy: it is not the case that sensation is either a representational 
content, like Husserl’s hyle, or an amorphous, discrete datum about which 
nothing meaningful can be said. Instead, sensation should be seen as a 
complex meaningful content composed of no less than six dimensions, 
enumerated here as theses to be elaborated throughout the remainder of this 
book and expanded in future work.
1. Sensations are objective, real. Sensations belong to independent 
bodies, animate as well inanimate,116 and make up the singular qualitative 
constitution of these bodies. So, when Locke writes in his Essay that 
secondary qualities like color, sound, and taste are “nothing in the objects 
themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their 
primary qualities,”117 I would insist that this power really does reside in the 
objects themselves, specifically as their singular sensory composition and 
its attendant effects. This postulate takes root in empiricist anti-substance 
theories, including Hume’s stageless theatre of personal identity and 
Berkeley’s Lockean definition of the object as a collection of qualities.118 
Sensations are effective insofar as they can bring about changes or engender 
responses in other bodies. For example, sandpaper can smooth wood 
because it has abrasion as a property. Or rather: its abrasive identity just is 
its capacity to affect wood abrasively. Similarly, we can enter an illuminated 
room because a light bulb or the sun is able to produce brightness, and a 
sound wave can shatter a glass because glass has fragility as a disposition and 
the sound wave has shattering power.119 Sensations should not be restricted 
to their familiar role as qualitative or stimulating manifestations, for they are 
virtual capacities inhabiting objects and not mere potentialities;120 or, if we 
insist on calling them properties, they must be conceived as transmittable 
rather than fixed to the substance in which they inhere.121 It is not that the 
carpet is red, but that the carpet can produce red for color-sensitive bodies.
Throughout this book I will use the terms capacity, disposition, and power 
as synonyms that denote a formal structure (or property) of bodies. These 
terms denote real properties that entail determinate, although conditional, 
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effects and/or affects. Dispositions are not merely possible or conditional, 
but virtual. They are real, but not actual, as Deleuze says. They exist in 
bodies whether manifested or not. In Stephen Mumford’s words, “To 
ascribe a disposition is to suggest possibilities of behaviour. It is to say that 
something could or would happen if the circumstances were right.”122 Later 
on I will explicate plasticity as the basic disposition intrinsic to bodies. 
Ontological dispositions will be shown to equal practical powers.
2. Sensations are actualized relationally. Relations must be understood 
alongside, not in opposition to, objectivity. It is in their relations that 
objects exhibit their capacities, or deploy themselves. This does not mean 
that objects are reducible to their relations, however. Using the sandpaper 
example again, it can be said that sandpaper is abrasive only to surfaces that 
are receptive to abrasion. That is, only the right conditions can manifest its 
abrasiveness. A piece of wood will receive sandpaper sensations differently 
than a marble or glob of pudding. So, while sensations belong to objects 
as effective dispositions, they only make sense or actualize themselves when 
they enter relations with something that senses them. They never fully 
actualized themselves in any given relation, however. Something is always 
left in reserve. Other actualities remain dormant, as it were. Consider color, 
for example. As Alva Noë shows, color can be understood as the way a thing 
is disposed to change its appearance in color-critical conditions. To have 
a color, in other words, is to affect and be affected by the environment in 
specific ways that vary according to the specific dispositional capacity of 
a specifically colored object: “An object with a determinate color acts on, 
or responds to, its environment in a special way.”123 There is never a point 
at which this is not occurring. Relations are ubiquitous, but they do not 
exhaust the being of bodies.
Human perception is not a necessary condition for the manifestation 
of sensations. Abrasion makes sense to any surface that is susceptible to 
scratching. Sensations therefore display a liminal and diacritical aspect: they 
always express themselves in relations between objects (liminal) and are 
effective in different ways which are determined by the sensory capacity and 
susceptibility of the objects encountered (diacritical). For humans, liminal is 
conditioned by the fact that the body is both part of and in some ways out 
of step with the world. It is immanent to, but also seems to transcend, the 
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material world.124 Diacriticality implies that sensations are always caught 
up in a differential sensory system, each system comprising a distinct, 
complex environment with countless folds and niches that afford singular 
encounters.125
It should be noted here that I insist on the relationality of sensation to 
acknowledge what Timothy Morton has called “the ecological thought,” 
roughly the idea that every living and nonliving thing in the universe is 
interconnected, at all times. But interconnection does not necessarily 
eliminate alterity.126 Sensory environments are always caught up in an 
ecology of sensations and qualitative forms, some of which are foreign, 
unknown, or unknowable. But as I have indicated, sensation is not purely 
relational, nor are bodies reducible to the sets of relations entangling them. 
Bodies, even when deployed in multiple relations, always hold something 
in reserve. Otherwise, how could they ever forge new relations? Sensation 
is best regarded as the precondition of relation ; it is what enables bodies to 
enter into and exit alliances. It is the body’s disposition/power that houses 
the architecture which allows it to shift allegiances.
3. The practical value of sensation is ambivalent. Sensations can enable and 
disable bodies, stimulate or violate them. Because sensations are ambivalent 
in this way, it is not possible to interpret them as merely subjective or 
internal. Some sensations result in the dissolution of the subject and 
their destructive capacity must be accounted for. Neither Merleau-Ponty 
nor Levinas adequately addresses this dimension of sensation. Sensory 
ambivalence provides the chance to build an ethics of embodiment which is 
based on our vulnerability to and nourishment by sensations.
4. Sensations are a source of alimentation. It has already been said that 
sensations must be in some sense objective if we are to explain their 
effectiveness, or what Aristotle refers to as sensation’s dependence “on being 
moved and being affected.”127 This objectivity also accounts for sensation’s 
capacity to nourish our senses and feed our bodies in the way that a melody, 
painting, or landscape has the power to transform or invigorate us, or how 
a contour of the ground orients our posture and gait. On this rendering, 
the Aristotelian distinction between the nutritive and sensitive faculties is 
collapsed. Sensation just is nutrition, alimentation. Without alimentation our 
bodies are left to languish in their habitual sensory circuits.128 Alimentation 
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and nourishment are two of the most significant elements I take from 
Levinas’s corporeal ontology.
5. Sensations are basically anonymous. The anonymity of sensation is what 
prevents it from becoming an anthropocentric concept, one which would 
drive a wedge between the human and nonhuman worlds. Contra Aristotle, 
sensations do not rely on humans for their effectiveness; humans may feel 
the abrasiveness of sandpaper in ways that a piece of wood cannot, but 
this is only because humans (and some nonhumans) possess the power to 
translate sensations into affections or to process sensations into perceptions 
or cognitions or linguistic expressions, thus personalizing them. This is 
why I would say that perception is personal while sensation is not. The 
human ability to translate sensations into something personal speaks to 
the relationality of sensations, not to their objective constitution. It will be 
said that sensations are always attached to a particular object (Merleau-
Ponty speaks not of red, but of the unique red of this carpet), but this by no 
means renders the quality qua quality proper to any particular object. They 
are, as it were, “transobjective.” I will argue that our identity is constituted 
by the sensations we receive as well as the sensations we give off, but I 
will insist that these sensations do not belong to us, but rather we belong 
to them. Subjects, then, need sensations in a way that sensations do not 
need subjects.
6. The time of sensation belongs to the past. Sensations are almost 
universally regarded as phenomena of presence and equated with how 
they immediately manifest themselves to the senses. But the actualization 
of sensations requires a different temporal signature. Without the duration 
involved in the movement of my hand across a pane of glass, I cannot 
sense its smoothness. Over time sensations accumulate in the body (as 
habits, for instance) and leave a unique footprint on our body schema. 
This sedimentation may lead to a desensitization or inattention to 
familiar sensations, a condition involving practical consequences, like a 
diminishment of adaptability. Insofar as sensations are virtually real, their 
existence prior to actualization belongs to the past, to what Merleau-Ponty 
calls “a past which has never been present.” In a sense, then, the reality of 
sensation remains forever past, shattered as it is when it manifests its efficacy 
at the level of present attention, perception, or reflection. It therefore 
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challenges the priority given to the future-oriented and instrumental human 
projects by Heidegger and others. Again, sensation is the precondition of 
these projects.
These six theses arise out of a rereading of the corporeal ontologies 
of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. But neither Merleau-Ponty nor Levinas 
subscribes to all six of sensation’s dimensions. Complete adherence to these 
theses requires that we formulate an independent position which is in some 
respects at odds with the French phenomenologists. This position emerges 
in this book and has its most elaborate expression in the last two chapters, 
wherein I attempt to develop an original view of the embodied subject’s 
reliance on sensation.
Three Body Types
The modern view which sees sensation as merely subjective or dependent 
on objective, “primary qualities,” does not adequately address the reality 
of sensation.  Some contemporary philosophers have tried to respond to 
this inadequacy, and it is their attempt to do so that orient the analyses of 
the following text. Additionally, I suggest that the inadequacy in question 
arises because sensation is always kept at a safe remove from the subject and 
that this gesture is informed by a dualist ontology that conceives the body 
as separate from the perceptual and intellectual operations of the subject. 
Such a view obscures the subject-object relation as well as the nature of 
the intercorporeal community. My cursory history of the fate of sensation 
in the post-Kantian milieu serves not as an indictment of modern idealism 
tout court, but rather as an heuristic with which to understand the corporeal 
phenomenologist’s desire to inject sensation with new life. The problem 
now is to give an account that adheres to the volatility of sensation and 
captures the aspects of experience left out of the Kantian/Husserlian model. 
The resolution of this problem reveals not only a more complex picture of 
sensation itself, but also demonstrates the central function of sensation in 
the processes of corporeal individuation, the constitution of bodily identity, 
and intercorporeal commerce. Such an understanding motivates my critique 
(understood in the Kantian sense) of the phenomenology of the body and 
the development of a practical theory of corporeal power.
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My own view of the body as plastic emerges through an exploration 
of the phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty (Chapters 2-3) and Levinas 
(Chapter 4), with whom I travel up to the point at which they no longer 
pursue the questions that I would like answered by a theory of embodiment. 
Admittedly, these questions are my own concern and are motivated by 
a materialist impulse that neither phenomenologist attempts to satisfy. 
Merleau-Ponty’s reversible body, which is developed in response to the 
modern theory of sensation and really begins to take form in the chapter 
on “Sense Experience” (le sentir) in Phenomenology of Perception, is treated 
first. There are traces of the reversible body at play in The Structure 
of Behavior and this model is modified in texts like “Eye and Mind,” 
“Cézanne’s Doubt,” “The Child’s Relations with Others,” and The Visible 
and the Invisible, but the most substantial articulations appear in the 
Phenomenology, which nowadays is often overshadowed by the ontological 
promise of The Visible and the Invisible. My view is that the earlier text is by 
no means superseded.
Partly in response to an apparent ethical defect in Merleau-Ponty’s own 
philosophy, Levinas deploys what I call the susceptible body. If Merleau-
Ponty’s body downplays its passivity in favor of its competence or grasp 
(prise) of things, consequently misrepresenting the volatility of sensitive life 
and posing an obstacle to the solicitations of other bodies, then Levinas 
provides an account of the body which overstates the vulnerability of the 
body and obscures the enabling effects of sensation. Notably, however, he 
does provide unique resources for thinking sensation in its transcendental 
and alimentary functions, as well as its affective and material dimensions.
The plastic body I eventually endorse against the phenomenologists 
(Chapter 5) is a reconstruction built from components found in both 
Merleau-Ponty’s and Levinas’s texts, most important of which is the carnal 
sensibility they offer as a replacement for the Kantian model. Following 
James, Dewey, and Malabou, among others, the plastic body balances what 
I see as two extreme yet opposing descriptions of the body-world relation. 
Once this balance is struck we then have an account of embodiment 
that provides an alternative to the correlationist view of sensation 
and subjectivity, narrows the gap between phenomenology and non-
phenomenology, and provides the basis for a practical philosophy grounded 
in the aesthetic life of the body (Conclusion).
Chapter 2
Synchronic Bodies and Environmental Orientation
Let us return to sensation and scrutinize it closely enough to 
learn from it the living relation of the perceiver to his body 
and to his world.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception
At this point we have a historical framework in place to situate the 
reformulation of sensation in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. This chapter 
and the next focus on what Merleau-Ponty has to say about the body’s 
constitution, the aesthetics of embodiment, and the nature of sensation. 
They adduce the divergence between sensation and perception as Merleau-
Ponty understands it, principally in the Sense Experience (Le Sentir) chapter 
of Phenomenology of Perception. My purpose is to exhibit Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology of the body, giving specific attention to the practical function of 
sensibility, and ultimately to challenge his thesis that the intercorporeal 
relation is fundamentally synchronic and reversible. My critique results in 
the claim that if we maintain Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that the perceptual life 
of the body is the bedrock of experience, then it becomes difficult to explain 
the asymmetry of violence and the reality of hostility, as well as the death of 
the body and a fortiori the disintegration of perception entailed in death.
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The Centrality of the Body
It is undeniable that Merleau-Ponty makes the body central to his 
philosophy of the subject and that the ideality of the real—defended by 
countless thinkers before and after him, including his Gestalt allies—is 
contested by his theory of embodiment and his primacy of perception 
thesis. By putting the body at the base of his analyses, indeed at the birth 
of the world, he puts the body immediately in touch with the objects of 
human perception and argues for the codependent, dialogical constitution of 
subject and object.129 By making perception primary, he shows how things 
and persons, minds and ideas—in short, determinate entities as such—arise 
out of the indeterminacy, or nascent figuration, of the perceived world. 
Sometimes he equates body and perception; other times he casts the body 
as an instrument or vehicle of perception. Most commentaries resolve this 
inconsistency by showing that Merleau-Ponty means to overcome mind-
body dualism by relocating consciousness from the mind to the lived body, 
or they excuse him for carelessly invoking the dualism he clearly rejects. 
There is no conscious mind “within” the body: it is just the body itself which 
is conscious. This is his explicit view.
It is not always noted, however, that the body is only important for 
Merleau-Ponty because it is essential to any account of the nature of 
perception. His introduction of the body into the discourse of perception is 
meant to challenge classical philosophers of mind (Descartes, Hume, and 
Kant, for instance) as well as the dominant psychological theories of his 
day, particularly behaviorism. The body imbues the primacy of perception 
thesis with a practical perspective that redefines the objective world as a 
series of adumbrations and meaningful forms determined by the corporeal 
constitution of the subject. It is precisely the embodied dimension of 
perception that is missed by the classical philosophers on Merleau-Ponty’s 
view. As for his opponents in psychology, they fail to acknowledge that a 
mechanistic view of behavior overlooks the vital role that meaning plays 
in human consciousness. Behaviorism remains beholden to the actuality 
of stimuli, even when it does talk about anticipation. Anticipation, as 
the behaviorist views it, is always a mechanical reaction to stimulation, 
not a creative or interpretive encounter with meaningfulness. Human 
consciousness, in Merleau-Ponty’s estimation, “has the ability to orient 
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itself by the possible, the virtual” and these capacities are to be located in the 
structure of perception.130
Despite his corporeal orientation, it could be said that Merleau-
Ponty is not really interested in the body as a material entity. He is only 
concerned with how the body’s situatedness shapes perceptual experience 
and the sense of the world. He is not immediately interested in addressing 
the metaphysical questions which surround the body or incarnation, nor 
is he bothered about reconciling the phenomenology of embodiment 
with the research of the physical sciences, as the current efforts of 
neurophenomenology and embodied cognition are attempting. Or rather, he 
would prefer to explain empirical research on the basis of phenomenology, 
not the other way around, as is the trend today. The body as perceived 
and lived, as given phenomenally to the consciousness inhabiting it, is his 
primary object of description. Most of what he says about the lived body 
is evidently given to perception; it is neither speculative nor deductive. He 
thus adopts Husserl’s distinction between Leib and Körper in order to set the 
latter aside and focus exclusively on the former. His analyses are undeniably 
founded upon this distinction. Körper is the determinate, objective body of 
science. It is known from the third-person standpoint. It is the physiological 
body that functions in many ways below the level of consciousness and that 
is constantly degenerating and regenerating with the passage of time. Leib 
is the conscious body, the body that experiences the world as a network 
of meaning instead of as a field of causal interactions. When the lived 
body (Leib) is in pain it confronts that pain with horror or with patience. 
By contrast, pain for the objective body (Körper) is little more than a 
physiological change of state and is legible not by the body itself but only by 
an external observer trained to read its biological or neurochemical data.131 
Whenever Merleau-Ponty is explicating the life of the body it is the lived 
body he intends to describe. His object of study is, to be sure, circumscribed 
by a methodological decision: his adoption of phenomenology and its strict 
adherence to what appears (as given) to consciousness.
The problem of the body is not simply, for Merleau-Ponty, a matter of 
simple description or a vindication of first-person experience. It represents 
the problem of how “there is for us an in-itself” (PP 71/86), or how it is 
possible for perception to immanently order the perceptual field while 
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at the same time revealing the world as a transcendent phenomenon. To 
reconcile this apparent paradox Merleau-Ponty interrogates the fact that 
perception is never divorced from a body’s perspective on things. In order 
to disclose the significance of perspective, he is forced to come to terms 
with the ontological meaning of the body. Therefore, instead of considering 
the body as an “obstacle” to be overcome, or as a material thing, Merleau-
Ponty conducts a critique of the body as the very condition of possibility 
for disclosing the world (PP 68/82). He posits that “The object-horizon 
structure, or the perspective, is no obstacle to me when I want to see 
the object; for just as it is the means whereby objects are distinguished 
from each other, it is also the means whereby they are disclosed” (PP 
68/82). This means that our corporeity not only circumscribes our 
finitude, our determination as creatures locked within a given spatial and 
temporal horizon, but that horizonality, or the figure-ground structure, 
is basic to perception, knowledge, and the individuation of bodies. It is a 
transcendental condition of experience.
It must be kept in mind that inserted in the middle of the figure-ground 
structure is a “third term.” This is the body (PP 101/117).132 Since the body 
plays such a pivotal role in the structuring of perception, and therefore the 
world, it is necessary to outline the ontology of the body to reveal Merleau-
Ponty’s general theory of perception and, consequently, being. After all, he 
does say that the perceiving subject is the perceived world (PP 72/86). To 
understand Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the subject and how it interacts with 
the world, we must first know what makes up the lived body.
Perception and the Lived Body
It would seem that by beginning with perception Merleau-Ponty is mainly 
concerned with epistemological questions, or at least with the question 
of how we access and apprehend things. This is implied when he says 
in “The Primacy of Perception” that his project is “not a question of 
reducing human knowledge to sensation [sentir], but of assisting at the 
birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover 
the consciousness of rationality” (PrP 25/67). As well, M.C. Dillon’s classic 
Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology is curiously oriented by a classical epistemological 
problem: Meno’s paradox.133 This right away suggests that Merleau-Ponty 
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is occupied with unraveling our knowledge of the things themselves rather 
than the things themselves. Moreover, by closely following Husserl, it would 
seem that Merleau-Ponty is endorsing some form of idealism, even if not the 
strong transcendental type.134 But Merleau-Ponty actively criticizes idealist 
presumptions by repeatedly pointing to the incongruity between perception 
and things perceived. Thus, while his primacy of perception thesis works 
as a response to a host of epistemological viewpoints,135 it also advances an 
ontological position which speaks to the constitution of both subjects and 
objects, and finds these entities to manifest an autonomous life of their own 
that actively resists cognitive synthesis or total comprehension.136
The double epistemological/ontological concern marks a tension within 
Merleau-Ponty’s methodological starting point: immanent perceptual 
phenomena. How can specifically human perception reveal to us what 
ultimately exists in itself? That is the paradoxical question Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological ontology seeks to answer. The paradox is ostensibly 
resolved when Merleau-Ponty recognizes that the duality of subject 
and object, in-itself and for-itself, is founded by perception, rather than 
presupposed by it.
The first philosophical act would appear to be to return to 
the world of actual experience which is prior to the objective 
world, since it is in it that we shall be able to grasp the 
theoretical basis no less than the limits of that objective world, 
restore to things their concrete physiognomy, to organisms 
their individual ways of dealing with the world, and to 
subjectivity its inherence in history. Our task will be, moreover, 
to rediscover phenomena, the layer of living experience 
through which other people and things are first given to us, the 
system ‘Self-others-things’ as it comes into being; to reawaken 
perception and to foil its trick of allowing us to forget it as a 
fact and as perception in the interest of the object which it 
presents to us and of the rational tradition to which it gives 
rise. (PP 57/69)
The apparent immediacy of perception, which “is no longer the 
impression, the object which is one with the subject, but the meaning, the 
structure, the spontaneous arrangement of parts” (PP 58/70), is defined in 
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non-objective terms and cannot be dissociated from the network of concrete 
meanings that are exchanged at the intercorporeal level. Perception is not 
first a matter of intuitive apprehension or judgment, it is a dialogue of 
physiognomies— corporeal arrangements whose sense is deciphered and 
rendered determinate by the body’s practical know-how.
John Sallis identifies three important characteristics of perception. 
These encapsulate the ontological consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s 
primacy of perception thesis. By designating perceptual experience as 
primary, Merleau-Ponty shows that perception is original, autonomous, 
and foundational.137 All our reflections, and thus everything we know, 
have their origin in perception. The fund of perceptual experience is 
already there before our senses, full of animation, form, and meaning. 
Perception is not produced by the subject: the subject always finds itself 
inhabiting, from a singular perspective, a phenomenal field whose horizon 
is forever receding and whose figures are always shifting their look. For 
phenomenology, the resistance this field offers to our gaze reveals it to be 
beyond our comprehension and in some sense prior to us. The phenomenal 
field, in short, is not a human fabrication. It conditions human fabrication. 
The open, ever growing field that Husserl calls the Lebenswelt comprises 
phenomenology’s version of the transcendental (PP 61/74; VI 185-186/239).
Whereas for Kant the transcendental ego is what unifies and stabilizes 
the sensible realm, for Merleau-Ponty only a subject situated within an 
environment is able to negotiate the coordinates that characterize our 
experience and furnish itself with the material that founds understanding, 
judgment, reflection, and action. “A subject so aloof from the world as 
to be able to constitute space as pure form would be no more capable of 
distinguishing ‘up’ from ‘down’ than would a subject so subordinated to 
the world as to be merely receptive of non-oriented sense-content,” says 
Sallis.138 Perception and constitution is what takes place between subjects and 
objects. It belongs neither to the subjective nor the objective side of things, 
but rather involves (folds, envelops) the subject and the object at once. The 
fundamental opacity or ambiguity of this involutionary movement resists 
objective circumscription and prevents the evidence of perception from 
being “absorbed into the circuit of reflective thought.”139 The object given 
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in perception is never given completely, yet we nevertheless observe and 
interact with it as a unified thing (PrP 15/47).
By designating perception as the birthplace of the world, while at the 
same time imbuing this place with an irreducible ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty 
poses a considerable challenge for anyone asking, “What exists?” Is it a 
disfigured world eventually figured by perception, or is there some figuration 
prior to perception? Is matter nothing without perceptual form, or is matter 
always already formed? For phenomenology, it seems necessary to always 
reformulate this question as: “What meaning can I discover, given my finite, 
corporeal constitution?” Of course, this echoes the Kantian critical question, 
“What can I know?” But Merleau-Ponty modifies the Kantian problem, 
which attempts to draw the limits of rational knowledge, by turning the 
synthetic act of cognition into a problem of synthesis whose solution is the 
lived body. As Sallis puts it, “The body, to which is linked the whole series 
of reductions that indicate the need for synthesis, is, in a sense, the agent 
of the synthesis that is needed.”140 This does not mean that Merleau-Ponty 
simply replaces Kant’s transcendental ego with a lived body that remains 
free of the effects of history. The body is always already “saturated with its 
object” (PP 215/249) and a history, and thus not the proper origin of the 
world. The body that performs the synthesis of perceptual experience is 
never completely “aloof” from the world because there is always something 
impersonal and improper about the body (PP 215/249)—a foreignness 
inhabiting it—unlike its self-identical doppelganger, the transcendental ego. 
Moreover, despite its capacity to “withdraw” from the world in reflection, 
the lived body always remains tied to its world by an intentional thread (PP 
72/86).141 The subject-object correlate is irreducible; it colors everything that 
can be said about the reality of things and the life of the subject.
The need for a transcendental faculty of synthesis becomes superfluous 
if the body already accomplishes the coordination of experience. Now, 
Merleau-Ponty does not say that matter is formed prior to perception, 
but he also does not say that it is not formed. He says that the genesis of 
form is traceable by examining perception, which, again, does not tell us 
something explicit about things but rather about how we know them. “In 
positive terms, Merleau-Ponty’s task is to retrace, beginning at the level 
of profiles, the constitution of the object, in such a way as to show how 
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at each level there is already a synthesis initiated within the matter itself 
without there being any need for an extrinsic act of synthesis.”142 The body 
is able to accomplish this retracing because it is inserted directly into the 
perceptual horizon and serves as the anchor “in a total system of possible 
profiles in their correlation with certain motor possibilities.”143 The body 
is always converging in practice upon an optimum perspective, or an 
increasingly coherent system of appearances, but never absolute knowledge 
of the object itself (PP 301-303/347-350). The object always evades the 
reach of perception despite perception’s increasing ability to make sense of 
or manipulate it. Although perception is foundational, it discloses objects 
as independently constituted, and never reaches complete convergence 
with the object.
In a frequently cited working note to The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-
Ponty acknowledges that by beginning with perception in Phenomenology 
of Perception he prevented himself from articulating the kind of non-dualist 
ontology that he was working out in his later texts. When he admits that 
“The problems posed in Ph.P. are insoluble because I start there from the 
‘consciousness’-‘object’ distinction” (VI 200/253), he realizes that it is 
impossible to bridge the gap between subject and object, as well as lived 
body and objective body, if these binaries remain cast as ontologically 
distinct. He thought that, by beginning with perception, subject and object 
could be shown to achieve their (abstract) distinction from out of the more 
primary unity of perception, considered as a dynamic intentional nexus. 
Ultimately, the argument runs, it is the body’s practical competence that 
carves out the contours of reality: “My body is the fabric into which all 
objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the 
general instrument of my ‘comprehension’” (PP 235/272). It is clear that 
it is only through the body—here portrayed as a kind of prosthetic of the 
understanding—that the world is organized into semi-discrete and discrete 
objects of perception. But is this an ontology of what exists or an ontology of 
embodied perception?
The lived body problematically possesses a kind of double life. On the 
one hand, Merleau-Ponty wants the body and its practical aims to provide 
the transcendental background against which perception is generated 
(consider his privileging of “spatiality of situation” over intelligible 
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Newtonian space in PP 100/116). On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty insists 
that the body always finds itself caught up in a world populated with objects, 
people, meanings, and ideas. He maintains the first position in order to 
escape a naturalistic or positivistic conception of subjectivity. He maintains 
the second position in order to avoid charges of idealism or immaterialism. 
These evasions force him to maintain a view of the embodied subject as 
both generative of, and generated by, its perceptual world, a view which 
has become more common than it was in the 1940s. The generated world 
is identical to (or at least correlated with) the perceived subject insofar as 
the subject is what gives form to the world, by orienting its spatiality, for 
example (see PP, chapter 3). The objective world that generates the body 
is what harbors the perspectival and practical environment we always 
find ourselves within, and which resists us when we try to encompass it 
in theory or practice. The objective environment would be the world in 
which things store their unseen profiles, the forgotten world of anonymous, 
non-intentional sensory existence which lines the visible world  (PP 215-
216/250-251). As objective, or “invisible,” it can only be inferred from the 
evidence of the visible.
By bracketing the objective world as well as the body taken as physical 
object, and beginning with the world as perceived, Merleau-Ponty gives 
himself over to a sustained phenomenological interrogation of the aporetic, 
somewhat Schellingian, query, “How can my body serve as both the origin 
of the world and its product?” His book-length reply details the ways 
in which the body primarily interacts with its world at the phenomenal 
level, that is, at the level of perception. This interaction is several times 
characterized as a dialogue of reciprocal determination. Subject and object 
codetermine each other, exchange forms, and trade meanings (PP 127, 
129, 132/148, 150, 154). Neither subject nor object enjoys privilege of 
determination.
This maneuver, that is, beginning an ontological investigation with 
perception, raises questions about the pre-perceptual genesis of the body, 
particularly at the material level. Some of these questions are addressed by 
Merleau-Ponty, but we must ask whether his account of the pre-perceptual 
genesis of the body falls within the scope of phenomenology or whether it 
must have recourse to a supplementary speculative metaphysics, a question 
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of absolute origins. I will argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology does 
draw upon a metaphysics of the body, but that this metaphysics derives from 
and transgresses his phenomenological investigations.
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that the primacy of perception thesis is 
reminiscent of an idealist epistemology that assumes the constitutive power 
of consciousness, only now that power takes the form of the lived body. But 
if the body is what makes perception part of the objective world while at 
the same time serving as the condition of that world’s appearance, then a 
kind of distance must be introduced between the material world in which 
the body is an object of science and the lived world in which the body 
engages a meaningful existence. Otherwise, how can he explain the body’s 
frankly transcendent constitutive power? As Merleau-Ponty remarks, “If my 
consciousness were at present constituting the world which it perceives, no 
distance would separate them and there would be no possible discrepancy 
between them” (PP 238/275). Whence the discrepancy? Whence the escape 
from immanence?
Merleau-Ponty answers that what makes the body more than a physical 
object is the distance opened within consciousness by the polarization of 
subject and object effected by intentionality. Intentionality is both what 
animates the body as a subject, but also what keeps it necessarily correlated 
with the world. It enables transcendence, but only ever a transcendence 
within immanence. Like the figure-ground structure, intentionality is 
an ontological fact of existence (PP xvii/xii). In principle, it holds that 
conscious life and knowledge are inextricably bound up with the historical 
horizon in which we act, interpret, and exist. At the corporeal level 
intentionality structurally links my lived body, my objective body, the 
body of the other, and the objects of the world. Each comprises a quasi-
independent node of the perceptual web, but each node is nevertheless 
always correlated with the others.
The Materiality of the Body
Merleau-Ponty’s lived body must be decidedly “closer” to the material 
world for his phenomenology to challenge the idealist phenomenology of 
Husserl. That is, the lived body must really possess a kind of materiality that 
is unappreciated by Husserl. To achieve this materialization, Merleau-Ponty 
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must posit a pre-perceptual life of the body, a life lived before constitution. 
Otherwise, the body is reducible to its perceptual activity: esse est percipi. 
Merleau-Ponty must allow that the body’s capacity for perception is not 
merely the result of its own ideal activation, and that its constitution is 
not comprised only of “existentials” that “operate in perceptions” but 
remain unperceived themselves (VI 178, 180, 189/232, 233-234, 243; 
see PP 238/275).144 Upon reflection the phenomenal field must show 
itself to have already been a field full of extant bodies. Without a site of 
genuine intercorporeity Merleau-Ponty would have to resort to a quasi-
theological account of the incarnation of consciousness in the body, or 
leave the birth of consciousness, along with the gap between self and other, 
shrouded in mystery.
Faced with the threat of immaterialism and despite the constraints 
placed on his discourse by the phenomenological perspective, he does 
not pass over in silence the pre-phenomenal constitution of the body. He 
delimits its materiality from an ontological, rather than physiological or 
biological, perspective. This requires some speculative deviation from his 
commitment to phenomenological method.
When I say that Merleau-Ponty “speculates” about the constitution of 
the body, I mean that he admits elements into his account of subjectivity 
that are not disclosed phenomenologically. Methodologically, his 
phenomenology displays a hybrid form, foregoing as he does the quest 
for scientific purity exhibited in so many of Husserl’s texts. It is a mixture 
of phenomenological description, empirical research, and metaphysical 
speculation. Entangles these threads is not always easy. This ambiguous 
deployment of method is partly what enables him to escape the fate of 
subjective idealism; it is what Lakoff and Johnson admire when they call 
Merleau-Ponty an “empirically responsible” phenomenologist.145 For 
instance, in order to explain the rigidity of psychological prejudices like 
racism and their influence on the structuring of perception, Merleau-
Ponty appeals to the genetic, historical, and physiological dimension. 
He does this not to show that perception is always forced to conform to 
a reified biological or social structure (Child 107/15), but to argue that 
heredity and social conditioning are co-constitutive of the individual and 
his or her attitude toward others. He writes that it is not the case that 
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“the way in which the child structures his social environment is unrelated 
to the hereditary or constitutional dispositions of his nervous system” 
(Child 108/16). The individual is never simply determined by his or her 
environment. The individual operates between the biological and the 
social, “takes a position in the face of [these] external conditions” (Child 
108/17, my emphasis). Here we see the phenomenological supplement to 
the biological. The child’s perceptual prejudices are the result of a “single 
global phenomenon” that emerges from certain natural determinations and 
social conditioning, but against which the child is able to make his or her 
own meaning (Child 108/17). To comprehend the genesis and alteration of 
this meaning it is necessary to see how perception is both something given 
(as social prejudice and physiology) and enacted (in the body’s meaningful 
responses to its perceived environment).
Unfolding the constitution of the body means giving an account of 
the genesis of its many dimensions with a view to exposing how these 
dimensions make up the “new definition of the a priori” discussed at several 
points in the Phenomenology of Perception (for example, PP 220-222/255-
257). The corporeal a priori is addressed from at least three aspects which 
do not always display a coherent relationship: (1) the primacy of perception 
thesis, (2) the body as the hinge of perception,146 and (3) sensation as the 
body’s original communion with the world. The primacy of perception 
thesis says that the things we encounter are conditioned by, which is to 
say, oriented according to, our field of perception. This field is coordinated 
by the (partially anonymous) constitution of our bodies and their (often 
impersonal)147 capacity to practically synthesize the world (PrP 14/45-
46). Of particular importance for this synthesis is the schéma corporel, or 
body schema,148 along with a number of other components which function 
transcendentally in Merleau-Ponty’s view of the body as reversible. These 
will be examined momentarily.
Although it operates as a transcendental, the lived body is never fully 
detached from external bodies, objects, and other persons.149 The material 
world and the body as subject are co-transcendentals or codependent, we 
might say. This is Merleau-Ponty’s original philosophical innovation.150 
The body for him is not “an agency underlying the organization of 
experience” or “the foundation of transcendental constitution.”151 He 
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does argue, however, that the body organizes the space it inhabits into 
functional and practicable places, although he does not mean to say that 
places are generated spontaneously by individual bodies. Instead, the body’s 
organizational capacity “is a response to the questions the world raises,” 
which means that its transcendental function “is inconceivable apart from 
its receptive, responsive, centripetal role before the givenness of the world, 
its existence as flesh amidst the flesh of the world.”152 When we speak of 
Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental perspective, we must always keep in mind 
that his is an impure transcendental, a set of conditions that are themselves 
conditioned by the body’s mutable history. This “historical a priori is 
constant only for a given phase and provided that the balance of forces allows 
the same forms to remain” (PP 88/104). Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of habit 
provides the concrete key to the historical a priori, a powerful notion that 
underlies much of the discussion of corporeal genesis below.
Dillon’s defense of Merleau-Ponty’s non-Kantian transcendental 
philosophy does not fully appreciate the difficulty of escaping Kantianism/
correlationism, especially for the phenomenologist. On the one hand, the 
primacy of perception thesis opposes the Kantian model by claiming that 
the phenomena of perception are prior to the divorce of subject and object, 
subject and object being abstractions conditioned by the primordial layer of 
perceptual experience. The transcendental is generated not by a pure lived 
body, but by the lived body’s phenomenal, intercorporeal encounters in the 
“system ‘self-others-world’” (PP 60/73). In Dillon’s words, “The lived body 
is not a transcendental subject; it is a phenomenon situated among other 
phenomena within the world horizon.”153 Merleau-Ponty further displaces 
the constitutive role of the subject by speaking sometimes of the thing as 
the source of the body-subject’s unity (PP 322/372). But how can the thing 
provide the lived body’s unity if the thing’s unity is merely an abstraction 
from perception, which is itself conditioned by the lived body, which is 
merely a phenomenon? Merleau-Ponty maintains that neither body nor 
object possesses priority; it is their dialogue, communion, or intertwining 
which is primary. But if he wants to displace the constitutive role of the 
subject, then he must posit the externality of other bodies a priori. This, 
however, is disallowed by the primacy of perception thesis as well as the 
general phenomenological perspective Merleau-Ponty adopts from Husserl. 
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To sidestep idealism and ground embodied perception in intercorporeity, 
Merleau-Ponty needs the lived body to be the product of intercorporeal 
encounters rather than their condition of possibility. This requires him to 
commit to both an ontological realism about other bodies and a correlative 
dualism that enables his subject-object dialogue to be truly dialogical. 
His realism is most evident in his treatment of sense experience, where he 
deviates from what is given phenomenally to perception in order to speak 
about what lies below the level of intentionality; his tacit commitment to 
dualism in the Phenomenology gets recast in terms of reversibility in The 
Visible and the Invisible, arguably to the detriment of alterity.
Sometimes he speaks to the contrary, but there is neither a pure a priori 
nor a pure a posteriori in Merleau-Ponty.154 For instance, he says that the 
habituated body schema “remains forever anterior to perception [qui reste 
toujours en deçà de notre perception]” (PP 238/275), which would seem to 
indicate that the body schema is always prior to the existence of the world, 
and is therefore an ahistorical a priori. The body and perception would be 
non-identical in such a case, the former always already constituted prior to 
the appearance of space-time of perceptual events. But since temporality is 
always indexed to embodiment for Merleau-Ponty, there would appear to 
be no body before time or time before the body. “We must understand time 
as the subject and the subject as time,” he says (PP 422/483).155 If the body 
and perception are identical—that is, if there is no body before perception 
and no perception before body—it is necessary to make sense of the latency 
of the lived body, the body lived unconsciously, prior to reflection and in the 
background of explicit perception.156 As Merleau-Ponty writes in “Eye and 
Mind:” “There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties 
of the visible; but there is also that which reaches from below—the profound 
postural latency [latence posturale] where the body raises itself to see…” (EM 
187/85-86). This is the body in the grip of the corporeal world, constrained 
by the exigencies of its embodied experience, and always locked in a circuit 
of habits and default practices.
When posited from the phenomenological point of view the primacy 
of perception thesis has the disadvantage of not really explaining how it is 
possible for the body—its habits, body and postural schemata, behavioral 
circuits, style, or physiognomy—to be constituted prior to its own 
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perception. And yet, these things must already be in place for perception 
to function. Indeed, phenomenology does not allow us to speak of an 
“anonymous” or “impersonal” body that underlies conscious perception 
and precedes the differentiation of my body from the body of the other (PP 
240/277; Child 119/33). Such a dimension must be admitted, however, 
unless we are willing to concede that the body perceives every event or 
alteration that affects it, even the imperceptible. This would be stretching 
the meaning of perception too far, I think. Like Merleau-Ponty (VI 
200/253), I see the troublesome status of the impersonal/imperceptible 
as a methodological problem that limits his early work but which can 
be overcome by adopting an ontological perspective, as he does most 
explicitly in The Visible and the Invisible when he shifts from the language 
of consciousness and object (dualism), to the language of the flesh of 
the sensible (monism).157 It remains to be seen whether he abandons the 
subject-object correlation as a presupposition of his thinking of being, or if 
his later work retains the basic correlationism of the earlier.
Is Perception Really Primary?
Despite his focus on first-person human perception, Merleau-Ponty’s earlier 
texts have plenty to say about the pre-perceptual and anonymous elements 
of the body. While an adequate metaphysics of corporeal individuation may 
be lacking in the Phenomenology of Perception, there is a healthy ambiguity 
that attends the transcendental status he assigns to the body. For instance, 
a structure like the body schema might be designated as a pure a priori if it 
can be shown to possess an immutable, or ahistorical, element (PP 142/166; 
SB 189/204). Are their immutable structures at work in the Phenomenology? 
I believe there are.
What I suggest in this discussion of the primacy of perception thesis is 
that, if perception is in a strong sense essential to the configuration of being, 
it is not clear how we are to conceive the materiality of the body prior to 
perception. And yet, if it is the body that perceives (PP 238/275), and this 
body is the product of “a past which has never been present” (PP 242/280), 
then we are obliged to speculate about the metaphysical genesis of this 
body. On Merleau-Ponty’s view we are forced into the position of thinking 
the body as the condition of possibility of experience while simultaneously 
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upholding the view that both body and world are the products of perception. 
To make salient this issue it seems necessary to distinguish the body, 
as what gives rise to perception, from perception as an embodied activity. 
This distinction would lend primacy to the body as corporeal and render 
perception a secondary activity of the body. In other words, corporeality 
and perception would not be equiprimordial. It will be objected that this 
distinction is precisely what is contested by all of Merleau-Ponty’s work on 
perception. In response, I would maintain that if we push the primacy of 
perception thesis to its limit, what we end up with is the limits of human 
knowledge, or the finitude of thinking about the origin of perception. 
The objective body may only be knowable through perception, and in 
a sense borne of operative intentionality, but this does not explain how 
consciousness itself gets off the ground. If, by Merleau-Ponty’s logic, the 
existence of consciousness depends on the body (or, in Spinoza’s language, 
the mind is the idea of the body), should we also say that the body exists 
because of consciousness? Or because of perception? That does not seem 
quite right. And Merleau-Ponty agrees.
The distinction I propose between the perceiving body and the pre-
perceptual body is spurred by an asymmetry in Merleau-Ponty’s text 
between the body and perception, two terms that are supposed to be 
synonymous and therefore symmetrical. There are moments, however, where 
perception is distinguished from and subordinated to the body, although 
the converse does not occur. This subordination, when it occurs, challenges 
the primacy of perception thesis by shifting transcendental character of 
perception to the level of corporeal sensibility. That is, sensation becomes 
the transcendental condition of perception. Support for this interpretation 
is found in the “Sense Experience” chapter of the Phenomenology, where the 
privilege of perception is called into question while Merleau-Ponty attempts 
a delimitation of the difference between sensation and perception. It is here 
that we see the most radical elements of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental 
philosophy, as well as his most fecund flirtations with the concept 
of sensation.
To substantiate these points I will defend the deliberately provocative 
thesis that Merleau-Ponty, while attempting to account for the body’s 
relation to the world, gives priority—perhaps unwittingly—to sensing, 
Synchronic Bodies and Environmental Orientation 83
not perceiving. The priority is granted from an ontological/metaphysical 
perspective, decidedly not from a phenomenological one. Let me be clear: I 
am orienting my investigation at a level not explicitly engaged by Merleau-
Ponty, so I am not criticizing him for failing to discern what I am concerned 
with here, namely, the ontology of sensation. With this caveat, we will now 
pursue the following basic questions: (1) What constitutes this body that 
orients our perceptual field? Merleau-Ponty has plenty to say about this. (2) 
Where does this body come from, and how is it individuated from the ambiguous 
field of the sensible? First we will unpack some of the primary elements of 
the body and show that Merleau-Ponty consistently conceives the body as 
reversible, that is, synchronized with its environment. A close look at his 
analysis of sensibility reveals the mechanics of reversibility.
Synchronization and Habit
We have seen how the problem of the body is a problem of perception. We 
must now uncover what this lived body is that coordinates and conditions 
the subject’s capacity for perception. Indeed, this capacity is what gives 
meaning to the world as perceived. Where does it come from and of what 
is it made? The lived body is not explicitly thematized in our everyday 
operations, although we are always in some sense aware of it. Many of 
its components exist in the background as we carry out our mundane 
activities, and we rely on its stability and health as we go about our business. 
Most of its physiological activity proceeds without our attention. When 
the body becomes ill or is disturbed in some other way, it announces 
itself like Heidegger’s broken hammer and becomes an object requiring 
examination.158 In these cases it presents itself as an obstacle to be overcome 
rather than a vehicle or tool that allows us to navigate our environment 
with facility. Under normal circumstances our bodies are attuned to their 
material situation and function together as an uninterrupted unity. As Shaun 
Gallagher puts it,
When the lived body is “in tune” with the environment, when 
events are ordered smoothly, when the body is engaged in a 
task that holds the attention of consciousness, then the body 
remains in a mute and shadowy existence and is lived through 
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in a non-conscious experience. But when the lived body loses 
its equilibrium with the environment, it suddenly appears at 
center stage, announcing itself as painful, fatigued, distorted, 
clumsy, embarrassed, etc.159
This does not mean that we inhabit two ontologically distinct bodies or 
that the body can be divided into multiple ontological levels.160 It means 
that the lived body is most of the time absent or withdrawn from perceptual 
experience while at the same time conditioning that experience.161 It can 
assume various degrees of conspicuousness, but for the most part it is 
inconspicuous.
Equipped with this image of the normal mode of embodiment, I want to 
argue that the texts prior to The Visible and the Invisible catalogue a series of 
correlations between body and world that prefigure the concept of flesh, a 
concept which provides a promising and problematic depiction of the body-
world relation. These correlations can be found, among other places, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of habit, style, physiognomy, and body schema. 
Admittedly, the language of “correlation” prejudges the matter at hand 
by smuggling in dualist/objectivist terms when these terms are precisely 
what Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology aims to dispel. However, given that 
perception always “takes advantage of work already done” (PP 238/275), 
there seems to be at least a minimal, or qualified, ontological objectivism 
at play in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. He believes in a world that 
precedes and will outlast human perception. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s use 
of terms like “communion,” “dialogue,” and “synchronization” suggests that 
perception in the Phenomenology can be thought within a dualist framework, 
even if this framework is only to be understood as the result of a more 
originary unity of subject and object. In short, the correlationist prejudice 
is operative in the language employed in Merleau-Ponty’s exposition 
of perception.
The emphasis on synchronization expresses Merleau-Ponty’s desire to 
take the middle road between rationalism and empiricism, and to strike 
a balance between active and passive conceptions of embodiment and 
perceptual synthesis. The body is not fully responsible for creating the world 
in which it exists, he contends, but neither is it completely vulnerable to all 
of the impressions inflicted upon it by material events. It is an entity whose 
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actions are partly enacted according to its desires and partly dictated by the 
impersonal contours of its physical locale. As Madison puts it, “The subject 
of perception is not the free subject, the master of itself which realizes itself 
to be a unique individual.”162 Because the body is bound up with the world 
and given a form or “logic”163 that it does not give itself, its capacity for 
action, its existence as an “I can” rather than an “I think,” is determined by 
the “unreasonable promiscuity”164 it carries on with its environment when 
it is not reflecting on itself. The pre-personal unity of the body conditions 
perception and everything perceptual experience entails. As Morris shows, 
“the body only perceives through its anticipatory motor explorations” which 
are informed by motor and body schemes that “allow the body to bring the 
past into the present, and thus articulate the present in a way that would 
otherwise be impossible.”165 Let us look at the elements of this past.
Perhaps the central correlation of body and world is habit. Merleau-
Ponty’s account of the habituated body is closely tied to discussions of the 
body/postural schema, physiognomic perception, and behavioral circuits, 
each of which is supported by what he calls an “intentional arc.” The 
intentional arc names the set of skills or (non-representational) disposition 
that predisposes an agent to perceive and act in the world with optimum 
facility. It subtends consciousness and draws together the various threads 
of the practicable environment into a meaningful horizon of possibilities. 
It does this by first unifying the senses into a synchronized system that 
lends sensory coherence to perception. This is what Merleau-Ponty means 
by “synaesthetic perception” (PP 229/265). The body is not just a reflex 
mechanism, it is a physical entity capable of interpreting, making sense 
of, and adapting to the disparity of stimulation it constantly receives. 
The “personal core” (PP 134/156) of the body “brings about the unity of 
the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility” and “goes limp” in 
illness, as the famous Schneider case reveals (PP 136/158-159). Habits 
are crucial because they provide the body with its historically informed 
behavioral identity, in the form of latent or sedimentary sets of actions that 
make our surroundings familiar and workable, allowing it to sense and 
perceive without always having to explicitly appeal to the personal core of 
consciousness. Habit gives the intentional arc a certain regularity.
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Habits provide the body with a stable, practical form. This means 
that, for the body that possesses a stable identity, they are not merely 
supplemental or ancillary modifications of a blank corporeity. Or rather, 
insofar as we acquire them from our cultural and social environments they 
are a kind of original prosthetic, not unlike language (Child 99/4-5). They 
comprise a substantial part of who we are, how we experience, and what we 
can do. Habits allow us to sink our attention in the present without having 
to attend at each moment to what the body is presently doing or going to 
do. Taken as a unified system the body is, Merleau-Ponty says, “my basic 
habit” [l’habitude primordiale] (PP 91/107). In order to free itself from the 
environment the body adopts “pre-established circuits” that give it the 
space to pursue its intellectual projects. As he says, “it is an inner necessity 
for the most integrated existence to provide itself with an habitual body” 
(PP 87/103).166 This is a view shared with William James, who maintains 
that habit condenses and simplifies the movements required to complete a 
particular task, thus habit “diminishes fatigue” by freeing up attention.167
Habit, for James, is a material phenomenon that is registered both on 
and in our bodies. He holds that our repertoire of habits “depend[s] on 
sensations not attended to,” which means that our “body’s attitude” or 
proprioception subtends the series of movements which make up a given 
habitual action, like buttoning a shirt or brushing one’s teeth.168 The body’s 
attitude is written in the body and, like Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc, 
what enables the body automatically to make sense of a particular series of 
sensations and unify them into a coherent habitual action. As he explains 
in The Principles of Psychology, “the phenomena of habit in living beings 
are due to the plasticity of the organic materials of which their bodies are 
composed.”169
Merleau-Ponty does not share James’s naturalistic/neuroscientific 
interpretation of habit. For Merleau-Ponty habits are not stored in the 
physiology of the body as muscle memories or neurological patterns. Habits 
are an acquired power built upon the body’s unified capacity to grasp an 
environmental directive and imbue that directive with a meaningful “motor 
significance” of its own (PP 143/167). The sedimentation of a habit in 
the body is always permeated, as Edward Casey notes, by the “intentional 
threads that go back and forth between the body and its ever-changing 
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phases, which are continually reanimated by current experience.”170 In short, 
habits are anchored in the intentional arc.
The acquisition of a habit involves the “rearrangement and renewal 
of the body schema,” which underlies the habituation process as an 
“immediately given invariant” (PP 141, 142/165, 166; translation modified). 
The body schema is an invariable corporeal structure, an open system of 
motor potentiality that is receptive to the cultivation of habit but not itself 
capable of being dissociated from the lived body. It remains open because 
it is arranged according to the shifting practical objectives of the subject, 
which are not determined in a vacuum but arise in a historical horizon 
and are always motivating new projects. The subject sets his or her tasks 
according to the layout of his or her situation and the practical possibilities 
it presents, while habits reorient the body schema according to the singular 
way these possibilities are inhabited. Correlatively, the body schema is 
structured as a response to concrete conditions; it is a dynamic form that is 
at once shaped by material forces and regulated by the intentional arc and 
existential milieu of the embodied agent. Casey writes, “the habituation 
which such inhabitation accomplishes involves a delicate dialectic between 
the implied passivity of enclosure … and the activity of getting to know our 
way around in a given circumstance.”171 There is never a point at which 
this dialectic is not underway, which is why Merleau-Ponty says that space 
“is already built into my bodily structure, and is its inseparable correlate” 
(PP 142/166). 
The sedimentation of habits in the lived body releases the subject from 
the immediacy of the present and enables the “movement of transcendence” 
that characterizes Merleau-Ponty’s conception of volition. The movement 
of transcendence—which is, paradoxically, enabled by a habitual will—is 
never a movement toward absolute transcendence. It is always a relative 
transcendence, more like a reconfiguration of the immanence of being in the 
world. In his discussion of being in the world we find a decisive statement of 
Merleau-Ponty’s embodied, correlationist view of transcendence:
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject 
which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject 
is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the 
subject itself projects. The subject is a being-in-the-world and 
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the world remains “subjective” since its texture and articulations 
are traced out by the subject’s movement of transcendence. 
(PP 430/491-492, my italics)172
As we know, this is not an endorsement of idealism. It does, however, 
indicate that Merleau-Ponty sees our capacity to transcend any present 
situation as predicated upon the immanent organization of that situation 
by the body’s perceptual activity. Conversely, this activity must be seen as 
a mode of the fundamental passivity of the body. The world, too, turns the 
subject into a project. There is a certain plasticity underlying this dialectical 
relation. Despite the apparent symmetry, however, there is a sense in 
which the plastic correlation of body and world—that is, the immanence of 
embodiment—is dominated by the projects/projections of the subject. This 
is because the “texture” of the world is an “articulation” of the subject’s 
practical freedom, which means that the constraints imposed on the subject 
by the world are, in a sense, self-imposed. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty 
seems to suggest that the world would be a desolate wasteland without 
the texture afforded it by subjectivity. It is not so much that the subject 
possesses a mysterious power to escape immanence, but that Merleau-
Ponty’s immanence is never pure. It is always already crisscrossed with 
avenues of transcendence traced out by the subject. Perception guarantees 
the complicity, which is not to say identity, of subject and world because it 
has intentionality at its center. Intentionality, as we know, binds subject and 
object while it simultaneously polarizes them. Its difference is subsumed 
by a fundamental sameness. The complicity of intentionality remains 
asymmetrical, however, for it is the subject that introduces perception into 
the world and initiates the movement of transcendence. The asymmetrical 
relation accounts for the ability of the subject to cultivate its own habits.173 
Without the movement of transcendence habits could only be imposed on 
the body from outside. The body possesses a basic creativity that allows it to 
habituate itself from within.
Just as tissue, neurons, blood, bone, and all the rest work together to 
form our physiological system, the habits we adopt, cultivate, and inherit 
make up the lived body’s non-biological armature. Without the economizing 
effect of habit our bodies are destined to expend their energy on simple 
reflexive behavior or waste it relearning how to perform operations 
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performed many times before. Our bodies are normally not restricted to 
these modes of existence. Much of our lives are routinized and we perform 
many tasks as if we were automata. But our automation is only apparent. 
Habitual activities actually enable us to expand our range of spontaneous 
actions, which is what Merleau-Ponty means when he says that “habit 
expresses our power of dilating our being in the world, or changing our 
existence by appropriating fresh instruments” (PP 143/168). Although 
automatic, they amplify the range of our freedom.
The armature of habit is no less fundamental than the biological 
constitution of the body. It is true that Merleau-Ponty says that habit 
is “merely a mode” of the body’s fundamental capacity to transform 
a spontaneous action into a personal gesture (PP 146/171, translation 
modified), that habit particularizes the body through repetitious and regular 
acts. In contrast to the substantial, teleological self of Aristotle or Aquinas 
or Kant, self-identity for Merleau-Ponty “is maintained through time not by 
virtue of an unchanging underlying entity, but through repeated action.”174 
Habit, then, is ontologically basic to embodiment. More strongly, the body 
subject is a habit. As Casey shows, the primacy of habit is twofold. First, 
habit is the corporeal manifestation of a past that lives on in my body as its 
unreflective history. “In this way habit takes the lead over the very body it 
requires for its own realization.” Second, habit forms the basis upon which 
corporeal style and personal expressivity rest. It mediates between the 
general, anonymous body and the sculpted body built up by our culture and 
conduct.175 In Merleau-Ponty’s words:
Although our body does not impose definite instincts upon 
us from birth, as it does upon animals, it does at least give to 
our life the form of generality, and develops our personal acts 
into stable dispositional tendencies. In this sense our nature 
is not long-established custom, since custom presupposes the 
form of passivity derived from nature. The body is our general 
medium for having a world. (PP 146/171).
Habits are what enable the body to comprehend its environment, to 
achieve a “harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between 
the intention and the performance” (PP 144/169). This understanding is of 
course not intellectual, but inscribed in the body as the physiognomy and 
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corporeal sens (meaning, direction) that at once opens and limits our field of 
perception (PP 152/178).
Before we achieve the freedom to cultivate our own habits we must 
have reached a workable state of corporeal equilibrium. The forces and 
impulses we are born with must be tamed in order to make life manageable. 
Only then are we free to take up the world as a field of equipment. In a 
sense this is already done for us as we enter into the circuits of behavior 
maintained by our culture. As Alphonso Lingis puts it, “One is born with 
forces that one did not contrive. One lives by giving form to these forces. 
The forms one gets from the others.”176 As human beings we are delivered 
directly into a world whose form has been shaped by human artifice and 
techniques of civilization. These forms are technologically produced and 
conducive to the kind of beings we are. Cultural artifacts are ideally made 
to enable the postures that we normally adopt as we take our position in the 
environment. The built places that receive us as newborn infants already 
have us in mind, or they at least anticipate that our bodies will resemble 
those which came before. When they do not we rebuild them or adapt our 
postures accordingly, or the body endures the labor of forced adaptation 
and potential debilitation. The network or circuit of places made to 
accommodate our corporeal physiognomies constitutes the meaning of our 
built environment, the infrastructure of our culture.
The development of the lived body that Merleau-Ponty describes 
is supported not just by the foresight of architects, but also by cultural 
atavisms that live on in our human bodies. Following André Leroi-Gourhan, 
Lingis explains,
Unlike other mammals, which make their way head first, 
the nose is no longer in contact with the environment; the 
eyes have become the directing organ. The upright posture 
disengaged the hands from the terrain; they now become 
coordinated with the eyes. As humans begin to alter and 
reconstruct the environment about them, new functions are 
taken on by different body parts and organs.177
So, it is not just that our bodies are born into habitable spaces that will 
enable the acquisition of habits. The ways in which we as humans have come 
to inhabit our environment are ingrained in the physiology of our species, 
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and therefore operate to construct the postures we assume. This point 
echoes, from an evolutionary perspective, Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about 
the symbiotic relation between the child and its world. Here he is showing a 
degree of sympathy with James’s more naturalistic perspective:
In fact, from the time of his birth the child who will have 
prejudices has been molded by his environment, and in that 
respect has undergone a certain exercise of parental authority. 
Consequently, there is no moment at which you could grasp, 
in a pure state, his way of perceiving, completely apart from 
the social conditioning that influences him. Inversely, you can 
never say that the way in which the child structures his social 
environment is unrelated to the hereditary or constitutional 
dispositions of his nervous system. … And so the internal 
characteristics of the subject always intervene in his way 
of establishing his relations with what is outside him. It is 
never simply the outside which molds him; it is he himself 
who takes a position in the face of the external conditions. 
(Child 108/16)
Ultimately, the individual is neither social nor natural at its start. He or she 
is both at once. The space between these two organizational forces—nature 
and culture—possesses an “elasticity” [élasticité], says Merleau-Ponty, 
because it can manifest both reactive and active responses within the child 
(Child 108/16).
Synchronization and Affective Circuits
The body is similarly caught up in circuits that are basically affective. 
Affective circuits lend our bodies an emotional identity by economizing the 
things we feel. 178 Since the body is never without its passions, never without 
a certain emotional disposition or mood, its affectivity must be regarded as 
constitutive of embodiment.179 It can be argued, as Lawrence Hass does, 
that it is affectivity that separates us from the world of inanimate things.180 
Our affects imbue our intercorporeal encounters with a resonance that 
can energize us (joy) or enervate us (sadness). But it is not just personal 
encounters that are laced with affectivity—it is the entirety of aesthetic 
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experience. This insight is behind the almost essentialist discussion of 
color in the Phenomenology of Perception, where colors are said to have 
a “felt effect” and a “motor significance” that explains why, for instance, 
“red signifies effort or violence, green restfulness and peace” (PP 209-
211/242-244).181 This is not to say that our bodies are hopelessly at the 
mercy of sensory stimulation. As Merleau-Ponty argues, “The subject of 
sensation is neither a thinker who takes note of a quality, nor an inert setting 
which is affected or changed by it, it is a power which is born into, and 
simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or is synchronized 
with it” (PP 211/245). Sensory and affective circuits carry our bodies along, 
pushing and pulling them, because our bodies are of the sensible realm and 
informed by its sensory contours. Yet we retain the ability to seize upon and 
transform their meaning, and thus transcend ourselves through aesthetic/
affective creation. “I cannot be caught in immanence,” says Paul Klee.182
Gail Weiss explains how the intentional arc enables a series of disparate 
affects to be drawn together into a personal circuit of emotion. The 
intentional arc acts as the internal circuitry of the lived body in the sense 
that it is always running in the background as the (normal) subject sets out 
to enter into new and habitual series of tasks. Unlike the habitual circuits 
that we find in James, where the body runs according to an established set 
of neural pathways that correspond to its observable behavior, for Merleau-
Ponty it is the body’s intentional arc that allows it to engage in habituated 
activities unthinkingly. “This intentional arc,” writes Weiss, “provides 
human beings with an affective sensibility that enables the integration of 
quite dissimilar experiences into a synthetic whole.”183 For Merleau-Ponty 
it is the intentional arc (which is reducible neither to the physical nor 
the representational) that underpins the body’s competence, its coherent 
and almost effortless way of moving, acting, gesturing, and expressing 
itself corporeally. Or more specifically, it is the habituation of the body’s 
intentionality through practical interaction with the environment that 
establishes the intentional arc as the grid upon which the world is always 
diagrammed.184 
There is evidence to suggest that the emotional life of the brain is 
at least as fundamental to the lived body’s normal functioning as the 
meaningful dialogue it carries out at the perceptual level. The point here is 
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not merely that the lived body cannot perform without having an emotion 
and that this emotion is localized in the brain. It is the more salient point 
that the meaning culled from the world by the lived body is always in part 
produced by the affective valence of our situations. A situation, as Johnson 
understands it, is a complex event which occurs between an organism and 
its environment. It is analogous to what Merleau-Ponty means by our 
existential situation, or being in the world. Drawing from the philosophy of 
Dewey as well as the neuroscience of Antonio Damasio, Johnson argues that,
Emotions are key components of complex processes of 
assessment, evaluation, and transformation. As such, they are 
integral to our ability to grasp the meaning of a situation and 
to act appropriately in response to it. Most of this ongoing 
processing and action is never consciously entertained, but 
it is nonetheless meaningful to us, insofar as it constitutes an 
important part of our maintaining a workable relation to our 
surroundings.185
Without emotions it is difficult (or impossible) for our bodies to determine 
whether or not their present environment is safe to inhabit. Without 
emotional assessment the body cannot rationally act or free itself from the 
defensive posture in which it remains vigilant against imminent threats. 
By the same token, the body cannot read hostility or security into the land 
without having fashioned an intentional arc that enables it to judge another 
body as congruent or incongruent with itself. Affectivity and intentionality 
are woven together, infused in the body’s sensibility.
Anticipating a bit, I would say that Merleau-Ponty too often focuses 
on the intentional life of the body while neglecting its affective and 
material life. In this he remains very much a proponent of the subject 
as calculative agent, as actor. It is not that he fails to see that these two 
dimensions of embodiment—activity and affectivity—are intertwined and 
equiprimordial, but that he tends to pathologize those moments when the 
body loses its competent hold on the world or when its intentional arc 
loses its coherence.186 This results in an inadequate view of how the body 
acquires its identity and maintains its integrity vis-à-vis the environment. In 
the same way, he tends to overlook the physical or material aspects of how 
objects and emotions orient the body’s activity.187  The dialogue of subject 
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and object—which forms the kernel of Merleau-Ponty’s narrative regarding 
the primacy of perception—is driven by the exchange of meanings intended 
by the conscious body, not by unregistered (autonomic) signals received 
from the environment or mundane sensations that fail to solicit attention. 
It is, for the most part, only figures or forms which stand out against a 
horizon that attract Merleau-Ponty. He has considerably less to say about 
insignificant and “neutral” situations, as well as situations where the body 
is so overwhelmed that its intentional threads are severed and the figure-
ground structure is torn asunder.188 I am thinking here of what Foucault 
refers to as “limit-experiences.” It is the immediacy, it seems to me, that is 
significant about these situations (often painful) that Foucault describes as 
pushing our bodies to the edge of their power threshold, and thus enhancing 
their capacity for pleasure. It is true that our bodies recover from/adapt to 
the extreme situations that test their limits—that these situations solicit our 
bodies in a particular way that often allows them to incorporate the lesson 
of the situation—but the situation as disruptive event, not just its stable 
outcome, must also be considered integral to the body’s historical identity.189
(Dis)Orientations
Objects, for Merleau-Ponty, have a hand in regulating the intentionality 
and material form of the body. “The keyboard,” explains Shannon Sullivan, 
“has a particular shape and manner of operating that call for a specific 
bodily comportment in order to use it.”190 There is a plurality of significance 
transmitted to the body by the keyboard that can be accommodated in a 
variety of ways; the body must adapt itself to these meanings if it wants 
to dialogue with, rather than dominate, the object. Entailed in this is the 
idea that my body does not perceive the material world without that world 
confronting it with a meaning that I have already projected onto it. Sullivan 
writes: “The keyboard has a meaningful place within my world because, 
through my body’s familiarity with the keyboard gained through the 
repeated use of it, a piece of plastic and metal has become an extension of 
my intentionality.” She continues: “My intentionality turns a heavy object 
into a paperweight; it is because of my need to hold papers down that a 
random stone nearby becomes a cultural object.”191 These descriptions 
imply that ultimately the lived body, not its object, controls the order of 
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perceptual significance, the circuits of meaningful behavior, and to some 
extent the very form of the objects it confronts.
There are instances, however, when the materiality of the world seizes 
upon our bodies and perception is unhinged. And these are not pathological 
moments, but constitutive of normal lived experience. Lingis describes the 
orgasmic body as one whose seizure is not merely a failure of the intentional 
arc, but the result of a decomposition of the body’s postural schema itself. 
“Does not the orgasmic body figure as a body decomposed, dismembered, 
dissolute, where postures and dynamic axes form and deform in the limp 
indecisiveness of the erotic trouble? Is it not a breaking down into a mass 
of exposed organs, secretions, striated muscles, systems turning into pulp 
and susceptibility?”192 In a different context George Yancy describes a scene 
wherein the body of a white woman is given over to involuntary gestures that 
cannot be explained with a Pavlovian reflex theory or a theory of dialogical 
perception. Something else is required to account for the “ambush” of the 
black body—the visceral response solicited in a white woman when the body 
of a black man enters her elevator. She may tell herself that she knows this 
body; that she has a handle on what a black body is and what it wants to 
do; that she has no reason to clutch her purse closely. Yancy writes how “she 
may come to judge her perception of the Black body as epistemologically 
false, but her racism may still have a hold on her lived body.”193 Despite 
herself, she tenses up, her body recoils. She does not search the man’s body 
to bring its true sense into relief; nor does she objectify him. She has no 
need to: his darkness symbolizes a threat that her sensibility registers with 
lightning quickness. She becomes self-aware, nearly to the point of paralysis. 
She averts her eyes and fixes them straight ahead, trying to overcome her 
body’s racism.194 But it is not that the black body’s gaze has turned her 
into an object, as Sartre would say. It is the very darkness of the man’s 
body, his sensory and symbolic constitution, that arrests the white woman’s 
movement. He remains an ambiguous presence, his darkness gripping her in 
such a way that her intellect and volition become helpless.
Yancy’s work draws insight from Merleau-Ponty, but even more from 
Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, a book wherein Fanon explicitly takes up 
the concept of the body schema to interrogate its function in intercorporeal 
relations. Ordinarily, the body schema is described as the “implicit 
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knowledge” possessed by the body that enables it effortlessly to reach for the 
cigarettes at the corner of the desk, or lean backward to retrieve the matches 
buried in the desk’s drawer.195 Such postural facility is experienced by the 
white body whether it is in its office or out in public. The black body, by 
contrast, is not afforded this facility when the gaze of a white body descends 
upon it. Recalling such an encounter, Fanon describes himself as once 
upon a time “completely dislocated” by the white gaze, which apprehended 
and returned his body to him “sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad 
in mourning….”196 “What else could it be for me but an amputation, an 
excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole body with black blood?”197 
In this scene of confiscation what gets excised from Fanon’s subjectivity is 
precisely his body schema, or at least its enabling function. It is replaced by 
a “racial epidermal schema” that, if anything, disables his body by entering 
it into an economy operating according to hues and tints, shades of light 
and dark.198
As objectified, the black body becomes laced with legends, symbols, 
myths, and fantasies—all of which are woven into it by the look of the white 
person and supported by what Fanon calls a “historico-racial schema.”199 
This schema, which is situated anonymously below the body schema, hijacks 
the black body, summoning it to be more than a practical, competent 
corporeality—what Merleau-Ponty calls an “I can.” Merleau-Ponty plainly 
says that it is our competent embodied perception that weaves the fabric of 
the real (PP x/iv-v). Fanon reminds us that it is the perception of the white 
body that traces the contours of the world and forces the non-white body 
to respond accordingly. “I wanted to come lithe and young into a world 
that was ours,” laments Fanon, “and to help build it together.”200 Alas, this 
world came readymade for him. To summarize this contrast, we might say 
that whereas the white body is solicited by the world to actively complete it, 
the black body is made to perform in a world that has always already been 
completed for it. It is in this economy of colored skin that the dialogical 
theory of perception exposes one of its limitations.
Perceptual experience, vision in particular, can never be divorced from 
the historical and cultural milieu that orients the body’s postural schema.201 
Corporeal orientation is what enables a simple look to confiscate the other’s 
body and elicit from it involuntary movements and emotions like shame or 
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fear. This orientation is invariably underwritten by race, among other social 
factors. As Sara Ahmed describes it, corporeal orientation is the point at 
which a body’s world unfolds. This world, we learn from Merleau-Ponty, 
expands outward from its center by the appropriation of language, tools, and 
other technologies. And just as our instruments become invisible once we 
have adapted ourselves to them—once they become zuhanden, as Heidegger 
says—whiteness disappears as a category that normatively structures the 
historical a priori of experience, not only for white bodies but for non-
white bodies as well. At any given moment this disappearance is already 
accomplished. The norm is set in place. Consequently, a racialized world 
oriented toward whiteness dilates the white world while simultaneously 
contracting the non-white world.202 All bodies depend upon the familiarity 
of this white world for their work. Getting things done or “doing things,” 
writes Ahmed, “depends not so much on intrinsic capacity, or even upon 
dispositions or habits, but on the ways in which the world is available as a 
space for action, a space where things ‘have a certain place’ or are ‘in place’.” 
If the body is always already racialized and oriented by whiteness, then the 
body schema is fundamentally structured by the world of whiteness and 
compelled to “inhabit whiteness” in order to navigate the world with facility, 
as if it were at home in whiteness, even when that body is black or brown.203 
This, of course, entails that the non-white body is never at home unless its 
home is the world of whiteness. The orientation of whiteness is precisely 
what puts “physical objects … styles, capacities, aspirations, techniques, 
habits” within our grasp.204 Conversely, failing to inhabit whiteness puts 
many things out of reach.
Reading Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology, it often seems that the world 
he has in mind is for the most part a world filled with things to be handled 
or manipulated, a world within reach of anybody or any body whatsoever. 
Merleau-Ponty’s world is a one of practical abilities. This world downplays 
how in the process of getting things done the functional use of everyday 
objects neglects their sensuous aspects, which require a more attentive, 
impractical, or contemplative approach in order to access, accommodate, 
and adapt to them.205 To be sure, the manipulation of things leads to 
better understanding; this is where knowledge and know-how come from. 
But we can manipulate things because we are things ourselves, sensitive 
98 Chapter 2
things. Sensing enables us to orient ourselves toward goals and order our 
surroundings into a meaningful habitat. For some of us this habitat is more 
accommodating than it is for others.
The problem of other bodies, different bodies, is certainly considered 
in the Phenomenology. So is sensing. Sense experience is considered at 
length. But the exemplary scenes in Merleau-Ponty’s text involve a human 
being confronting some inanimate object. This encounter anchors the 
norms of perception. When the human is incapable of maximizing its grip 
on the object, that is, when the human is unable to adjust its body to the 
physiognomy of another body, Merleau-Ponty signals a pathology (PP 
136/158). Yancy’s description of the “elevator effect,” Fanon’s theory of the 
racial epidermal schema, and Ahmed’s assessment of racialized corporeal 
orientation, however, reveal corporeal incompetence and dissymmetry 
as marginalized but no less prevalent norms of embodiment. We too are 
manipulated by objects, symbols, and orientations—and not just in ways 
that enable our bodies or expand our perceptual grasp.
Identity: Physiognomy and Style
Merleau-Ponty’s account of color perception in the Phenomenology 
underscores his more general point that our body’s communication with its 
environment happens primarily at the level of perceptual meaning, or what 
he often calls “physiognomy” or “motor physiognomy” (PP 209/243). The 
subject is not a pilot navigating the body from within or merely an organic 
mechanism. The subject is able to negotiate its surroundings because its 
corporeal composition is legible by other bodies, and other bodies are legible 
for it. Bodies possess the power to read and respond directly to both formal 
and qualitative features. Merleau-Ponty insists that perception is always 
laced with sense, and it is this sense that enables the body to respond to 
“sensations.”206 To say that colors induce the body to move in specific ways 
because they display a certain physiognomy is to say that sensory experience 
is always figured, that even colors are never experienced as detached from 
a significant horizon.207 The body can negotiate this horizon because it 
possesses its own physiognomy, one which is arranged by the physiognomy 
of the world and displayed in the arsenal of gestures it typically deploys 
(PP 143/168).
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Merleau-Ponty deploys many concepts to characterize the original unity 
of body and world. In the Phenomenology, it is perception, physiognomy, and 
style; in the course on nature, it is natural environment and the Earth;208 in 
The Visible and the Invisible, it is the flesh of the sensible, “this generality of 
the Sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to Myself,” as Merleau-Ponty 
puts it (VI 139/183). Individual bodies for him are always cut from the same 
impersonal cloth—personal individuation is something achieved, not given. 
The meaning of the personal, however, can only be understood against 
the backdrop of a pre-personal milieu, whether this is nature, the sensible 
realm as such, or the world as the sum total of profiles or an eminently 
expressive style:
The natural world is the horizon of all horizons, the style 
of all possible styles, which guarantees for my experiences 
a given, not a willed, unity underlying all the disruptions of 
my personal and historical life. Its counterpart within me is 
the given, general and pre-personal existence of my sensory 
functions in which we have discovered the definition of the 
body. (PP 330/381)
The concept of style gives us a clue to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding 
of corporeal identity, which is something dynamically constituted by 
environmental conditions and repetitive encounters. It must be maintained; 
it is not given. Our bodies are products of the sedimented meaning that 
constitutes our cultural milieu and the physical makeup of habitable 
space. These conditions comprise the always tenuous historical a priori 
which provides the mutable, phenomenal ground upon which the world is 
synthesized, understood, and modified by the body-subject.209 Born into 
a stylized environment which calls upon it to adopt a compatible bodily 
comportment, the body is not inscribed with a style as much as it coherently 
expresses a historical embeddedness, a set of social and physical limitations, 
constraints, and possibilities. The body is “a certain style informing my 
manual gestures and implying in turn a certain style of finger movements, 
and contributing, in the last resort, to a certain bodily bearing.” Its identity 
is, in a word, “a work of art” (PP 150/176).
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Style is not fixed in the visible form of the body; nor is it an abstraction 
from the many postures a given body exhibits. A style is nothing other 
than the specific animation of a body, the invisible force that renders it 
recognizable in its singularity (PP 327/378).210 As Graham Harman writes, 
“style is a real force that animates the qualities [of a body].”211 Style is not 
spontaneous expression, however, and in the last analysis the general style 
of the natural and social worlds serves as the condition of possibility for 
the emergence of individual style, which is to an extent determined by its 
historical and natural milieu.212 “Expression,” therefore, “has the form not 
only of a creative, but also of a responsive expression.”213 Style is an eminently 
consistent kind of response to how things are.
By defining it as style, Merleau-Ponty lends a determinate fluidity to 
corporeal identity. “A style,” he writes, “is a certain manner of dealing with 
situations, which I identify or understand in an individual or in a writer, by 
taking over that manner myself in a sort of imitative way, even though I may 
be quite unable to define it” (PP 327/378). Style is not only recognizable, 
it is transferable as well as somewhat vague and elusive. It is precise, 
but difficult to trace. Husserl might call it “anexact.” Style, of course, is 
recognizable across an array of individual examples and generalized from 
those many examples. “One can hear a newly discovered Charlie Parker 
recording and,” notes Harman, “immediately recognize the style; one can 
and will say that ‘that solo is really classic Bird’, even though up till now it 
was not part of the known Parker oeuvre.”214 Beyond a certain threshold 
of differentiation, however, a specific style begins to break up and lose 
coherence, perhaps morphing into another style. We can imagine a masterful 
jazz musician like Parker deviating so far from his usual delivery so as to 
approximate John Coltrane. Like plagiarism, this can happen intentionally 
or by accident, unbeknownst to the plagiarist. In such an instance, what 
would be left of Parker? Has he not in a sense become Coltrane, insofar as 
Coltrane’s musical style is the extent of his (audible) identity? In a strong 
sense Parker and Coltrane just are the sounds they produce, especially 
for the millions who do not know them personally. Merleau-Ponty gives 
a visual example in The Visible and the Invisible, explaining that a pebble 
or a shell exhibits an identity that persists throughout “their variations” 
but “within certain limits.” On this principle of identity bodies maintain 
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their identity so long as their sensible modifications do not disintegrate the 
style that animates them, whether this style is self-generated, borrowed, or 
remixed from already available styles. Identity is lost when a body moves 
“beyond a certain range of their changes” (VI 161/213), or crosses a stylistic 
threshold.215 Merleau-Ponty does not fully explore the causes of these 
deviations in identity, but he gives one of the best accounts of what style 
means for identity.
For Descartes, by contrast, it is the mind that judges an object’s 
identity as continuous throughout its modifications, or that determines a 
cloaked figure perceived from some distance to be a person rather than 
an automaton.216 It is this same mind which, removed from the mutable 
world of extended substance, retains its identity and subsists through every 
modification of the body. For Merleau-Ponty it is the body that recognizes 
another human being beneath the cloak. And it is the cloaked figure’s style 
of moving that gives it away. “It is through my body that I understand other 
people, just as it is through my body that I perceive ‘things’” (PP 186/216). 
The dialectic of recognition becomes a dialogue of styles that unfolds 
without the mediating judgment of the mind. “The concept of style,” 
writes Linda Singer, “secures the Other’s direct accessibility as a distinctive 
way of inhabiting the world. … His integrity is not that of a conceptual 
consistency, but of an existential project which is directly present, even if 
I cannot reconstruct its inner workings.”217 In Merleau-Ponty’s words, the 
other is for me “an unchallengeable style” that relays its identity to my own 
body’s identity and makes the other “in principle accessible to me as I am to 
myself” (PP 364/418; SB 222/238).
Style is one of the most supple phenomena adduced by Merleau-Ponty. 
It “ensures my existence of a stability, while allowing for the possibility of 
growth and change.”218 James, as we will see, refers to this stable instability 
as plasticity. Merleau-Ponty, for his part, directs us to the fluid constitution 
of bodily integrity. He defines the intercorporeal realm as a sphere of 
immanence where bodies communicate, influence, and reinforce each other. 
This communication is at once personal and anonymous, inherited and 
created.219 But corporeal style remains always dependent upon the body 
schema, which offers a constant stability amid the flux of intercorporeal 
dialogue. Gallagher points out that the body schema should not be regarded 
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as something standing between subject and object as mediator or “screen” 
(SB 219/236), but rather,  “insofar as it is dynamic in taking up certain 
postures and thus situating the body in respect to the environment, it 
remains experientially invisible—absently available.”220 It is there and not 
there, operating in the “active role of organizer” of sensations as something 
that “reflects and determines the posture that is taken up by the lived 
body in its everyday situations.”221 This seems to suggest that the activity 
of the body schema plays a more fundamental role in the organization of 
perception than any other component, including style, habit, or sensibility.
Identity: Body Schema
Faithful to phenomenological doctrine, Merleau-Ponty contends that a 
figure against a background is the simplest form of experience. Experience 
tells us this. But his point is not merely empirical. Lest we interpret 
his observation as a simple empirical truth, he notes that “this is not 
a contingent characteristic of factual perception” (PP 4/10). It is an 
ontological truth, a truth about how the world is structured transcendentally. 
And like all transcendentals in Merleau-Ponty, it is historically conditioned 
by perception. As Elizabeth Grosz points out, the body schema (she says 
“body image”) is at work in the structuring of this a priori. She writes,
The body image is necessary for the distinction between 
figure and ground, or between central and peripheral actions. 
Relative to its environment, the body image separates the 
subject’s body from a background of forces; but also within the 
body, the body image establishes the distinctions—between 
movements of limbs, say, and the rest of the body—which 
provide it with its corporeal context. A single movement 
reorients the whole of the body, creating what might be called 
a gait or posture, an individual and cultural bodily style.222
Sullivan refers to this orienting of the environment/other as “projective 
intentionality” and, like Grosz, sees such a view as troubling from a feminist 
ethical perspective:
Instead of being an account of the dynamic, co-constitutive relationship 
between self and other, the model of intersubjectivity offered by Merleau-
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Ponty tends toward that of a subject’s monologue with itself that includes 
a domineering erasure of others in its projective ‘communication’ 
with them.223
Although invaluable for understanding the corporeal structure of lived 
experience, Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema is often blind 
to raced, gendered, and other forms of embodiment.224 I would add that 
he equally neglects unfigured experience, or the experience of sensing 
what is ungraspable—for example, wind, cold, sunlight; the elemental or 
atmospheric in general—that does not stand out in relief against a backdrop. 
This blind spot in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, which ties the structure of 
the world to the constitution of the body schema, informs his view that 
body and environment, subject and object, are synchronized or reversible, 
and that our primary mode of engagement with the world is our familiar 
manipulation of things as well as their innocuous solicitation of us.
We have already seen that habits are specific rearrangements of the 
general body schema, which serves as the variable invariant, as it were, 
against which the modifications of the body are registered. We have seen, 
moreover, how Fanon, Yancy, and Ahmed call into question the normative 
historicity of the body schema, and how Grosz and Sullivan raise problems 
about its constitutive activity. It then becomes possible to say that the 
body schema’s dynamic relation with its environment is constitutive of 
its individuation and that its apparent invariance (PP 141/165) applies 
only to its function as active regulator of movement, but does not apply to 
any determinate regulations themselves. These regulations are normative, 
determined culturally, historically, intercorporeally; they configure and are 
configured by the world we perceive. Despite its historical variance the body 
schema nevertheless operates for Merleau-Ponty as the dominant organizing 
principle of perception. From the perspective of lived experience, then, the 
world must appear as complicit or synchronized with the body-subject’s 
practical agenda, even if this agenda is laced with anonymous, impersonal, 
and unconscious prejudices—with alterity.
On the one hand, it is possible to characterize Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of the body schema and habit as plastic, as does Weiss.225 
This does not mean that the lived body’s structure begins as a blank, 
undifferentiated slate and only subsequently becomes schematized and 
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habituated. The lived body requires habits and body schemata in order 
to perceive, and without them “perception is impossible,” says Merleau-
Ponty (Child 122/37). They are a basic condition of perception, not just an 
outcome of it. These basic structures maintain their stability while remaining 
open to modifications that would restructure them. The modifications 
could be perceptual or physiological. Since perception is internally linked 
to the body’s constitution (in as much as the body is part of the world of 
perception), any restructuring entails a new style of movement, and thus a 
new perceptual experience. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “This link between 
motility and perception shows at what point it is true to say that the two 
functions are only two aspects of a single totality and that the perception 
of one’s entry into the world and of one’s own body form a system” 
(Child 122/38).
On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty seems resistant to the idea that the 
lived body is fully plastic, completely open to external modification or 
destruction. There appears to be something indestructible about the lived 
body. Insofar as it is a living (human) body, and not a body reduced to 
its objective relations in the world—a merely material body—it maintains 
a set of transcendental invariants that do not succumb to the effects of 
material transformation or physical breakdown. Or, put differently, it is 
not clear on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis how these invariants could ever be 
directly affected by material forces; they themselves are not material and 
they have no material basis. They are, as it were, incorporeal corporealities. 
Included among these, the body schema, consciousness, and intentionality 
serve as the limit conditions of the embodied subject, that is to say, the 
conditions that compose the agent to whom the world appears and from 
whom the world receives its meaning, but who also remains out of step 
with the world’s physicality. The difference of the lived body is precisely is 
non-physical constitution. Also among these invariants is the figure-ground 
structure of perception, something only possessed by beings with bodies 
like ours. The figure-ground structure is grounded in the body schema, 
which suggests that the body schema must be always present in some 
form for the body to perceive. If this is true, then perception must submit 
its primacy to the body’s postural latency, which is internally related to 
perception but also determined by the body’s physical, physiological, and 
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generally material dynamics, some of which are not perceptual and can be 
metaphysically separated from the perceptual system. Put otherwise, the 
lived body is dual in nature: it is both physical and non-physical, material 
and transcendental. These aspects are internally related and inseparable, 
and it is clear that Merleau-Ponty favors the lived body as in some sense 
constitutive of objectivity, including the objectivity of the physical body. 
But could the lived body exist without the physical, objective body? Is the 
lived body transcendental in the strong sense, the condition of possibility 
of the objective body? It seems that it would have to be if it is the case that 
perception is the condition of possibility of the world. This would also mean 
that the lived body cannot be fully destroyed by the physical world, that 
something of it transcends the body’s materiality. Merleau-Ponty’s language 
of flesh and incarnation suggests a “spiritual” dimension to the lived body, 
although he is careful to avoid that term.
The lived body is essentially the perceiving body. Perception is what 
gives the body its life. But perception depends upon the body schema, which 
is vulnerable to imperceptible forces. While the dialectic of perception may 
work to reconfigure and reorient the body schema, material forces threaten 
to destabilize/deschematize it, along with the figure-ground structure of 
intentionality and even perception itself. An unschematized body is longer 
capable of distinguishing figures or grounds and is not, therefore, able to 
enter into dialogue with its environment. Such a body would not be “lived,” 
in Merleau-Ponty’s terms; it would be reduced to an object. But the lived 
body is an object; its objectivity is the site of its living. Without it there is no 
place for perception or consciousness to occur, no place from which the 
body schema or figure-ground horizon can organize the world of perception. 
The latter are not the unqualified conditions of possibility for the world to 
appear, for they themselves cannot appear without the objective body that 
functions as their material locus.
All of this is to say that the lived body is discontinuous with the material 
world in which it is embedded. There is a diachrony that marks the interface 
of body and world. And yet, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, body and world are 
synchronous with each other. They are ontologically parallel and internally 
related, co-constitutive. What I am suggesting is that this is true only at the 
level of perception, but not the deepest level of their relation—sensibility.
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Since, on Merleau-Ponty’s view, perception presupposes a functioning 
body schema, and the body schema is acquired dialogically, body and 
world must be synchronized for perception to occur. Otherwise, the body 
schema could not develop and the dialogue could not occur. I think this 
synchronization is required for Merleau-Ponty’s conception of reversibility, 
which is implicit in the Phenomenology and explicitly emphasized in The 
Visible and the Invisible. It is responsible for his view that subjects and objects 
are basically articulations of a single sensible element called the flesh, 
where “seer and visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know 
which sees and which is seen” (VI 139/183). If the subject-object relation 
is fundamentally diachronic, however, then it is not properly reversible. It 
is asymmetrical. And it is sensibility, I will argue, alongside Levinas, that 
introduces asymmetry into the subject-object relation.
A Synchronous Sensibility
The language of synchrony is employed by Merleau-Ponty on many 
occasions to describe the body-world relation. It is a recurrent trope in his 
texts. He speaks, for instance, of impersonal biological life and personal 
life as for the most part operating in concert, the former being “practically 
taken for granted” as something “I rely on to keep me alive.” As he frames it, 
we exist “without being able either to reduce the organism to its existential 
self, or itself to the organism” (PP 84/99). Citing the biography of Saint-
Exupéry, Merleau-Ponty notes that on rare occasions our organic life can 
be almost completely suppressed by our personal life: “It may even happen 
when I am in danger that my human situation abolishes my biological one, 
that my body lends itself without reserve to action” (PP 84/99). Later in the 
Phenomenology he explicitly notes the synchronization of the biological and 
the human, yet lends a certain primacy to the biological:
as we have indicated above, biological existence is 
synchronized [embrayée] with human existence and is never 
indifferent to its distinctive rhythm. Nevertheless, we shall 
now add, ‘living’ (leben) is a primary process from which, as 
a starting point, it becomes possible to ‘live’ (erleben) this or 
that world, and we must eat and breathe before perceiving 
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and awakening to relational living, belonging to colours and 
lights through sight, to sound through hearing, to the body of 
another through sexuality, before arriving at the life of human 
relations. (PP 159-160/186)
Instead of taking this as a glimpse into Merleau-Ponty’s tacit naturalism, we 
should see it as an example of his “empirically responsible” phenomenology, 
but an example that seems to oppose his primacy of perception argument. 
From an existential point of view the biological does not come first; the 
human is not built upon the organic body. The lived body expresses, 
reciprocally, the physiological and psychic because it always already finds 
itself absorbed in a meaningful circuit of behavior. Its biology must be 
understood and expressed from out of its lifeworld.
This is one of the reasons why Merleau-Ponty speaks on the one hand 
of an original syncretism of body and world, but then quickly dispels the 
notion that sensing (sentir) is ever without a human sense (PP 211/245). 
And yet, he speaks of sensibility as belonging to an anonymous life of the 
senses that thrives “on the fringe of my own personal life and acts.” He 
writes, “Each time I experience a sensation, I feel that it concerns not my 
own being…but another self which has already sided with the world, which 
is already open to certain of its aspects and synchronized [synchronisé] with 
them” (PP 216/250). Now, this is a form of synchrony that the lived body is 
not in control of, for it is established imperceptibly and concerns the body 
as something that senses before it perceives, that lives materially before it 
grasps meaningfully. It hints at an aesthetic dimension operating below the 
radar of perception.
It is here that we see Merleau-Ponty catching sight of the immanent 
relation between sensing and sensed that characterizes his notion of flesh. 
More important for us, however, we are shown the diachronic point at 
which the body-world relation becomes a volatile one. It is at the level of 
sensing that the body is at its most vulnerable, where its hold on the world 
and its capacity to dialogue with other bodies is not yet accomplished, and 
is even susceptible to experiences that could dismantle its integrity. It is here 
that body and world become unhinged.
Sensing relies on a synchronization or synthesis of the senses (with each 
other and with their proper objects) whereby each organ’s unique means 
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of exploring is brought together in the intersensory realm of perception. 
Perception is made possible by the “domain of sense itself, the community 
of significance between [the visual and tactile] being inadequate to ensure 
their union in one single experience” (PP 225/260). This union, as we 
have seen, is effected by the body and the intentional arc that allows it to 
actualize the “motor potentiality” of an object and thereby effectively grasp 
its meaning.
I am able to touch effectively only if the phenomenon finds 
an echo within me, if it accords with a certain nature of my 
consciousness, and if the organ which goes out to meet it 
is synchronized with it. The unity and identity of the tactile 
phenomenon do not come about through any synthesis 
of recognition in the concept, they are founded upon the 
unity and identity of the body as a synergic totality. (PP 
316-317/366)
Thus, the dialogue of subject and object, of styles and physiognomies, only 
occurs when the lived body is capable of conforming itself to the “logic of 
the world,” that is, when it is capable of synchronizing with it (PP 326/377).
In his treatment of sensibility/sense experience Merleau-Ponty seems 
to acknowledge the diachrony of sensation and its capacity to disrupt 
body-world synchrony. But, as we will see, he is reluctant to assign explicit 
primacy to sensing over perceiving. Indeed, these distinct modes of 
experience—the former unwieldy, the latter organized—are either conflated 
or collapsed in most of Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions. Understood as a pre-
perceptual and anonymous mode of embodiment, the volatility of sensing 
poses a threat to the synchronization of body and world. It opens the body 
to forces foreign to perception.
The concept of flesh developed in The Visible and the Invisible follows up 
the idea of synchronization with the insight that seer and seen, touching and 
touched, are reversible or chiasmic phenomena. The subject-object dialogue, 
which retains the dualist form, is transformed into an immanent ontology 
that regards subjects and objects as individual expressions of the sensible in 
general. I would not want to go so far as to say that such a move “reduces 
the other to the same” or eliminates alterity from intercorporeal relations. 
However, I do agree with Levinas when he says that “[there is a] priority of 
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the flesh…to the detriment of another ambiguity or ambivalence, that of the 
enigma of sensation-sentiment, which is played out in the passivity of the 
senses affected [sens affectés] by the sensorial, between the pure undergoing or 
suffering and eventual pain, and the known [su] of knowledge that remains 
behind as its residue or trace.”226 Later I will return to this insight.
Not unlike the idealists, Merleau-Ponty tames the volatility of sensation 
in two ways: first, by defining it in terms of synchrony and treating it as 
something that for the most part enables our perceptual competence; and, 
more radically, by invoking a “fundamental narcissism of all vision” which is 
supposed to describe the mode of being of the flesh. The general reversibility 
signaled by this portrayal of the sensible may indeed pertain to peaceful 
and mundane experiences of otherness, but it neglects the many ways that 
sensation can disable us, as well as the uncertainty, if not danger, involved 
as our bodies move from one sensory environment to another. It does not 
do justice to novel or extreme sensations, and it downplays the reality of 
hostile or deadly environments. In a word, it mitigates the vulnerability 
of our bodies.
As noted, Merleau-Ponty does recognize a layer of sensation that 
operates “below” perception. As pre-perceptual it does not solicit dialogue 
with the lived body. Instead, it remains out of sync with lived experience 
and descends upon the body with a volatile proposition.227 Merleau-
Ponty’s emphasis on body-world synchronization obscures the asymmetry 
of intercorporeity at the level of sensation. This results from his desire to 
assimilate sensation (le sentir) to the model of perception as “communion,” 
which tends to regard otherness as generally hospitable. The thesis of 
reversibility can only be advanced by ignoring the resistant alterity of the 
material world, that is, at the peril of sensation’s volatility. This is why 
neither the phenomenology of perception nor the ontology of the flesh can 
adequately address the problems of embodiment and why the metaphysics 
of bodies we find in Spinoza or Nietzsche,228 for instance, must also be 
consulted in order to decipher the meaning of the body.
In giving an account of subjectivity and the immanence of the body-
world relation Merleau-Ponty makes significant advances past Kant and 
Husserl by developing concepts such as style, physiognomy, and habit. 
These concepts allow him to speak coherently about perception and 
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intersubjectivity as corporeal interactions that do not require the mediation 
of an immaterial transcendental subject or disembodied mind. For this 
reason, Merleau-Ponty can be regarded as a kind of materialist.229 This 
ambition becomes even more apparent when he is writing about sensing, or 
when he speaks of the “carnality” of the flesh in The Visible and the Invisible. 
There his theory of embodied perception shifts its focus from the form of 
perception to the material of perception—that is, sensation, or the sensible 
as such. It is in his analysis of sensing that we can best see Merleau-Ponty 
trying to secure the immanence of body and environment. His commitment 
to immanence, however, is limited by his commitment to the primacy of 
perception thesis and his methodological commitment to the principle 
of intentionality. Both of these reintroduce a measure of distance, or 
transcendence, into immanence. The limit of his materialism appears when 
his theory of habit is contrasted with a neurophysiological account like that 
given by James.
At this point and beyond I remain agnostic on the question of whether or 
not Merleau-Ponty succeeds at establishing the materiality of the world and 
making concrete the phenomenological subject. That is, it is not clear to me 
that he has the resources to argue for the material reality of the body or its 
world. What is clear is that in his attempt to do justice to the subjective and 
objective sides of experience he tends to provide more substantial arguments 
for the constructivist view of the subject. This is no reason to abandon his 
path in favor of another, but it does call into question the degree to which 
his corporeal descriptions distance him from the idealism of Husserlian 
phenomenology.230
Chapter 3
Perception, Sensation, and the Problem of Violence
The body is a strange thing, and when it is caught up 
in an accident involving non-human forces, there is no 
predicting the result.
Aira, An Episode in the Life of a Landscape Painter
Merleau-Ponty begins his rehabilitation of sensation as early as 
Phenomenology of Perception. After rejecting the modern view of sensation 
as a discrete unit of content that must be assembled by the mind with 
other units in order to build the objects of perception, he endorses a view 
of sensation as sensing (a more appropriate translation of le sentir, sense 
experience)231 which is adapted primarily from Erwin Straus’s The Primary 
World of Senses, on the one hand, and Husserl’s Ideas II, on the other. 
His idea of sensing regards it as “that vital communication with the world 
which makes it present as a familiar setting of our life” (PP 52-53/64-
65). He thus makes sensation central to his post-dualist perspective and 
incorporates it into the primacy of perception thesis he champions. The 
trouble is that he uses the concept in several, not always compatible, ways. 
Its reference shifts throughout his texts. Although I will not catalogue every 
nuance of le sentir or la sensation, I will adduce some of the divergent uses 
of “sensing” in Merleau-Ponty’s texts. At the same time I will argue that 
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one particular usage best captures the significance of sensing, namely, that 
sensing is the body’s primary mode of engagement with otherness; that it 
operates below the level of intentionality (and therefore perception); and 
that it is even more basic than operative intentionality, which Merleau-
Ponty identifies as the “natural and antepredicative” form of perception. 
The operative form of intentionality negotiates the body’s first contact with 
the phenomenal field, “furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to 
translate [via explicit judgments] into precise language” (PP xviii/xiii). It is 
tacit, “unconscious.” Like operative intentionality, sensing denotes a certain 
imperceptible continuity between body and world, and it is fundamental to 
Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal philosophy. While his privileging of perception 
often elevates the perceiving subject above the perceived object, there is a 
pervasive sense in which the dialectical relation between subject and object 
is primary for him. He does not fully appreciate, however, the subject’s 
passivity in this dialectic.
A Healthy Ambiguity
It is notable that Merleau-Ponty recognizes a distinction between 
sensation and perception. Indeed, it is this distinction that motivates the 
present analysis of his work. Whereas perception is constantly striving 
to pull objects out of their ambiguous presence and into workable relief 
from their background, it is sensation that occasionally threatens to 
break up the synchrony enjoyed by perceptual experience. To claim that 
such interruptions are merely invitations to explore the undiscovered 
meanings contained in the perceptual horizon, as Merleau-Ponty and his 
commentators often do, is to miss the qualitative difference between an 
experience that beckons our attention (perception) and one that directly 
engages—sometimes forcibly—our bodies (sensation). This is not to 
say that sensation marks the suffering of the body, but it is sometimes 
that. He writes: “With the problem of sense experience, we rediscover 
that of association and passivity” (PP 53/65). Perception, by contrast, is 
never merely passive; nothing just “happens” to the lived body. That is, 
there are no non-subjective perceptual events (PP 411/470). There are, 
however, “vital event[s]” that occur unconsciously (Nature 174). Are these 
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events sensed, perceived, or both? Neither? It is not clear how they are 
phenomenologically disclosed.
Sensation is often assimilated to perception in Merleau-Ponty’s texts. 
When this happens there is a problematic reduction of the alterity of 
sensation, as well as a glossing of the problem of passivity posed by sense 
experience. Once again, a healthy ambiguity inhabits the border between 
sensing and perceiving and Merleau-Ponty knows this, even exploits it. The 
ambiguity makes it difficult to know whether he intended to differentiate 
rigorously two ontologically distinct layers of experience, or if he desired 
simply to demarcate two aspects of perception: the affective/passive and 
the intellectual/active. My view is that he explicitly regards sensing as a 
mode of perception, but in his explication of le sentir he also uncovers a 
lost dimension of embodiment that cannot be readily recuperated by his 
model of perception. The question now becomes, does Merleau-Ponty 
attempt to incorporate the “problem of sense experience” into the problem 
of perception? Or is there something about sense experience that proves 
intractable for the phenomenology of perception? At the end of the day, 
the ambiguity that motivates these questions proves irresolvable and yet, 
precisely for this reason, worthy of interrogation.
Perhaps anticipating that a simple privileging of embodiment is not 
sufficient to liberate phenomenology from transcendental idealism, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that it is the “primary layer [couche originaire] of 
sense experience [sentir]” that allows perception to “break with the critical 
attitude” (PP 238, 239/276). It is here that Merleau-Ponty most deliberately 
departs from his idealist precursors in order to chart the existence of an 
experience not prey to any kind of subjective synthesis. By beginning with 
what is phenomenally sensible, he begins with an always already synthesized 
form/content instead of positing a discrete form and content that are only 
brought together by a unifying faculty.
I start from unified experience and from there acquire, in a 
secondary way, consciousness of a unifying activity when, 
taking up an analytical attitude, I break perception into 
qualities and sensation, and when, in order to recapture on 
the basis of these the object into which I was in the first place 
blindly thrown, I am obliged to suppose an act of synthesis 
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which is merely the counterpart of my analysis. (PP 276-
277/275; cf. PrP 25/69)
The classical approach to experience begins with abstractions, not with 
what is given, and is responsible for the mistaken view that the subject’s 
role in experience is to provide the chaotic world of sensation with formal 
order. Merleau-Ponty’s concern is to keep the subject always in touch with 
the objective world and to demonstrate that this immanent relation is the 
source of the content of perception and, by consequence, the form of the 
world. This results in the view that the world does not achieve any explicit 
form unless it is in dialogue with a human agent, which sounds like idealism. 
“The thing is inseparable from a person perceiving it, and can never be 
actually in itself because its articulations are those of our very existence…” 
(PP 320/370). Oftentimes the subject of perception is described by 
Merleau-Ponty as immediately in touch with a semi-determinate, but never 
amorphous, world of things always on its way to becoming more precisely 
formed and therefore more hospitable to the body’s motor capacity. 
This ambiguous and anonymous “lifeworld” provides the transcendental 
conditions of perception (PP 365/418-419).232 More fundamental than the 
lifeworld, I would suggest, is the realm of the sensible.
Anonymity
Both sensation and perception are occasionally designated as anonymous, as 
when Merleau-Ponty writes that “Sensation [sensation] can be anonymous 
only because it is incomplete.” Or: “Perception is always in the mode of the 
impersonal ‘One’” (PP 216, 240/250, 277). These remarks have generated 
consistent criticism from feminist philosophers who charge that by affirming 
the reality of an anonymous body, Merleau-Ponty overlooks the role that 
gender plays in the construction of experience. This criticism is justifiable, 
but it does not apply to all of the senses of “anonymous” employed by 
Merleau-Ponty. That is, it does not apply to the anonymity of sensation 
insofar as sensation is something undergone by the body unconsciously or 
pre-personally. Before explicating this level of sensation we need to see what 
else is anonymous for Merleau-Ponty.
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There are at least four sites of anonymity noted by Merleau-Ponty. 
First, there is the pre-communicative stage in the psychogenesis of the 
child, where his or her body is not yet distinguishable from the body of 
another. Here “there is not one individual over against another but rather 
an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated group life” (Child 119/33). 
Second, there is the anonymity of habitual actions. It is true that a person’s 
habits inform their style, and thus their personal identity. But to the extent 
that habits can be triggered unthinkingly or operate automatically, they 
possess a certain anonymity. Third, Merleau-Ponty sometimes speaks of 
the body in general, by which he means the organic body that lives “as a 
prepersonal cleaving to the general form of the world, as an anonymous and 
general existence” (PP 84/99). The idea of a general—that is, gender-free, 
race-free, ability-free—body “beneath” the personal is problematic because, 
as Sullivan argues, it suggests a neutral ground upon which our bodies 
communicate with other bodies. But, the objection runs, no such ground 
exists, as our bodies are always individuated by habits and other historically 
particular bodily behaviors. When I assume that the gestures of the other 
are understandable because we share a common body, then I run the risk of 
deciphering the other in terms of my corporeity (or the myth of a universal 
body), rather than trying to achieve a site of communication that preserves 
the other’s particularities.233
Johanna Oksala rejects the view that an anonymous body subtends the 
intersubjective relation and that intersubjectivity is something that needs to 
be achieved. She argues that the body-subject is historically generated all the 
way down by “language, tradition, and community.”234 Even the anonymous 
body is structured by environmental and social conditions. We have already 
seen that Merleau-Ponty does not quite offer a fully historicized lived body, 
that there are certain structural invariants that assume different modes 
but are ontologically immutable. Or, as Butler argues with reference to his 
treatment of sexuality, Merleau-Ponty’s appeal to “the universal structures 
of bodily existence” “prefigures the analysis of lived experience, investing the 
body with an ahistorical structure which is in actuality profoundly historical 
in origin.”235 Whether or not he subscribes to an invariant general body, it 
seems that Merleau-Ponty recognizes at least one anonymity that is radically 
ahistorical: the anonymity of sensation, “which remains forever anterior to 
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our perception.” This is the fourth site of anonymity, the transcendental 
mode of sensation.
Modes of Sensation
There are two forms of sensation at play in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, one 
that he criticizes (call it “substantive” sensation) and one that he endorses 
(call it “transitive” sensation). The transitive form is conceived under two 
registers: the phenomenological and the transcendental. It is implied in his 
term “sensing” (sentir).236 Despite what has been said about the impurity 
of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental philosophy he does provide a concept of 
sensation that is close to a pure a priori. Sensation, on this reading, serves as 
a necessary, unconditioned condition of perceptual experience. But to argue 
for the primacy of sensation in Merleau-Ponty, as I am here, it is necessary 
to contrast the notion of sensing developed in the Sense Experience chapter 
of Phenomenology of Perception with the classical conception of sensation 
(sensation) found in modern philosophy, which Merleau-Ponty critiques 
in the opening chapter of his text. The classical notion of sensation views 
sensations as data, as discrete bits of material received from the external 
world and processed by the mind into representations of that world. 
Merleau-Ponty rejects this view as a fiction that betrays the evidence of 
experience, but he does not provide a full-fledged alternative to the modern 
view. Likely fearing that he would merely be replacing one abstraction for 
another, he elects instead to turn to the evidence of lived experience, that 
is, the world of perception. His positive thinking about sensation, then, is 
overshadowed by his critique of sensation as a “unit of experience.” This is 
unfortunate because his own view of sensing forms the basis of his theory 
of painting in essays like “Cézanne’s Doubt” and “Eye and Mind,” and it is 
crucial to understanding that theory. Since he proclaims that “any theory of 
painting is a metaphysics” (EM 171/42), an understanding of his conception 
of sensing can reveal important features of his metaphysics.
The classical view of sensation which Merleau-Ponty rejects gets 
reinforced in everyday language when we speak of sensations as discrete 
properties that cause us to see a book as red or to feel it as smooth, for 
example. Red and smooth, we say, belong to the cover of this book and it is 
these properties that affect, separately, our visual and tactile senses. Color is 
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received by the eyes; texture is apprehended by the fingertips. It is the book 
that is red and smooth, and it is the task of the mind to reassemble these 
stimuli into representations that correspond to the objects that produce 
them. The problem with this view is that it places metaphysical prejudices 
ahead of experience (PP 5/11) and results in a backward view of the nature 
of things and how we know them, according to the phenomenologist. As 
Taylor Carman puts it,
Nowhere in our perceptual awareness do we come across 
discrete qualitative bits of experience fully abstracted from 
the external, perceptually coherent environment. … This is in 
part just to say that perceptual experience is intentional, that 
it is of something, whereas impressions, sensations, and sense 
data are supposed to be the nonintentional stuff from which 
the mind somehow extracts or constructs an experience of 
something.237
We perceive things, not sensory units. Sensation, phenomenology teaches 
us, is inferred from perception when we reflect on how it is that an object, 
which is “not completely our work,” can transmit its qualities to us (PP 
37/46). This classical (and quotidian) line of thinking assumes that objects 
exist apart from us, fully formed with sharp boundaries and fixed properties. 
It puts an objectivist metaphysics and naïve realism ahead of the ambiguous 
content of perception, which for Merleau-Ponty is the first and final arbiter 
of what exists. “Experience,” writes Carman, “rarely exhibits such sharply 
defined features and no analysis of perception into discrete attitudes with 
crisply defined contents intending isolated qualities can capture the peculiar 
perceptual milieu’, always at once a behavioral milieu’, in which things 
show up for us under meaningful aspects.”238 When we attend to what we are 
actually given, we never discover sensations. Instead, we find figures against 
backgrounds and semi-determinate bodies which become more determinate 
as perception catalogues their adumbrations. We find qualities that entice 
and repel us, a sensible realm that perception “infuses” [imprègne] with 
significance and style (PP 34/43).
What is required is a concept of sensation that does not reduce the 
style of the sensible to the intentional life of the perceiving subject and 
does not completely subject the materiality of sensation, its affective 
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and imperceptible directive force, to the formality of the understanding 
or practical orientation of the body. Shying away from the language of 
sensation, Merleau-Ponty speaks of sensing as “an experience in which we 
are given not ‘dead’ qualities, but active ones” (PP 52/64). This is what I am 
calling the shift from a substantive notion of sensation (“dead qualities”) 
to a transitive one (“active qualities”). In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, sensing is 
that “vital communication with the world” which makes it feel like home, 
familiar and manageable. Sensing “invests the quality with vital value, 
grasping it first in its meaning for us, for that heavy mass which is our body, 
whence it comes about that it always involves a reference to the body” (PP 
52-53/64-65). By interpreting it as communal Merleau-Ponty indicates 
that sensing has active and passive dimensions. Sensing receives the world 
and seizes it. By making sensing a corporeal event he puts the subject 
immediately in touch with the object itself. But, of course, this is an impure 
immediacy, mediated by the invariant structures that keep the body out of 
step with the physical world.
The insistence that sensing is a bodily event at once active and passive 
is taken over from Husserl and Erwin Straus, both of whom contest the 
Aristotelian idea that sensing is analogous to a piece of wax receiving the 
imprint of a seal. In addition to the sensations that fill our representations, 
Husserl’s Ideas II describes the role that kinaesthetic sensations (kinaestheses) 
play in the constitution of perception. Kinaestheses are the non-
representational sensations that guide motility. They denote “one’s inner 
sense of the movements, tensions and possibilities of one’s own Body,” as 
Alia Al-Saji puts it. As the body moves about its environment, negotiating its 
contours and encountering other bodies, it responds almost automatically 
to the directives and solicitations communicated to it. This practical know-
how, or competence, requires no mediating idea or judgment in order to be 
executed, although it typically draws on established habits. As Al-Saji says, 
“there is no question of mimesis between kinaestheses and the qualities of 
the perceived thing. It is rather by moving around things and tracing their 
contours that kinaestheses make perception, as a concrete dynamic process, 
possible.”239 She concludes: “Kinaesthetic sensations are hence a function 
of my Body’s orientation in the world; they are my way of feeling the active 
engagement of my Body with an outside.”240
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A similar view of the function of sensation—as non-representational, 
directive—is found in the work of Erwin Straus, a figure to whom Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology appeals and whose analysis of sensing clearly 
influenced the latter’s own position. In The Primary World of Senses Straus 
argues that Descartes is responsible for the pervasive view that sensations 
are ideas, merely mental events. “As mere ideas of color, light, and the like, 
sensations to Descartes lack any intrinsic contact with physical things. This 
relationship is only inferred….”241 On this view, the subject has sensations 
but does not properly receive, let alone suffer, them. This is because the 
subject who senses, for Descartes, is “removed from time and becoming” 
and “receives indifferently and unmoved.”242 For Straus, this entails the 
elimination of the “life” of sensing, by which he means its dialogical or 
communal character as well as it affective force. He writes:
All sensory impressions are answers to questions; they are not 
simply there in the way in which the physiological processes 
underlying them are. We receive sensory impressions insofar as 
we orient ourselves within our primary relationship with the 
world by questing, seeking, expecting.243
Sensing and knowing are sharply distinguished in Straus’s view. When we 
know something, we grasp its meaning by suspending our vital commerce 
and rendering an explicit judgment about the thing in question. This image 
of cognition is analogous to what Merleau-Ponty calls intentionality of act. 
“Sensing,” which is closer to Merleau-Ponty’s operative intentionality, is “a 
sympathetic experiencing. It is directed to the physiognomic characteristics 
of the alluring and the frightening,” says Straus. He continues, in language 
echoed in Phenomenology of Perception,
When we grasp an expression, a communion is established 
which seizes and changes us, which holds and confines 
us; while in knowing, it is we who seize the world, who 
appropriate it and detach ourselves from the particular, 
attaining the full scope of an horizon which, ultimately, we 
transcend.244
We see Straus here appreciating the ambivalence of sensation, its ability to 
provide us with appearances as well as their capacity to direct and transform 
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our corporeal identities. Moreover, we see him anticipating Todes’s 
insistence that practice makes the practitioner. He even acknowledges the 
disabling potential of sensation: “it is just in sensations of pain that we feel 
the world attacking and invading us.”245 It is this last point that gets covered 
over when the perceptual field is regarded primarily as a totality of tools 
or equipment to be handled, or when the synchrony of body and world is 
stressed too emphatically.
Straus’s theory of sensing is useful here because it brings out the 
material, vital dimension of sensing that is endorsed by Merleau-Ponty but 
sometimes overshadowed by his commitment to describing perception in 
instrumental terms. Straus demonstrates that the body’s sensibility is neither 
limited to the passive reception of stimuli, nor is it the Kantian faculty 
that projects a spatiotemporal grid into the sensible field. As Barbaras 
says of Straus,
sensibility must be apprehended in the form of sensing, 
understood as a specific mode of relation, as the 
communication of the living being with a world. Sensing is 
the mode according to which the living being as such is linked 
with the world (and this is why it defines a common ground 
between human and animal), it designates the living being’s 
originary mode of existence.246
Straus’s view of the lived body is more naturalistic than what we usually 
find in Merleau-Ponty. In his course notes on nature from the Collège de 
France Merleau-Ponty does, however, adopt Straus’s philosophical biology 
of sensory communion.247 But it is not so much a biological conception of 
human embodiment that Straus is interested in articulating. He is much 
more concerned to draw a phenomenological distinction between the 
affective and cognitive modes of existence, or what he calls the “pathic” 
and “gnostic” modes. These modes correspond for Straus to sensing and 
perceiving, respectively, and significantly do not display a continuity.248 
Needless to say, Straus spends most of his energy unpacking the mode of 
sensing, which Barbaras says “corresponds, in fact, to a mode of immediate 
communication, to a sympathy with the world that does not entail any 
thematic dimension.”249
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Although he does not explicitly draw such a definitive distinction 
between sensing and perceiving, Merleau-Ponty displays a marked interest 
in the immediate, affective dimension of body-world contact. When 
describing the transitive form of sensation, or sensation as communion, he 
refers to it, as already noted, as the “primary layer” of perception. It would 
be difficult for him to acknowledge that this layer is made up of “non-
intentional stuff,” for this would contradict the doctrine that experience is 
always of full-fledged things and, moreover, it would require him to give an 
account of how perception, which is thoroughly intentional, can commune 
with the non-intentional. Phenomenology could not provide such an 
account. This may be why Merleau-Ponty holds back from drawing a sharp 
distinction between sensing and perceiving. It is not always clear precisely 
what their relation is for him, if one is ontologically primary or if they are 
ontologically equiprimordial. One thing is clear, however: sensation is not 
seen as just the inferred material of perception or the passive reception of 
stimuli. It is a corporeal event undergone by the subject and constitutive of 
the subject’s integrity.
A purely physiological perspective cannot capture the phenomenon of 
sensation because it is blind to the intentional dimension of sensing, as the 
Phenomenology argues:
Sensation is intentional because I find that in the sensible 
a certain rhythm of existence is put forward—abduction or 
adduction—and that, following up this hint, and stealing into 
the form of existence which is thus suggested to me, I am 
brought into relation with an external being, whether it be in 
order to open myself to it or to shut myself off from it. (PP 
212-213/247)
We glean from this passage that “intentionality” does not just denote the 
fact that all sensory experience is directed toward an object. It suggests 
that to have a sensation involves electing to be taken into or removed from 
a situation. Furthermore, there is here an overlapping of intentionality and 
affectivity. To sense is to be directed by an external object, to be carried or 
assailed by its rhythm. This is what it means for sensation to have a “motor 
physiognomy” or “living significance” (PP 209/242-243). If it is the case 
that “the world ceaselessly assails and beleaguers subjectivity as waves 
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wash round a wreck on the shore” (PP 207/240), then we must regard 
the directives of sensation as fundamental to the constitution and power 
(puissance) of subjectivity (PP 210, 211/244, 245). We will see this theme 
recur in some of Levinas’s writing on sensation and aesthetics.
Sensation is able to play a part in the arrangement of our subjectivity 
because sensibility is internally related to our postural schema and the 
practical objectives it means to accomplish. Lingis writes that “the postural 
schema is not simply a diagram of the way all the parts are equilibrated: 
the body does not tend to a state of rest, but tends to maintain a state of 
tension centered in a particular direction.” This centering is directed by 
the body’s posture, “that is, the motile way the body centers and converges 
all its receptor surfaces upon an objective.”250 But we also cannot forget 
that the body “is itself a sensible being that continually schematizes itself, 
makes a gait of its movement, a gesture of its displacement, makes of each 
of its here-now particular configurations or positions into a posture or 
attitude maintaining itself or varying itself continuously.”251 This means 
that the body’s rhythm remains always susceptible to the sympathetic 
and antipathetic physiognomies of its environment. The way in which 
environmental determinations constitute the body’s power (or freedom) is 
addressed in my conclusion.
For the most part Merleau-Ponty regards sensing as an amicable affair, 
the mutual completion of subject and object. He speaks of it, after Straus, as 
a “sympathetic relation” with objects. “Apart from the probing of my eye or 
my hand, and before my body synchronizes with it, the sensible is nothing 
but a vague beckoning [une sollicitation vague]” (PP 214/248). Despite the 
fact that consciousness is “saturated” with the sensible, Merleau-Ponty 
insists that “the sentient and the sensible do not stand in relation to each 
other as two mutually external terms, and sensation is not an invasion of 
the sentient by the sensible” (PP 214, 215/247-248).252 The tireless influx 
of sensory stimuli is no affront to the subject’s sensibility, but rather an 
invitation to mutual animation. Sensation under this rehabilitated model 
is the primary mode of contact with being, neither completely active nor 
passive, and the means by which bodies originally and ordinarily respond to 
one another. Since sensation, for Merleau-Ponty, is not temporally prior to 
perception, we might be better off calling it the edge of perception.
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Painting the Body
Exactly what Merleau-Ponty means by sensing is perhaps best illustrated 
when he is writing about painting. The painter, unlike the scientist, is 
someone who defers his or her manipulation of objects and in this deference 
“returns to the soil of the sensible” (EM 159, 160/9, 12). Bypassing the 
practical aspect of things the painter tries to capture the birth of the thing 
by depicting the self-organization of its qualities and its “internal animation” 
(EM 182/71). This is possible, says Merleau-Ponty, because the painter’s 
body is “immersed in the visible” and can be used by the visible to give 
artistic expression to its many senses (EM 162/17-18). The painter swims in 
a sensory ocean that directs his or her body’s affective and motor capacities 
into aesthetic expression, but only if the painter is willing to lend his or her 
body to the visible. The task of the painter’s body is to express the nascent 
meaning of the visible. And this is precisely what painting is: it is the 
“transubstantiation” (EM 162/16) of the sensible from the sensory field to 
the canvas, a process which is made possible by the complicity of sensitive 
subjects and sensible objects.
By situating the painter and painted on the same plane—the visible—
Merleau-Ponty is able to collapse the distinction between art and nature, 
on the one hand, and the distinction between reality and representation, on 
the other. These distinctions are replaced by a general economy of sensation 
and expression, which is to say that the aesthetic dimension becomes for 
Merleau-Ponty the means by which the material and imaginary realms 
enter into communion. He cites Cézanne in “Cézanne’s Doubt:” “Art is 
a personal apperception, which I embody in sensations and which I ask 
the understanding to organize into a painting” (CD 13/22). To do this, the 
painter must become an articulation of the sensible, the mechanics of which 
are key to grasping Merleau-Ponty’s non-dualist, non-representational 
theory of painting.
At the heart of his theory is the idea that painter and the painted, the 
seer and the seen are made of the same flesh. In “Cézanne’s Doubt” there 
is a flesh of nature, whereas in “Eye and Mind” (which is contemporaneous 
with The Visible and the Invisible) it is the visible/sensible that defines the 
flesh. In both instances Merleau-Ponty wishes to demonstrate how subject 
and object participate in a “locus of reversibility”253 which permits them to 
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work together in expressing the aesthetic dimension of being. In the role 
of painter the subject catches onto the rhythm of the visible and allows it 
to commandeer his or her body’s intentions and gestures. In this way “the 
visible world and the world of my motor projects are each total parts of 
the same Being” (EM 162/17). It is this overlapping of seer and seen, this 
chiasm of visibility, that prohibits us from positing a distinction between the 
interiority of the subject and the exteriority of the world. It is what makes 
painting, at least in the case of Cézanne, a non-representational act.
To understand the act of transubstantiation carried out by the painter, 
the image to be rendered and the gestures required to render it must be 
seen as continuous with each other. There cannot be an absolute difference 
between the sensible and its artistic expression, for this would violate 
Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine of the flesh, which maintains that seer and seen 
are but two sides of a single visibility, indeed visibility as such (EM 163/19-
20). As Michael B. Smith writes, “Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics of painting is 
grounded in a metaphysics of vision, and vision, in turn, in an ontological 
description of the body subject as a seeing seenness.”254 Visual representation 
is not carried out by the viewer; it is “‘incited’ [excitée] to think by the body” 
(EM 175/51). For the painter this thinking is embodied in the painterly 
gesture itself. The unique contours of the visible spectacle seize upon the 
painter’s body and, catching the painter in a circuit of immanence, induces 
the body to adopt a physiognomy that expresses the “carnal formula” of 
the sensations to be painted. This entire process is made possible by the 
reversibility of visibility or, more generally, the “duplicity of sensing” which 
is the animating principle of both body and world (EM 164/23, translation 
modified). We may wonder whether this duplicity is not mediated, on the 
painter’s side, by reflection. But let us set this question aside for now.
As Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics makes clear, sensing occurs neither 
inside nor outside the subject. It is a liminal event, originally responsible 
for the style assumed by the painter’s body and, consequently, her 
artistic style. “Style is what orients and shapes in view of a revelation,” 
says de Waehlens.255 Before it becomes a defining trait of an artist, or 
an object of reflection for the artist, it “germinates at the surface of the 
artist’s experience” (ILVS 53/66).256 The “exigency” of style is therefore 
compromised by over-intellectualized or mannered treatments of the 
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sensible. Intellectualism in philosophy and objectivism/realism in art both 
eliminate the contingency of experience and thereby undercut its ambiguity 
with abstractions (PP 38-39/48-49). An individual’s style is a singular 
manner of accessing the real or negotiating its rhythms. These rhythms are 
first received, as directives of sens, by sensibility. Secondarily they become 
habits, gestures, signature techniques, or clichéd expressions. The problem, 
for someone concerned with portraying their immediacy, like Cézanne, is to 
portray these directives as they are delivered to sensibility“to make visible 
how the world touches us” (CD 19/33)—without imposing a form that is 
not given by the sensible itself. The style of the painting should reflect the 
immanent negotiation of subject and object that takes place at the level 
of “viscous, equivocal” appearance, rather than at the level of pragmatic 
manipulation or cool reflection (CD 17/30). “The painting,” writes de 
Waehlens, “gives visible presentation to what is not visible for the pragmatic 
eye, and is normally ‘possessed’ by the sense of contact: movement, volume, 
lightness, or mass, as they obviously are presented in the work of Degas, for 
example.”257
It is Cézanne’s painting, argues Merleau-Ponty, which is exemplary in its 
attempt to render for perception the “chaos of sensations” (CD 13/22). This 
gives us more reason to think that Merleau-Ponty understands sensation 
as something other than perception, since chaos is certainly not of a piece 
with perceptual life. Cézanne’s work is populated by figures which seem 
to be on the verge of breaking down or losing their form; or, on their way 
to metamorphosing into an altogether different figure. Chaos lurks within 
them. They attempt to bring to appearance what Merleau-Ponty refers to 
as the “unstable, and alien” element of “natural perception” (PP 225/260). 
Cézanne, he writes, “wanted to depict matter as it takes on form, the birth 
of order through spontaneous organization” (CD 13/23). If this organization 
is to be truly spontaneous, not mediated by the artifices of technique or 
idealization, then Cézanne would have to develop a style that matches the 
immediacy of his theme: the emergent sensory order, or the world as it 
acquires its aesthetic contours. In short, he would need to compose the 
chaos of sensation. Merleau-Ponty writes:
The outline should therefore be a result of the colors if the 
world is to be given its true density. For the world is a mass 
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without gaps, a system of colors across which the receding 
perspective, the outlines, angles, and curves are inscribed like 
lines of force; the spatial structure vibrates as it is formed 
(CD 15/25-26).
This conception of spatiality is antithetical to Kant’s in that it makes 
spatial organization a product of the sensory manifold, thereby locating the 
principle of animation in the matter, rather than the form, of perception.258
What allows the painter to be animated by the sensible? Like his or 
her chosen subject, the painter possesses a physiognomy that can adapt 
to the physiognomy or “motif” of still-life objects, landscapes, the faces of 
portraiture (CD 17/29). The motif, which is “no more than a combination 
of colors,” provides the body of the artist with directives that initiate the 
creative event, “an event which grips [the] body, and this grip circumscribes 
the area of significance [sens] to which it has reference” (CD 16/27; 
PP 235/272). Art is not first and foremost an act of symbolism. It is an 
affective reconfiguration engendered by the body’s sensibility. The artist’s 
body “is an object which is sensitive to all the rest, which reverberates to 
all sounds, vibrates to all colors, and provides words [or lines, colors] with 
their primordial significance through the way in which it receives them” 
(PP 236/273).
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Cézanne suggests a conceptual, but 
perhaps not real, distinction between sensation and perception. This is 
discernible in his remark that Cézanne breaks with the Impressionists by 
rejecting the latter’s attempts to “capture, in the painting, the very way in 
which objects strike our eyes and attack our senses.” This attack, he says 
vaguely, occurs at the level of “instantaneous perception” and appears as 
the chaos of sensations invoked above (CD 11/19). The Phenomenology 
of Perception likewise implies that sensation is part of perception, and yet 
distinguishable from what is ordinarily perceived—whole, medium-sized 
graspable objects projected against a background. Most tellingly, he writes: 
“What is called sensation is only the most rudimentary of perceptions, and, 
as a modality of existence, it is no more separable than any other perception 
from a background which is in fact the world” (PP 241/279). In a manner 
different from Staus, Merleau-Ponty finds continuity between sensation 
and perception because he wants to avoid making the latter the “form” 
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and the former the “matter” of experience. Because no distinction exists 
phenomenologically for him, no real distinction exists.
The Diachrony of Sensation
Despite his allegiance to the thesis that all consciousness is both directed 
toward some object and always projected against a horizon of meaning, 
Merleau-Ponty does suggest that a non-intentional form of sensing 
exists. This he describes as “forever anterior to perception,” a provocative 
formulation that opens a distinction between sensing and perception, and 
points to an originary, pre-phenomenological encounter with the sensible, 
one that belongs to the prehistory of perception. When Merleau-Ponty 
speaks of the anonymity of the body, it seems to me that it is this encounter 
he intends to highlight, and not the general or neuter form of the body. 
Moreover, his view of sensibility situates sensing on a transcendental 
level, or in “a kind of original past, a past which has never been present” 
(PP 242/280). It is into this original past that perception must reach in 
order to apprehend what there is to perceive. Or rather, perception must 
nourish itself on the sensations that make up its irretrievable past. Without 
sensation, consciousness cannot survive. This is because, as Al-Saji argues, 
“perception lags behind sensibility—so that consciousness and being do not 
coincide, despite Merleau-Ponty’s claim in the ‘Temporality’ chapter [of 
Phenomenology of Perception].”259
There is, then, more than a conceptual distinction to be drawn between 
perception and sensation. The case can be made that the pre-personality 
of sensation should take ontological precedence over the personality of 
perception in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, although, as we have seen, 
he usually folds these disparate experiences into the image of perception 
as communion, as sentir. There is a fundamental diachrony, or non-
coincidence, at the heart of perception that breaks up its synchronization 
with the world. This diachrony is introduced by sensation. Levinas takes 
up this point and uses it, like Deleuze, against Merleau-Ponty. Diachrony 
is the work of sensation, the “primary layer” of sense experience “which at 
once grounds perception and assures its opacity and non-coincidence,” in 
Al-Saji’s terms.260 Upon this shifting ground lie at least three other layers 
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which constitute the perceptual experience. Merleau-Ponty outlines these in 
a discussion of hearing.
The different layers of sound are only identifiable once the unified 
experience of listening, say, to a piece of music is analyzed by reflection. 
After making this phenomenological point Merleau-Ponty ventures to 
speculate about the multidimensional sensation of sound itself: “there is 
an objective sound which reverberates outside me in the instrument, an 
atmospheric sound which is between the object and my body, a sound which 
vibrates in me ‘as if I had become the flute or the clock’; and, finally, a last 
stage in which the acoustic element disappears and becomes the highly 
precise experience of a change permeating my whole body” (PP 227/263). 
Merleau-Ponty here describes the liminal nature of sensation—it “is between 
the object and my body”—as well as its capacity to directly reconfigure the 
body. This reconfiguration might manifest itself in dance, which is arguably 
the most obvious example of “a change permeating my whole body” or the 
body communing with its auditory environment. Given Merleau-Ponty’s 
description, however, we should hesitate to posit dance as a primary or 
“instantaneous” reconfiguration. What comes first is the “objective sound 
which reverberates outside me in the instrument.” Physically, a sound 
wave. This reverberation reaches us in a highly complex situation, against 
a background of noise and silence, and in principle could drown out this 
background by reaching an oppressively loud volume. That is, the sound is 
potentially hostile to the body and the body’s potential communion with 
the aural environment. This potential results from the fact that sensation’s 
liminality places it at the threshold of the world as perceived. Sensation 
reverberates whether anyone is there to perceive it or not; it is not beholden 
to the mechanics of perception.
On average we do not experience the pure reverberation of an 
instrument outside of an aural context, and yet Merleau-Ponty says that 
this objective sound occurs in the instrument rather than in our ears. 
This compels us to think of our perception of sound as delayed. Our ears 
arrive late to the event of sound. This is because we must “learn to perceive 
according to Merleau-Ponty,” says Al-Saji.261 The world possesses rhythms 
that solicit synchronization from our bodies; it challenges us with dissonant 
rhythms; it meets our bodies’ groping with inconvenient designs and 
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incapacitating sounds. Some of these we can catch onto, other not. Our 
sensory environment is not always ergonomically advantageous: it contains 
sensations that are alien and unstable, but whose meaning nevertheless 
saturates us (PP 214, 215/248, 249). Perception “converts the elements of 
the sensory encounter into recognizable and representable identities” and 
effects a “transformation of the inherent ambiguity and intertwining of the 
sensory—a transformation that the sensory suggests but as a result of which 
it comes to be overlaid and forgotten qua sensory life.”262 On this reading, 
sensory life becomes the virtual dimension of perceptual life.
Always beyond the reach of perception, but nevertheless serving as the 
“unreflective fund” that provides it with phenomenal content, the sensory 
life of the body reveals itself as the anonymous, objective ground of any 
actual perception (PP 242/280). In Al-Saji’s words,
Perception may be a prospective actualization, but it is 
experienced as the discovery of what was always already 
there. It is this anteriority that makes objects appear real to 
us—our experience of their presence being given through 
their inexhaustibility and alterity. This inexhaustibility is due 
to the coexistence and non-coincidence of rhythms in sensory 
life, a life which at once constitutes the ground of perceptual 
experience while being irreducible to perceptual form. What 
allows the experience of anteriority to be more than an illusion 
for Merleau-Ponty is that it relies on, and holds the trace of, a 
more original delay—that of sensory life as forever past with 
respect to perception.263
It is not so much that Merleau-Ponty subscribes to the view that there is an 
anonymous body subtending the historically and culturally inscribed body, 
but that he affirms a carnal sensibility whose resources cannot be exhausted 
by an individual’s consciousness or singular perceptual experience. 
Sensibility is basic to the pre-personal identity of the body and constitutive 
of an “unconscious” dimension of subjectivity. Put otherwise, only a 
portion of what the lived body senses makes its way into perception, and 
even less becomes the object of reflection. When Merleau-Ponty writes that 
“Perception is always in the mode of the impersonal ‘One’,” we must take 
this to mean that perception is at every moment the renewal of the synthetic 
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act which reaches into the past while projecting into the future in its attempt 
to fix the object of perception before us.264  This entails that perception is 
an “ever-recurrent failure” [échec perpétuel] to hold onto what is given in 
sensation (PP 240/277).
Perception apprehends a phenomenal field which is “never presented in 
any other way than integrated into a configuration and already ‘patterned’ 
[‘mise en forme’]” (PP 159/186). Following Gestalt principles Merleau-Ponty 
holds that no sense experience happens outside of the horizon subtended 
by my personal intentional arc and the historical/cultural horizon in which 
I am always situated. This phenomenal field, however, cannot be identical 
to the field engaged immediately by the senses, for the latter is marked by a 
singularity which resists entry into the intentional horizon. Sensibility, then, 
remains bound to a pre-personal field wherein “each sensation, being strictly 
speaking, the first, last and only one of its kind, is a birth and a death” of the 
body that receives it. Moreover,
the subject who experiences it begins and ends with it, and 
as he can neither precede nor survive himself, sensation 
necessarily appears to itself in a setting of generality, its origin 
anterior to myself, it arises from sensibility which has preceded 
it and which will outlive it, just as my birth and death 
belong to a natality and a mortality which are anonymous. 
(PP 216/250)
The carnality of the subject inhabits two distinct spheres, the practical-
personal, on the one hand, and the sensible-impersonal, on the other. They 
never operate in isolation from each other, and this fact calls into question 
the primacy of perception and the primacy of body-world synchrony.
The tension between the personal and impersonal body is palpable in 
Merleau-Ponty’s reluctance to disengage sensation from perception and 
allow the former to devolve into the formless data of the empiricists or the 
pure sensory manifold of Kant. This is why sensation appears sometimes as 
a rudimentary form of perception (thus guaranteeing perception’s inherent 
form) and at other times as the transcendental condition of perception 
(which ensures Merleau-Ponty’s anti-idealist credentials). In the last 
analysis Merleau-Ponty wants to maintain the primacy of perception while 
at the same time championing the immediacy of sensingwhich is clearly 
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endorsed in his analysis of Cézanne’s painting and its ability to express that 
dialogue of physiognomies which is the body-world relation. If there is a 
truly anonymous and pre-perceptual form of sensing acknowledged in the 
Phenomenology, then there is reason to suggest that the sensations undergone 
by the body’s organs point to a transcendental field that is better depicted 
by the Impressionists, however speculative or non-phenomenological their 
aesthetic might be.
Merleau-Ponty tells us that Cézanne breaks with the Impressionists over 
their impossible desire to portray how objects strike our senses (CD 11-
14/19-23). The Impressionists are wont to paint what would be the pure a 
priori of perception, that is, sensation, whereas Cézanne’s painting exhibits 
sensible nature as it emerges into an organized form. On this reading, the 
Impressionists would be the painters of a “non-thetic, pre-objective, and 
pre-conscious experience” that depicts “sensation as a private phenomenon” 
(PP 242/279). It is this private sphere that is most problematic from 
the perspective of a perception which is, according to “The Primacy of 
Perception,” fundamentally intersubjective (PrP 17-18, 26-27/52, 70-71). As 
Merleau-Ponty writes in “The Philosopher and His Shadow:”
The fact is that sensible being, which is announced to me in 
my most strictly private life, summons up within that life all 
other corporeality. It is the being which reaches me in my most 
secret parts, but which I also reach in its brute or untamed 
state, in an absolute of presence which holds the secret of the 
world, others, and what is true. (Shadow 171/215)
Sensation then becomes problematic because it harbors a form of solipsism, 
a view which Merleau-Ponty ardently resists. The touch of sensation opens 
the body to the world of objects, others, and communication. But in itself 
it cannot be accessed, represented, or articulated. The problem of solipsism 
raised by the “aesthesiological” is resolvable only when it is assimilated 
to perception, for perception, writes Merleau-Ponty, “is never a matter of 
anything but co-perception. I see that this man over there sees, as I touch 
my left hand while it is touching my right” (Shadow 170/215). As he says 
elsewhere, perception is always already reversible. If there is solipsism, 
then it must be wrested from the intersubjective sphere and therefore no 
solipsism at all.
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Merleau-Ponty’s entire critique of sensation derives from his observation 
that we do not really encounter much of what the classical empiricists and 
rationalists say we do. For the most part he is right: we do not perceive 
sense impressions or sense data. We perceive things. Against classical 
theory he maintains that we only arrive at the imperceptible through 
analysis, which must necessarily begin with the perceptible. This may be 
true phenomenologically, but it does not foreclose the possibility that, 
ontologically speaking, perception is a derivative experience, subtended by a 
more rudimentary experience of embodiment. Merleau-Ponty acknowledges 
the existence of imperceptible encounters with things, which is why I think 
the realist strand of his analysis of sensing supports the thesis—even if he 
does not advance it himself—that perception derives from the transitive 
form of sensation. When he speaks of the sound reverberating in the 
instrument before it reaches the ears of the listener, he acknowledges the 
primacy of an aesthetic atmosphere that is anterior to perception. Here 
resides the anonymous sensory experience that saturates our bodies and 
cannot be recuperated by the subject-object dialogue. The Visible and the 
Invisible’s concept of flesh develops this anonymous sensibility into a general 
theory of being.
Reversible Bodies
The flesh (la chair) radicalizes insights from the Phenomenology by 
replacing the latter’s residual subject-object dualism with a monistic account 
of the sensible. In the early text our bodies and the bodies of others (human 
and nonhuman) are said to only achieve full expression through the co-
constitutive dialogue of perception. This dialogue is made possible, explains 
The Visible and the Invisible, because both subject and object belong to a 
common “element,” the sensible as such, or the flesh. It is this element that 
brings together while at the same time separating the poles of perception: 
“the thickness of flesh between seer and the thing is constitutive for the 
thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity” (VI 135/178). The 
separation of bodies, then, is derivative of the fundamental “narcissism” 
at the heart of the sensible. In The Visible and the Invisible it is no longer 
perception that gives birth to discrete objects, but the so-called dehiscence 
(écart) of the flesh. Dehiscence is the name Merleau-Ponty uses to describe 
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the fission of the sensible into sentient body and sensible world; it denotes 
the coiling back or enfolding of being performed in sensing:
[The flesh] is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing 
body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested 
in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing 
and touching the things, such that, simultaneously, as tangible 
it descends among them, as touching it dominates them all 
and draws this relationship and even this double relationship 
from itself, by dehiscence or fission of its own mass. (VI 
146/191-192)
At bottom it is the dehiscence of flesh that constitutes my body as an 
individual that senses and gains it the necessary distance from what is 
perceived (VI 140/185). Since individuation results from the separation 
(écart) of the flesh, understood as a single element, it entails a kind of 
reversibility between bodies. At the crossing where reversibility occurs, 
“perception is born” (VI 154/202).
By “reversible” Merleau-Ponty means that at any moment the one who 
sees can become the one seen, or the one who touches can become the 
touched. The possibility of a passive body becoming active or an active body 
becoming passive is immanent to embodiment as such. He holds that the 
reversibility of the sensible is analogous to what happens when I touch my 
left hand with my right. This is the narcissistic element of the flesh: “the seer 
and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees 
and which is seen” (VI 139/183). Sensing is here attributed not to individual 
subjects who exist apart from their worlds, but to the flesh as a substance 
that divides itself into sensible and sentient beings. This is the primary 
dualism of The Visible and the Invisible, it seems to me. The Phenomenology’s 
anthropocentric dualism has been mitigated here, but at the same time 
a new dualism, embedded in the rhetoric of “chiasmus,” arises. While 
intended as a figure that could overcome the Phenomenology’s undesirable 
dualism (as identified by its author), the chiasmus injects a new duality 
into the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s monism of the flesh. Consequently, the 
figure of the chiasmus “does not solve anything, because in order to work, 
both terms [subject and object, seer and seen] must be preserved even as 
they are cancelled at another level.”265 The sensible-sentient chiasmus is 
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what signals the dualism troubling—or short-circuiting, however you want 
to see it—the monistic ontology of The Visible and the Invisible. What 
remains unclear is how the flesh becomes sentient in the first place, why 
some beings achieve sentience while others remain merely sensible. “For 
if the body is a thing among things, it is so in a stronger and deeper sense 
than they,” Merleau-Ponty asserts (VI 137/181). One way to overcome the 
sensing-sensed dualism is by broadening the scope of sentience to include 
any entity that can receive sensory stimulation. If stimulation is regarded as 
an objective event, and is not confined to the interior life of humans or other 
living animals, then we can begin to speak of the sensations experienced by 
inanimate objects. This is one way to abolish The Visible and the Invisible’s 
dualistic conception of the sensible, but one which also commits us to a 
new, perhaps Whiteheadian, metaphysics of sensation
Merleau-Ponty explicitly points out that the presumed reversibility 
of sensible and sentient is always imminent, but never accomplished (VI 
147/194). In other words, my left and right hands cannot both be touching 
each other at the same time; one of the pair must play the role of passive 
object while the other actively senses it. More generally, sentient/subjective 
and sensible/objective never fully synchronize because reversibility has an 
asynchronous core. It must be stressed that the impossible coincidence at 
the center of reversibility is, in part, a product of the analogy of self-touching 
chosen by Merleau-Ponty. The asynchrony of reversibility is therefore a 
consequence of his analogy to self-reflexive behavior and does not seem to 
apply to what we typically consider an intercorporeal relation. Nor does it 
apply universally to sensing or tactility.266
What if the always deferred synchrony of reversibility is not like 
attempting to catch sight of one’s own shadow by quickly turning around? 
Consider how smelling, tasting, and hearing do not bear the kind of 
symmetry necessary for reversibility. Sure, I can be smeller or smelled, but 
the scent that invades my nose is in no position to take in my scent. The 
same could be said of a taste or sound. These sensations are more invasive 
than the tactile and give us a good idea of the basically irreversible or 
dissymmetrical nature of sensing. Something like a handshake, by contrast, 
appears to offer a better analogy for reversibility.267 But even the handshake 
proves irreversible—perhaps it is exemplarily irreversible—since the strength 
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and delicacy of the persons shaking will most likely be disproportionate, a 
matter of unequal force. This is why Beata Stawarska argues, rightly I think, 
that the concept of flesh performs a “massive reduction of the specifically 
intersubjective experience of the body manifest in an encounter with another 
embodied person to the corporeal dynamic operative within the body 
proper.”268 Self-touching offers us a helpful image of reflection, but not 
entirely an accurate account of the intercorporeal encounter.
In her work on Merleau-Ponty and political philosophy Diana Coole 
responds to Merleau-Ponty’s critics, chiefly Levinas, who claim that the 
metaphor of the handshake is ethically defective because it privileges 
continuity over discontinuity, sameness over difference. She writes, 
“Merleau-Ponty is surely using the handshake to advance an ontological 
rather than an ethical claim and he does so in order to disclose the 
very possibility of ethical (and political) relations.”269 If Coole is right, 
and Levinas’s charge holds, then Merleau-Ponty has misread a basic 
(ontological) difference at the heart of intercorporeity. But Merleau-Ponty 
does not see the handshake as an event of congruity, but one of écart, or 
separation, and so Levinas’s criticism falters.270 Merleau-Ponty retains the 
language of reversibility and is thereby left to account for the discontinuous 
continuity between the bodies exchanging the handshake. Is this continuity 
merely phenomenal? If not, what is the metaphysical mechanism of its écart? 
His life cut short, Merleau-Ponty never had time to provide an adequate 
reply to these questions.
The experience of the handshake illustrates how intercorporeal touching 
is fundamentally different from self-touching. The handshake exhibits 
an exchange of sensations that is not present in the case of self-touching. 
When I shift my attention and convert my touched hand into the hand 
doing the touching, as in the case of self-touching, there is no exchange 
of sensation, but rather a shift in attention, a reversal of intentionality. As 
Stawarska writes, “What distinguishes the intercorporeal relation from 
the intracorporeal one is that the passivity of my hand touched by the 
other—unlike the passivity of my hand that I touch—cannot reverse into 
an activity (of touching) for me, even though I can respond to the other 
touching me by touching them in turn.”271 The idea that two bodies stand 
in a relation of reversibility assumes that any passive relation is potentially 
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convertible into an active relation, even if this reversal is impossible, as in 
cases of domination, oppression, torture, or murder.272 The supposition 
of reversibility effectively neglects a fundamental feature of violence: 
the inequality of the sensations exchanged. This is precisely what makes 
intercorporeity irreversible.
The Reality of Violence
Rewriting the Cartesian cogito, Merleau-Ponty argues that the subject 
is an “I can” [“je peux”] before it is an “I think” (PP 137/160). But this 
formulation is only partially true. Is the subject not equally an “I can’t,” 
a perpetually constrained actor whose abilities cannot be privileged over 
its inabilities? The body’s orientation is always a mixture of abilities and 
disabilities, and some orientations, as Ahmed and Fanon suggest, are more 
accommodating than others.
If classical phenomenology is about “motility,” expressed 
in the hopefulness of the utterance “I can,” Fanon’s 
phenomenology of the black body would be better described 
in terms of the bodily and social experience of restriction, 
uncertainty and blockage, or perhaps even in terms of the 
despair of the utterance “I cannot.” … To be black in “the 
white world” is to turn back towards itself, to become an 
object, which means not only not being extended by the 
contours of the world, but being diminished as an effect of the 
bodily extensions of others.273
Nowhere is corporeal constraint more evident than in the threatened or 
disabled body. To say nothing, of course, of the corpse. If the subject, 
on Merleau-Ponty’s model, is to be identified with the body in all of its 
materiality (not just the body insofar as it is animated by an intentional 
consciousness or mind, that is, the lived body), then each of the body’s 
manifestations must be taken into consideration when embodied subjectivity 
is in question. Furthermore, the intercorporeal relation cannot just be the 
site where perception is born. It must also serve as the site where perception 
disintegrates or vanishes altogether.
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Merleau-Ponty does not completely neglect the reality of violence, 
however. Coole has shown that he acknowledges its reality in his political 
studies, refusing to reduce it to a metaphor. As she writes, “His emphasis 
on the body brings home the vulnerability and mortality of the flesh. His 
actors find themselves suspended between the violence of the visceral 
and the potential violence of the structural, where even peaceful aims can 
have violent repercussions.”274 It is true that he recognizes the inherent 
vulnerability of the body in the face of the other. Not unlike Sartre, who 
theorizes the gaze of the other as an instrument of objectification or seizure, 
Merleau-Ponty considers how the presence of the other entails a conflict of 
interpretations where the truth of the object is at stake, where the body’s 
hold on the world is contested by others (PrP 18/53). Just like me the other 
fixes his or her grip on objects and appropriates them in the system of holds 
that make up his or her own practical horizon. My own body, too, can be 
seized by perception, as Sartre, Fanon, Yancy and others have demonstrated. 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of a “passive vision…as in the case of a dazzling 
light,” wherein perception is rendered incapable of making sense of what 
is seen (PP 315/364). He recognizes the impact of pain and fatigue on our 
capacity for action (PP 441/504; SB 189/204). Ultimately, he defines the 
freedom of the body negatively as a “tolerance” of institutional and physical 
forces, thus eschewing the ideal of a pure subject who remains invulnerable 
to material forces (PP 454/518). What Merleau-Ponty does not provide us 
with is an ontological explanation for how real violence is possible, how the 
reversibility of the flesh is suspended, violated, or overridden. Unfortunately, 
it is not enough just to emphasize that subjectivity is embodied or that pain 
occurs in fact.
In order accurately to portray intercorporeal encounters, and the violent 
in particular, a robust notion of irreversibility or alterity must be provided. 
This does not mean that reciprocity between bodies should be deemed 
impossible (which seems implied in Levinas’s ontology, as we will see in 
the next chapter). What we need is a model that acknowledges the distance 
between bodies, but also enables them to exchange a common currency 
and participate in a common experiential economy. I suggest we consider 
sensation as providing this currency and the aesthetic as the common 
economy. To be fair, I think Merleau-Ponty notices, but does not pursue, 
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this possibility. It is present in his recognition of sensation as the past that 
never presents itself to perception; it is there in his acknowledgement of the 
affective quality of sensing; and it is implied in his ontology of the flesh (PP 
53/65). These moments of divergence and diachrony are where Merleau-
Ponty troubles the happy alliance of body and world while simultaneously 
recognizing an element shared by embodied beings. The dehiscence of 
the flesh, or what Hass calls the “constitutive difference in the fabric of 
experience,” offers another moment of divergence.275 But the mechanics of 
the involution of the sensible—how the flesh generates individual bodies—
remains a metaphysical mystery for phenomenology. In Phenomenology of 
Perception it is temporality that drives the dehiscence of being, but time is 
conceived there anthropocentrically as “born of my relation with things” 
(PP 412, 426/471, 487, translation modified). Merleau-Ponty’s later 
philosophy does not provide us with a non-anthropocentric conception of 
time or a metaphysical explanation of dehiscence or an adequate account 
of how bodies individuate themselves from the singular flesh of being, and 
eventually get destroyed.276 This is not a failure of Merleau-Ponty, but work 
he left for us to accomplish.
The gap (is it real or apparent?) between entities never reaches closure; 
reversibility is always deferred. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty’s analyses 
most often suggest the possibility of convergence: the subject is always on 
the way to a better understanding of its object; the left hand is always on 
the verge of touching instead of being touched; perception is perpetually 
on its way to a maximally clear expression.277 His faith in reversibility, once 
again, effectively misrepresents the intercorporeal relation by attenuating the 
volatility introduced by the transcendence of the other qua sensible. Levinas 
would say that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology ultimately reduces the other to the 
same and that reversibility denotes a relation whose “terms are indifferently 
read from left to right and from right to left” and which has been reduced to 
a “simple correlation” (TI 35/5).
Levinas’s charge is a bit hyperbolic in the case of Merleau-Ponty since 
the latter’s treatment of intersubjectivity cannot be reduced to a simple 
self-other duality and, indeed, actively strives to overcome such a reduction. 
He does, however, tend to subordinate what Levinas calls the “enigma of 
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sensation-feeling [l’énigme sensation-sentiment]” to the competent grasp 
[prise] of perception.278 As Merleau-Ponty writes,
my body, as the system of holds on the world, founds the unity 
of the objects which I perceive, in the same way the body of 
the other…tears itself away from being one of my phenomena, 
offers me the task of true communication, and confers on my 
objects the new dimension of intersubjective being or, in other 
words, of objectivity. (PrP 18/53)
The world is not first what eludes my grasp, but what offers me things to 
grab; the other is not what threatens my subjectivity, but what offers to 
communicate with me. Others and objects offer possibilities for being and 
doing because they belong to the phenomenal field open before me and 
essentially synchronized with my body’s practical horizon. Between seeing 
body and seen other there is “an intimacy as close as between the sea and 
the strand” (VI 130-131/173).279
The ideal of reversibility fails to notice that sensation, even in Merleau-
Ponty’s own terms, is precisely what cannot become phenomenal if 
phenomenality is the mode of expression proper to perception. Sensation 
remains forever out of step with the unfolding of perception; it is the dark 
side of visibility and ideality, what gives birth to perception and, perhaps, 
what accounts for its disintegration.
Carnal Sensibility
If we wish to talk about the centrality of the body, then it is necessary to 
attend to every aspect of its environmental sensitivity, the physiological as 
well as the phenomenal, insofar as this sensitivity gives rise to the corporeal 
structures that inform the contours of our perceptual and practical 
engagements. A neglect of the autonomy of sensation, by which I mean the 
sensible events which take place below the level of intentional consciousness 
and which remain “unstable, and alien,”280 can only hinder a philosophy 
that seeks to overcome the conceit of an idealism which refuses to recognize 
the corporeal dimension of subjectivity, freedom, and responsibility. 
Regardless of whether sensation is a viable phenomenological concept or 
not, it is necessary to providing a complete picture of embodiment. And 
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we risk misconception when we overemphasize the constitutive activity 
of the subject, or when we downplay its susceptibility, incompetence, 
disintegration, and mechanical or autonomic responses.281
Even though his philosophy of the body is sensitive to the constitutive 
function of the aesthetic dimension, Merleau-Ponty’s privileging of 
perception entails a misrepresentation of how the body’s identity is informed 
and sculpted by its aesthetic environment. He endorses the dialogical 
notion of aesthetic identity offered by Cézanne. Though instructive, this 
view does not do justice to the irreversibility of sensation. The pixelated 
images of the Impressionists, as already suggested, may offer us a better 
representation. Impressionism gives something like a snapshot of sensation; 
it captures the sensory event which, “strictly speaking,” is “the first, last and 
only one of its kind, is a birth and death.” These images ring false from a 
phenomenological perspective, but only because phenomenology distrusts 
and eschews speculation, preferring to derive its ontology from what is given 
to experience. For a philosopher like Merleau-Pontyunlike, say, Humethe 
chaos of sensation can only be hypothesized from the more coherent world 
of perception. This is why he favors Cézanne over the Impressionists. But 
once again, Cézanne is a painter of reversibility, of sensing taken as an 
amicable dialogue. He jettisons the immediacy of sensation in favor of the 
world figured, or at least figurable.
One of the problems left here is to theorize the discontinuity between 
bodies without succumbing to the allure of absolute transcendence, as 
Levinas does, and without casting intercorporeity as a purely continuous. 
To be sure, failure to concede the continuity or immanence of the 
intercorporeal realm results in a failure to see that sensory demands are 
communicated directly to the subject by the aesthetic environment. An 
account of the environment’s immanent aesthetic directives is crucial to 
understanding the emergence of the body’s competence and integrity. This is 
because there are solicitations issued by the environment that the body must 
respond to in order to effectively adapt, ways in which the body is determined 
by its sensory milieu. These determinants are therefore more than optional 
solicitations: they are imperatives.282 Sometimes these responses are 
pleasurable, sometimes they are painful or even excruciating. They can end 
in bodily obliteration, which is an extreme form of incompetence but a 
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form of responsiveness nonetheless. Merleau-Ponty appreciates this to some 
degree, but he consistently downplays the imperceptible quality of sensation, 
its objective power, and thereby pathologizes the vulnerability of the body. 
The tension between sensation and perception, which is clearly evinced in 
excessive or limit situations that threaten the coherence of perception and 
the organizational capacity of the body’s schemata, is passed over in favor of 
a more sympathetic reciprocity or the ideal of “maximum clarity”/“optimum 
balance” in perception (PP 318/367).283
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy has the virtue of being grounded in 
the carnality of life, and it does so without submitting to physicalism. 
Indeed, the depth of his phenomenological descriptions are borne of 
the concrete practices of the self as it engages other bodies, both human 
and nonhuman. The ontogenetic narrative Merleau-Ponty tells about the 
subject’s embodiment, which is first and foremost a story of the body’s 
anonymity and passivity, is grounded in the sensitivity of the body, or what 
we could call its carnal sensibility. This sensibility is at work in the sensuous 
communion of subject and object in Phenomenology of Perception; it is at the 
heart of The Visible and the Invisible’s notions of flesh, chiasm, and écart; and 
it is crucial to the psychogenesis of the child in “The Child’s Relations with 
Others” as well as his analyses of Cézanne’s theory of painting. In short, 
there is for me an inscrutable ambivalence at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s 
work. The problem we are left with is how to disengage the notion of carnal 
sensibilitywhich is anonymously productive of the body’s organizational 
capacity, rather than its productfrom the intentional structure of perception 
and the synchronic ontology of the flesh. Only after the diachrony of 
sensibility is disengaged from perception can we understand both the 
passivity of the body and its non-intentional responsiveness to sensations, 
that is, its obedience to the immanent directives embedded in the aesthetic 
environment.
Traces of Ambiguity
Reading Merleau-Ponty it is easy to get the impression that the body is 
operating as a tool or prosthesis of consciousness, rather than a substitute 
for the Cartesian ego. This is because he sometimes speaks of perception 
and consciousness as though they were not functions of the body: 
142 Chapter 3
“Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of 
the body” (PP 138-139/161). In his more radical formulations we are 
our bodies, nothing more. Establishing a non-reductive version of this 
identification of self and body is the most promising prospect of working 
through Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.
To overcome modern dualism it is necessary that Merleau-Ponty 
collapse consciousness and body. If we are to avoid conceiving the body as 
merely a vessel for the mind or consciousness or perception, there cannot 
be any mysterious elements of subjectivity or suspicious unbridgeable gaps 
between subject and world. This means emptying absolute transcendence 
from ontology, something Merleau-Ponty only begins to accomplish in 
his unfinished later work. The challenge is formulated by Deleuze in Pure 
Immanence when he says that “consciousness becomes a fact only when a 
subject is produced at the same time as its object, both being outside the 
field and appearing as ‘transcendents’.”284 In other words, a truly immanent 
ontology, like the one promised by the primacy of perception thesis or the 
ontology of the flesh, has to embrace an impersonal transcendental field, 
one free from the syntheses of a subject, the configuration of intentionality, 
and the prejudice of correlationism.
Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of sensing in Phenomenology of Perception 
is the most promising concept upon which to develop an immanent 
conception of embodiment. Here we find a concept of sensibility that 
reverses the Kantian view of the formality of the subject’s aesthetic faculty. 
Merleau-Ponty provides us with the means to envision sensibility as a kind 
of material transcendental. Recasting the continuities and discontinuities 
of the intercorporeal relation in terms of sensations and affects, rather than 
perception and flesh, recasts many of the problems raised by Merleau-
Ponty’s carnal ontology. Indeed, his reversibility thesis becomes more 
persuasive when we distinguish the sensible and perceptual life of the 
body, then restrict reversibility to the level of perception while assigning an 
irreducible alterity to sensing.
The relation between perception and sensation has a double 
character. In one sense, these two activities are coextensive; in another 
sense, perception is the product of sensation, the latter serving as the 
“rudimentary” content of the former (PP 241/279). A tension between the 
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impersonal, imperceptible layer of experience (sensation) and the personal, 
intentional (perception) arises at this point. If perception is given primacy 
in this tension, then experience must be always regarded as organized by 
the telos of our intentional arc. By the same token, if sensation is cast as 
the most basic form of perception, it can only appear as phenomenal and, 
in some sense, coordinated by the subject-object dialogue. But certainly 
there are sensations received by the body (what Leibniz would call petites 
perceptions)285 that are never elevated to the level of consciousness and 
remain forever at the level of proprioceptive information.286 Merleau-Ponty 
holds that every perception has something anonymous about it, and that 
this is linked to the body’s habits and schemata as well its “unsophisticated” 
(read: sensory) life (PP 238/275). Therefore, to delimit the sensory life 
of the body and see how it functions transcendentally for perception, it 
is necessary to remain open to speculation about the aesthetic life of the 
“impersonal ‘One’.” This is the lesson that emerges when we inhabit the 
ambiguity surrounding Merleau-Ponty’s work on sensibility.
Chapter 4
Sensibility, Susceptibility, and the Genesis of Individuals
Even when unformed, or deformed, by knowing, sensible 
intuition can revert to its own meaning.
Levinas, Otherwise than Being
Levinas’s philosophy of the body contains an explicit commitment to 
the primacy of sensation, one that remains only implicit in Merleau-
Ponty. Levinas’s analyses of embodiment display a marked interest in 
the materiality of the subject. This is most evident in his remarks about 
sensation and the affective life of the self (the “I”), as well as in his critique 
of intentionality and his occasional criticism of phenomenological method. 
In his early texts Existence and Existents, Time and the Other, and Totality 
and Infinity this materialism appears through an ontogenetic account of the 
emergence of subjectivity; later, in Otherwise than Being, it is through novel 
accounts of sensibility and vulnerability that we find Levinas defending 
a materialist ontology. It is in the later work that Levinas’s emphasis on 
the vulnerability of the body—that is, its susceptibility to wounding or its 
openness to the outside—goes too far in its appreciation of the reality of 
violence. The enabling aspects of the body-world relation are overshadowed 
by the exigency of violence that Levinas sees as basic to intersubjectivity. 
This chapter will not rehearse the drama of the same and the Other 
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(autrui)287 which dominates Levinas’s ethics. It will instead reinscribe 
Levinas’s phenomenology into the discourse of ontology and focus on the 
significance of sensation in his account of subjectivity. This is admittedly 
an heretical reading of Levinas, but one that is not forced upon him. 
The purpose of this reading is to supplement Merleau-Ponty’s treatment 
of sensation, and to assemble from their texts an account of embodied 
subjectivity that is present in neither thinker considered independently 
of the other.
Corporeal Ontology
Levinas is not usually the first person invoked when the philosophy of the 
body is up for discussion. His exploration of embodiment is not as broad 
as Merleau-Ponty’s; it is certainly less direct. To unpack Levinas’s corporeal 
ontology the theme must be approached obliquely through his fascinating 
treatment of concepts like sensibility, alimentation, fecundity, living from, 
and enjoyment. This constellation of concepts, along with some others, 
represents Levinas’s acute concern with affectivity as an individuating 
phenomenon. The same goes for sensation: with more candor than 
Merleau-Ponty, Levinas affirms sensation as basic to embodiment and the 
constitution of subjectivity. He goes further than Merleau-Ponty in pursuing 
sensation as a transcendental phenomenon. His analyses of sensation and 
sensibility try to fully appreciate the primacy of sensation and, in particular, 
its materiality.288
Claiming that Levinas is engaged in ontology is contentious among 
commentators because so much of the force of his philosophy operates as 
an evasion of ontology. In general he regards the desire for systematicity in 
ontology as inherently violent toward beings in their singularity. Ontology, 
in this respect, is Procrustean. Instead of approaching beings as unique 
individuals, ontology subsumes, or “totalizes” their uniqueness under a 
general system, thus reducing their otherness. To avoid violence of this 
kind Levinas consistently argues that ethics, rather than ontology, is 
first philosophy. In one sense this means that every individual maintains 
a peaceful, responsible, and heteronomous relation to the Other, one 
which is prior to any representation or understanding of him or her. 
Civil discourse among individuals forms the basis of the community 
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of knowers, and therefore is the condition of possibility of any theory 
of being or epistemology (TI 72-77/44-49).289 A certain intersubjective 
stability, a responsiveness to and responsibility for the other, is necessary 
for epistemological and ontological reflection to occur. So, ethics first, 
then ontology.
Levinas’s critique of ontology, Heidegger’s ontology in particular, often 
conflates “ontology” with “knowledge of Being” in order to argue for the 
priority of ethics. This conflation reduces being, or existence in general, 
to what can be known about being. This is a familiar move in the Levinas 
literature.290 It is symptomatic of the view that ontology cannot get outside 
the subject-object correlation, and therefore cannot accommodate the 
alterity (the Other) that transcends the correlation. Only metaphysics of the 
Levinasian variety can prepare such accommodation because Levinasian 
metaphysics is in actuality an ethics dedicated to hospitality toward the 
Other, not a theory of what exists or the basic structure of reality. It resists 
absolutely any attempt to subordinate the singularity of the Other to the 
generality of Being. He writes in Totality and Infinity about how ontology 
“reduces the other to the same” by making the Other appear through a 
“third term, a neutral term, which is itself not a being” (TI 42/12). This 
third term, through which the “shock of the encounter of the same with 
the other is deadened” is the theory of being, or ontology understood as a 
system of knowledge of beings.
Prior to any conceptualization of the Other, Levinas argues, is the 
“calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other,” or 
ethics (TI 43/13). But is not this calling into question an event that requires 
us to understand its conditions and terms? That is, is it not necessary for 
us to comprehend the constitution of the subject and the Other in order to 
realize the force of ethics? Ontology seems to come before ethics. There is 
a sense, however, in which neither enjoys priority, that it is in fact aesthetics 
that is first philosophy. This thesis, which was suggested in previous chapters, 
will be deepened here and in the remaining chapters.
If Heidegger’s ontology represents a form of correlationism—it 
would seem that this is how Levinas understands it, although the point 
is contentious—then Levinasian metaphysics challenges correlationism 
in the name of an infinity which exceeds the subject-object relation. The 
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challenge operates as a response to what Levinas perceives as the inability 
of Heideggerian ontology to accommodate otherness, infinity, alterity—that 
is, to think beyond being. This may not be a failure of ontology in general, 
however, but a failure only of correlationist ontology. An ontology that 
surpasses correlationism might not meet the usual Levinasian criticism. 
Indeed, what Levinas provides, I think, is a non-correlationist ontology, 
although he is reluctant to call it ontology for fear that his work will be read 
too closely to Heidegger’s. Putting this worry aside, we may conclude that 
ontology is not intrinsically reductive, violent, or unethical.
Levinas’s critique of ontology is strongest, I think, when it is seen as an 
internal critique of correlationist (including phenomenological) ontology, 
rather than as a wholesale rejection of ontology. Moreover, it seems that 
Levinas’s position would be strengthened if he allowed that what he calls 
ethics is actually grounded in ontology. On this reading our understanding 
of ourselves, others, and intersubjectivity would be seen as equiprimordial 
with (if not prior to) ethical responsibility.291 The ontological reading of 
Levinas gains traction, I would argue, when we consider that it is not 
possible to see what is “called into question” by the Other until we have 
laid bare the constitution of the egocentric subject, or the individual who 
cultivates a life of enjoyment and material security.
A grasp of the ontology informing Levinas’s account of the subject is 
essential for contrasting Levinasian and Kantian ethics.292 It is through a 
rejection of the Kantian subject as immaterial agent that Levinas is able to 
make his case for the eminent vulnerability of the subject and, consequently, 
the ethical responsibility entailed by that vulnerability. Levinas argues in 
Existence and Existents that the Kantian subject, the transcendental ego, 
always stands at a safe distance from the effects of the world. As that which 
allows things to appear and be apprehended by cognition, but which does 
not act in the world, the Kantian ego presents “a way of relating to events 
while still being able to not be caught up in them. To be a [Kantian] subject 
is to be a power of unending withdrawal, an ability always to find oneself 
behind what happens to one” (EE 42/77). The Levinasian subject, by 
contrast, is caught up in, produced as an “ontological event” by the world. 
Indeed, the entirety of Existence and Existents can be read as the tale of the 
subject’s emergence from bare existence, the assumption or actualization of 
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a “position” out of what Levinas calls the “there is”—the  il y a (EE 66-67, 
88/120, 149; TI 175/149). This positioning is the material substantialization, 
or “separation,” of the subject from anonymous existence, a process which 
is recounted in Totality and Infinity in terms of the body which enjoys, 
nourishes, and “lives from” (vivre de) the surrounding world:
Enjoyment accomplishes the atheist separation: it deformalizes 
the notion of separation, which is not a cleavage made in 
the abstract, but the existence at home with itself as an 
autochthonous I. The soul…dwells in what is not itself, but it 
acquires its own identity by this dwelling in the “other.” (TI 
115/88, italics added)
At bottom it is the invulnerability of the Kantian subject in the face of 
external affection, which is to say, the untraversable distance separating 
subject and world, that Levinas objects to.293 It is in this context that Levinas 
foregrounds the affectivity, and ultimately the a priori vulnerability, of 
the subject.
Individuation; or, the Enjoyment of Immanence
The story of the emergence of the embodied subject, especially in Totality 
and Infinity, but in other texts as well, is guided by the concept of enjoyment 
(jouissance). It is precisely the being that enjoys life that is summoned by the 
Other to respond, and one responds with offerings of what one enjoys. But 
which comes first, the enjoyment or the individual who enjoys? Enjoyment, 
it would seem, must either produce individuation or enjoyment must take 
place in an already-existing individual. In Levinas’s view, however, these 
events—enjoyment, individuation—are co-constitutive. They generate and 
reinforce one another, and there is an ontological story to be told about the 
process. And, arguably, this process must have occurred for there to be a 
responsive agent who can answer, adequately or inadequately, the call of the 
Other. Agency must be accomplished before it can assume responsibility for 
its genesis, otherwise what, exactly, is called into question?
What does it mean to be generated by enjoyment? The Levinasian 
analysis of enjoyment is packaged with companion concepts like living from, 
nourishment, alimentation, and need. These concepts possess physiological 
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and phenomenological senses, both of which Levinas attends to, often 
collapsing their distinction. The scope of enjoyment is not restricted to what 
can be consumed, nor is it interpreted as a phenomenon exclusively attached 
to the practice of living, using, and doing. Levinas gives enjoyment a more 
expansive sense, identifying it as the affect that effects our separation and 
makes possible our manipulation of things; it thus conditions the economic/
practical life that Heidegger sees as primordial to human existence.294 The 
content of this individuation, this independence, is primarily affective and 
self-sustaining:
One does not only exist one’s pain or one’s joy; one exists 
from pains and joys. Enjoyment is precisely this way the act 
nourishes itself with its own activity. To live from bread is 
therefore neither to represent bread to oneself nor to act on 
it nor to act by means of it. To be sure, it is necessary to earn 
one’s bread, and it is necessary to nourish oneself in order 
to earn one’s bread; thus the bread I eat is also that with 
which I earn my bread and my life. But if I eat my bread in 
order to labor and to live, I live from my labor and from my 
bread. (TI 111/83)
Enjoyment is not just about taking in and taking pleasure in taking in. 
This passage suggests that Sallis is too quick to reduce enjoyment to the 
consumptive aspect of alimentation when he characterizes enjoyment in the 
following way: “the determination by which to comport oneself to an object 
is to appropriate the object, that is, to cancel its otherness and affirm its 
sameness with oneself. As in eating.”295 This construal of enjoyment not only 
overlooks our affective engagements with what could never be consumed 
(the elemental, the ungraspable), it too narrowly restricts the meaning of the 
Levinasian alimentary. As we will see, alimentation has a much richer and 
more nuanced sense than that captured by “consumption.”
To be sure, enjoyment is a phenomenon analogous to desire in that it 
feeds upon and produces itself, unlike need which is satisfied once its lack 
has been filled.296 Hunger, for instance, results from a privation of food, 
and when I eat my hunger subsides. Even if the food is unsavory, my body 
takes pleasure in the sustenance. The structure of nourishment which is 
displayed by enjoyment is of a different order than my satiable hunger, 
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however. Levinas’s treatment of enjoyment belongs to his phenomenology of 
alimentation and his exposition of the concrete features of the interiority, or 
economy, of subjectivity.297
Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation 
of the other into the same, which is in the essence of 
enjoyment: an energy that is other, recognized as other, 
recognized…as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it, 
becomes, in enjoyment, my own energy, my strength, me. All 
enjoyment is in this sense alimentation. (TI 111/83)
To live is to savor life and to have that life nourished by the acts which make 
up living: sensing, knowing, imagining, wishing, resting, and so on. Each of 
these brings an immediate joy that feeds the egoism at the core of life (TI 
112/84). And it is in this enjoyment that the “very pulsation” of the I occurs 
(TI 113/85). “Subjectivity originates in the independence and sovereignty 
of enjoyment,” says Levinas (TI 114/86). Enjoyment makes no appeal to the 
absolute transcendence often cited by Levinas as the condition of possibility 
for subjective individuation. It is, after all, a product of immanence. It is no 
less significant for the genesis of subjectivity than the encounter with the 
Other, however.
Correlative with Levinas’s emphasis on the irreducible and absolute 
transcendence of the Other is an attempt to think the immanent production 
of subjectivity. This is evident in the language he employs to describe the 
becoming of the subject in enjoyment. He speaks of individuation as a 
“coiling” (enroulement), “folding back” (repli), as “spiral” (spirale) and 
“involution” (involution) (TI 118/91; EE 81/138; OB 73/92). Enjoyment 
is denoted as the “eddy of the same” (le remous même du Même) (TI 
115/88). The imagery here suggests that Levinas is trying to conceive 
individuation without recourse to some external, individuating agent or 
cause, but as an autoaffective process.298 That is, he seems to want an 
immanent principle of animation. It is true that the call to responsibility 
commanded by the Other singles me out, or individuates me as an ethical 
agent, but this can only occur once I have become someone capable of 
responding—that is, become a subject who can be subjected to moral 
commands. Levinas often speaks of the encounter with the face of the Other 
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as that which accomplishes my subjectivity as an ethical subject. For instance: 
“It is only in approaching the Other that I attend to myself.” And:
The face I welcome makes me pass from phenomenon to 
being in another sense: in discourse I expose myself to the 
questioning of the Other, and this urgency of the response—
acuteness of the present—engenders me for responsibility; as 
responsible I am brought to my final reality.” (TI 178/153)
It is true that for Levinas we are always already discursive, responsible 
beings; but he also implies that there is a form of subjectivity—incomplete, 
to be sure—which precedes our subjection to the Other. The material 
subject, the embodied I, must emerge into a position before it can be called 
to account for itself, its possessions, and its enjoyment.
For the subject to be responsible and capable of substituting itself in 
the place of the Other, which is precisely what Levinas wants to affirm of 
each of us, must not the subject already have something to give? Must it not 
be a singular individual, some actual person with actual resources? If not, 
would not Levinas be advocating an formal notion of responsibility, one 
which responds with empty hands? And would this not be the most abstract 
and general form of ethics, an ethics empty of content and on the verge 
of effacing the materiality of suffering, inequality, need, and vulnerability? 
A non-formal notion of responsibility seems to require a subject that has 
not only emerged as an individual, but one who has also already acquired 
possessions which it can offer to the destitute Other, before it can be 
designated as a responsible/responsive agent. There must be some form of 
subjectivity in Levinas’s thinking which is not merely envisaged as formal 
subjection to the Other, but as actual, concrete existing.
Levinas is grappling with the problem of immanent individuation in 
Otherwise than Being when he writes that
Matter “materializes” in satisfaction, which, over and beyond 
any intentional relationship of cognition or possession, of 
“taking in one’s hands,” means “biting into….” It is irreducible 
to a taking in one’s hands, for it is already an absorption of a 
“within” including the ambiguity of two inwardnesses: that of 
a recipient of spatial forms, and that of an ego assimilating the 
other in its identity, and coiling in over itself. (OB 73/92)
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And a little further along, he remarks how “there is enjoying of enjoyment 
before any reflection, but enjoyment does not turn toward enjoyment 
as sight turns toward the seen. Beyond the multiplication of the visible 
in images, enjoyment is the singularization of an ego in its coiling back 
[enroulement] upon itself” (OB 73/93). What Levinas calls the “advent” of 
the subject from out of the anonymity of existence is not a movement of 
transcendence, but the taking up of a position through effort, labor, and the 
consequent enjoyment which results from these acts. Enjoyment multiplies, 
folding back upon itself and wresting the I free, generating a substantial 
subject (EE 81/138). The substance of this subject little is rooted in the 
thickness or viscosity of its affective life.299
Sensibility and the Elements of Representation
Levinas’s apology for the primacy of affectivity and the sensuous 
embodiment of the subject operates as a response to a perceived deficiency 
in the phenomenological method devised by Husserl, in particular its 
doctrine of objectifying intentionality. It also continues his critique of the 
Kantian subject sketched above. Against Kant and Husserl he envisages the 
subject as a material event instead of as a transcendental ego that serves as 
the condition of possibility for representing or giving meaning to objects and 
events. Insofar as his philosophy attempts to supplant the privileged place of 
intentionality in phenomenology; as it attempts to install affectivity, alterity, 
and the like at the base of experience, Levinas’s philosophy works against 
phenomenology in the name of a quasi-materialist metaphysics. His interest 
in phenomenology is driven less out of a desire to contribute to a science 
of phenomena than from a desire to give a non-reductive metaphysical 
account of events that could otherwise be explained by the physical sciences 
or recuperated by a representationalist epistemology. In a strong sense 
Levinas’s critique of intentionality is an allergic reaction to what he sees as 
the hegemony of representation in phenomenological accounts of otherness 
(TI 122-127/95-100).
Levinas’s objection to phenomenological method is straightforward: 
if the objectifying acts of theoretical consciousness, what Husserl calls 
meaning-giving (Sinngebung) acts, are our primary mode of access 
to things, then those things can only appear to us as representations 
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whose content is predetermined by the representing subject. In short, 
phenomenology becomes a modified transcendental idealism, its 
ontology correlationist. The problem is that this kind of transcendental 
philosophy leaves no room for the radical passivity Levinasian ethics 
requires, and it fails to appreciate the ambiguity of the given as well as 
its capacity to surprise (TI 123, 125/96, 97). “The ‘act’ of representation 
discovers, properly speaking, nothing before itself” (TI 125/97). From 
the practical perspective, the subject who constitutes the content of the 
world through representations retains an identity that persists throughout 
all of its experiences. It is not properly shaped by its world because it is 
not fully exposed to the world. The spontaneity of its freedom to represent 
is never compromised by the objects it represents. As Levinas says, “in 
representation the I precisely loses its opposition to its object; the opposition 
fades, bringing out the identity of the I despite the multiplicity of its objects, 
that is, precisely the unalterable character of the I. To remain the same is to 
represent to oneself” (TI 126/99). Representation is the ruin of alterity.
Levinas supplants objectifying acts of consciousness and installs 
sensation as the ground of experience. An analogous move is made by 
Merleau-Ponty when he (tentatively) places le sentir before both operative 
intentionality and intentionality of act. Levinas’s move is more radical, 
however, because it unequivocally asserts that sensation is discontinuous 
with perception and cognition. He recognizes the content of sensibility as 
prior to intentionality of any form. This means that the subject’s sensuous 
contact with what is exterior remains forever anterior to its perception and 
representational acts. Its sensuous contact with the Other, as well as with 
matter and the sensible as such (the diminutive other), thus comprises 
the transcendental field in Levinas’s philosophy. John Drabinski writes 
of this field:
The sensible surrounds and structures the movement toward 
the object and thereby structures the very possibility of the 
noematic horizons that form the field of transcendental 
exposition. The sensible is transcendental, not in the sense 
that it is already an ideality, but rather that it is a presupposed 
condition of all reflective life.300
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That the sensible is “presupposed” signals Levinas’s transgression of 
phenomenological principles, as well as his willingness to speculate about 
the ontogenesis of subjectivity. This does not mean that Levinas must 
break completely with phenomenology in order to rediscover the force 
of sensation—on the contrary, he finds that “intentionality rehabilitates 
the sensible [réhabilite le sensible].”301 How so? He points to the tacit 
dimension of intentional acts, or that which “consciousness sees without 
seeing.”302 The tacit dimension of seeing is not just the unintended 
horizon of unfulfilled intentions which accompany explicit intentions, but 
represents the very excess of intentionality which “is incontestably akin to 
the modern conceptions of the unconscious and the depths.” There is a 
reciprocal constitution at play in intentionality, whereby the object, which 
is supposedly constituted by consciousness, proves to contain more than its 
explicit constitution, and this “more than” reveals itself as always already 
conditioning thought. “A new ontology begins: being is posited not only 
as correlative to a thought, but as already founding the very thought that 
nonetheless constitutes it.”303
Levinas’s new ontology locates a fundamental excess at the heart of 
intentional consciousness, signaling the “ruin of representation” and the 
destabilization of the Kantian (and Husserlian) subject. If Kant’s schema 
requires an imperceptible layer of content that lies below the level of 
representation, but one that is beyond the reach of transcendental idealism, 
then Levinas shows how this layer threatens to disrupt the stability of 
the subject of representation. Kant’s transcendental method admits the 
existence of this layer of content, but effectively neutralizes its volatility:
The idea of a necessary implication that is absolutely 
imperceptible to the subject directed on the object, only 
discovered after the fact upon reflection, thus not produced in 
the present, that is, produced unbeknownst to me, puts an end 
to the ideal of representation and the subject’s sovereignty, as 
well as to the idealism according to which nothing could enter 
into me surreptitiously. A deep-seated passion is thus revealed 
in thought.304
As the transcendental support of representation the sensible and its 
qualities constitute the milieu out of which the subject perceives. Totality 
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and Infinity gives a lengthy description of this ungraspable milieu, referring 
to it as “the element.” The element has no profiles, it is a pure quality that 
we enjoy before we make any categorical judgments about it (TI 131-
133/104-107). As Sallis characterizes it, the element is “irreducible to a 
system of operational references” and “has its own thickness and density…. 
And unlike the things that come to us in the medium, the medium itself 
is nonpossessable.” Sallis continues: “The depth of the element does not, 
as with a thing, conceal a series of other profiles that could be offered to 
various perspectives.”305 The element is that which surrounds us, like climate 
or atmospheric temperature or the aesthetic.
Lover of ambiguity that he is, and despite the fact that he uses the term 
to describe the flesh, the element as Levinas understands it appears to be 
missing in Merleau-Ponty.306 For Levinas the element is the very locus of 
ambiguity and what resists categorical judgment. This is its unique mode of 
being, what enables it to support the things that inhabit it without appearing 
as one of those things. And yet, it is not simply the horizon or background 
of an intentional act. It exceeds every such act. The elemental/sensuous 
milieu “is privileged, because within it that ambiguity of constitution, 
whereby the noema conditions and shelters the noesis that constitutes it, is 
played out.”307 Levinas notes that Husserl wanted to designate the sensuous 
as objective, that is, as independent of subjective constitution, but his 
adherence to the primacy of intentionality prevented him from doing so. 
This is because intentionality “plays the role of an apprehension with regard 
to those contents upon which it bestows an objective meaning and which it 
animates or inspires.”308 By contrast, Levinas insists that we live through the 
objectivity of sensations. Even Husserl recognized this. We should then say 
that the “materiality of sensations [matérialité des sensations]” is, borrowing 
Levinas’s own expression, lived from or enjoyed, never apprehended or 
grasped by the intellect or perception.309
In addition to acting as a resistance to representational thinking 
sensation provides the aliment that gives birth to any subject capable of 
representing. Sensation, then, would not be just an effect of the objective on 
the subject, but a “complicity” between the materiality of subject and object: 
“the corporeity of consciousness is in exact proportion to this participation 
of consciousness in the world it constitutes, but this corporeity is produced 
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[produit] in sensation.”310 In Otherwise than Being this complicity is developed 
in Levinas’s analysis of sensibility and in terms of “contact” with otherness, 
and contributes to Levinas’s transcendental aesthetic of embodiment.311 It is 
notable that emphasis in both texts is on the productive aspect of sensation, 
its capacity to generate the consciousness of the lived body.
The complicity of sensation between subject and object recalls Merleau-
Ponty’s idea of sensing as communion. The key difference between the 
two thinkers, however, is that Merleau-Ponty sees this communion as 
synchronous, whereas Levinas recognizes it as the locus of a diachrony 
which entails the very instability of the body-world relation. Also lacking 
in Merleau-Ponty’s understanding is the idea that corporeity itself is 
produced materially by sensations, that sensations conspire with affects 
to produce singular subjects. In Merleau-Ponty’s subject-object dialogue 
it is the movement of perception and the posture of the body (but not 
their materiality) that is affected by sensation, whereas for Levinas 
sensation actually produces the body qua living, sensing, enjoying being. 
The difference may be more palpable if Levinas’s position is rendered in 
neuroscientific discourse, which regards “the conversion of what is felt into 
nervous material [as] nonstop.”312 For Levinas, sensations and affects are 
converted—and this he tries to account for phenomenologically—into the 
content of life, or the feeling of living. Insofar as we live from this feeling 
and gain a desire to continue living, we can say that sensations are converted 
into material life. In biology there is a name for this process—metabolism.313 
Sensing, for Levinas, is a metabolic event. But it is also an intimate kind 
of transaction, beyond mere commerce or exchange, one that is felt and 
enjoyed by the being that metabolizes.
There is a distinct shift of emphasis between the analyses of sensibility 
given in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. In the earlier text 
Levinas concentrates his narrative of subject-constitution on the enabling 
features of sensibility and the dependence of the body on the material 
environment. In the later text he tends to cast sensibility as that which leaves 
the subject precariously exposed to the outside and vulnerable to wounding. 
That is, a non-reciprocity marks the relation between the body and the 
other: the Levinasian body ultimately becomes a susceptible body, where 
susceptibility is understood as the radical passivity which arises from the 
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diachrony of sensibility. In both instances sensibility is given a pre-reflective 
and pre-representational role, and it is clear that Levinas sees it as prior to 
the emergence of objectifying consciousness.
Levinas affirms, following Descartes, the irrationality and ambiguity 
of sensation. Like Kant, he separates sensibility from the understanding 
and relegates sensible “matter” to a place beyond “the synthetic power 
of representation” (TI 135-136/109). Nevertheless, Levinas maintains 
that a phenomenology of sensation is possible. I will try to adduce in the 
remainder of this chapter Levinas’s “phenomenology of the sensible” (TI 
136/109) and his unique perspective on sensibility.
The Phenomenology of Sensation
Totality and Infinity ties sensibility to enjoyment, calling enjoyment the 
“essence” of sensibility. Conversely, sensibility is determined as the “mode of 
enjoyment” (TI 134, 135/107, 108). Sensibility is therefore determined as a 
mode of affectivity or point of access for pleasurable and painful encounters. 
If, as we saw earlier, enjoyment is responsible for the genesis of the self, then 
sensibility must also have something to do with how the self is generated.
Sensibility’s modality is undirected and sufficient to itself (TI 135/108-
109), which means that it does not belong to the order of instrumentality 
that Levinas assigns to the economy of possession—the hand that grasps 
objects as tools/implements (as in Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty) or the 
mind which grasps objects as concepts (as in Hegel) or assigns phenomena 
their meaning (as in Husserl).314 Sensibility is neither “a means to…” nor 
“in the service of…,” despite being basic to labor, work, effort, dwelling, 
and so on. Above all, it is a direct encounter with the otherness that is 
given through sensations and materiality, which is not for Levinas simply 
a question of resistance to action or opposition: sensibility establishes our 
relation to the elemental through our corporeal enjoyment of aesthetic 
qualities (TI 136/109). This enjoyment is discontinuous with the synthetic 
acts of consciousness. It is not a stage toward representation, but a pulsating 
rhythm of the I. It is, as Merleau-Ponty has put it, a mode in which the 
subject is born and dies as each instant (TI 136, 143/109-110, 117; 
PP 216/250).
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Silvia Benso illustrates this process with an analysis of breathing. 
Breathing is a twofold process, inspiration and expiration. Inspiration and 
expiration, which are structurally equivalent to birth and death, provide the 
animation of the subject through the element of air. “Such an animation 
does not occur as the level of cognition, theory, or intentionality, claims 
Levinas. Rather, it is only possible at the level of the body, through an 
incarnation.”315 This interpretation of living disengages the body from 
its reliance on the soul by localizing the animation of subjectivity in the 
intercorporeal, rather than spiritual, realm. The problem of the interaction of 
body and soul drops off in favor of a phenomenology of corporeal life and its 
reliance on the elemental. “The body thus is retrieved from its confinement 
in that Cartesian…order of materiality for which the body and the soul ‘have 
no common space where they can touch’.”316 The significance of breathing is 
not merely physiological, as Levinas makes clear. It yields a transcendental 
interpretation that locates the conditions of possibility at the border between 
body and environment, that is, in sensibility.
The pulsation of the I is supported by the sensible, while the sensible 
itself remains groundless, anarchic. The insecurity entailed in this 
anarchy is not exactly a material threat, but a question of the temporality 
of the sensible. The sensible world “precedes me as an absolute of an 
unrepresentable antiquity” that is perhaps only apprehensible by imagining 
the total destruction of the world, an impossible thought experiment (TI 
137/111; EE 51/93). We cannot know from whence it comes or whether it 
will continue in the future. Its promise is precarious, without guarantee that 
it will continue to sustain life.
It is true that we always access the sensible in the present and, affective 
and abstract encounters notwithstanding, via representations. Merleau-
Ponty points to Cézanne’s painting; Deleuze, Francis Bacon’s. Digital 
imaging of the autonomic nervous system offers a high-tech representation 
of the sensing body. This does not mean that the totality of the sensible 
is given in representations, for “the represented, the present, is a fact, 
already belonging to a past” (TI 130/103). Representations are laced with 
an anteriority that cannot endure the formal exigencies of the present. To 
represent the sensible as such would be analogous to encountering the il 
y a in pure form, bare existence, in its absolute formlessness. It would be 
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an actualization in the present of the absolute past, the apeiron whence 
everything comes. Despite the impossibility of this event—we are always 
already caught up in a world of thought, language, perception—Levinas 
assures us that we do in fact come face to face with formless phenomena 
(TI 139/112). In Totality and Infinity he speaks of how our identities are 
haunted by the elemental and the insecurity this brings us, while in Existence 
and Existents he speaks of the horror of the il y a that we experience in the 
night.317 But how are these formless phenomena revealed, that is, accessed 
phenomenologically?
Building an Identity
Existence and Existents traces the genesis of the individual existent from 
out of the anonymity of pure existence, being qua being. This anonymity, 
although not temporally prior to individuation, maintains an ontological 
priority over the subject who thinks, acts, and feels as a singular ego or 
person. On Levinas’s account the existent breaks free from anonymity by 
taking up a position or assuming an identity, exerting itself against the 
indeterminacy of being and feeling itself alive in its efforts. It is only when 
we make an effort through labor that a rift is created in being and the 
present is allowed to open up: “Effort is the very effecting of a present,” 
says Levinas (EE 23/48), because the fatigue which results from effort 
dislocates the existent from its synchrony with the uninterrupted duration 
of bare existence.318 The same is said by Rousseau in the Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality, in which it is work and the subsequent circumscription 
of property that extricates human being from the infantile and innocent 
realm of sensibility.319 What Jean Starobinski calls the “struggle to overcome 
natural obstacles” with the application of tools is what gives rise to the 
psychological transformations that institute a critical reflective distance 
between humans and their environment.320 Work, in short, conditions 
reflection and leads eventually to the inequalities of society. For Levinas, 
work introduces more than a psychological rift and more than social 
inequality: work tears pure being and time apart. Work produces subjects. 
Whereas the process of individuation, and the opposition of self and other 
entailed in it, is for Rousseau psychological, for Levinas it is basically 
affective. And this affectivity performs a transcendental function that is 
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not found in Rousseau’s speculative anthropology. As an affective, rather 
than reflective, event the retroactive movement of work on the partitioning 
of being awakens us to our interminable contract with existence. Despite 
appearances, work is not an escape from existence: “Fatigue is to be sure 
not a cancellation of one’s contact with being. The delay it involves is 
nonetheless an inscription in existence…” (EE 25/51).
Our inescapable attachment to existence is dramatized in the experience 
of insomnia. The insomniac not only feels herself alive in her fatigue, 
she suffers existence in a much more menacing form. She faces the 
insufferability of pure existence as she seeks, through what Levinas calls 
“vigilance,” to tear herself free from the indeterminacy of the night which 
watches over her, holds her hostage to her wakefulness.321 Particularly in 
Existence and Existents the night figures as the experiential form of the il y a, 
or pure being. In the night, Levinas tells us, things lose their form and the 
dark matter of existence encroaches upon us. Being takes on a menacing 
aspect through which we are confronted with the anonymity of our own 
existence. Insomnia reminds us that we are not completely in control of our 
being.322 The insomniac experiences a wakefulness at night that contests 
the spontaneity of her will, that challenges the authority she claims over her 
position in existence. She wants and wills sleep, but sleep will not come. 
And it eventually seems that it is the night itself which withholds sleep 
from her. The sense of being alive that comes with fatigue transforms into 
a restless horror. She finds herself at the mercy of being. Instead of fatigue 
giving way to sleep, “One watches on when there is nothing to watch and 
despite the absence of any reason for remaining watchful” (EE 61/109). It is 
as though, in the grip of the night, the restlessness of the insomniac’s body 
has extinguished the freedom of the ego and rendered the ego a prisoner 
of the night. “I am, one might say, the object rather than the subject of an 
anonymous thought” (EE 63/111). And this, says Levinas, is a horrifying 
condition (EE 55/98).323
The horror of existence is articulated with the insecurity bestowed 
upon our bodies by our sensibility, a condition which is warded off (for a 
time) in dwelling (TI 137/110-111). In dwelling we shelter ourselves from 
the elements, and this sheltering offers the nourishment of enjoyment. 
The enjoyment of warmth, security, comfort. We shelter ourselves because 
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we are incapable of getting a hold on or containing the elements that, 
beyond a certain threshold, begin to deteriorate instead of sustain us. The 
air we breathe is the same air that freezes our flesh. The themes of fatigue 
and effort found in Existence and Existents recur in the narrative regarding 
dwelling and possession contained in Totality and Infinity. The phenomenon 
of dwelling is elaborated against the backdrop of enjoyment, on the one 
hand, and the insecurity buried in the depths of enjoyment, on the other. 
Dwelling is an ambivalent affair.
Dwelling gives rise to the representation and, ultimately, possession 
of objects. But dwelling is not only an activity in which consumption and 
possession occur, it is itself an event of alimentation. There are multiple 
kinds of alimentation involved in dwelling, some affective and others 
consumptive. In the home the subject takes up a position of refuge. Only 
after this position is established can labor commence, and it is this labor, 
for Levinas, that gives form to matter and produces the world of graspable/
consumable things—possessions (TI 156, 157, 159/130, 131, 133).324 “A 
subject does not exist before the event of its position. The act of taking 
a position does not unfold in some dimension from which it could take 
its origin; it arises at the very point at which it acts” (EE 81/138). Taking 
a position is a condition of laboring, and yet it is not yet acting. Acting 
is a movement of transcendence, whereas laboring is a movement of 
immanence. Assuming a position belongs to the involutionary movement of 
effort and fatigue, of enjoyment and living from…. Positioning and dwelling 
are the concrete modes through which the subject comes to be situated 
in the objective world. They lend bodies the support needed to come to 
terms with the elemental through labor (TI 158/131). Yet, this is the kind 
of support that must be constantly taken up, rebuilt, and maintained—a 
Sisyphean labor.
Labor leads to possession and is guided by the final causality of the 
hand. The hand takes hold of things, masters them, comprehends them. It 
takes them up and puts them to use. “Possession is accomplished in taking-
possession or labor, the destiny of the hand” (TI 159/132). Possession is 
contrasted with the enjoyment of sensibility, which is precisely determined 
by its non-possession: “The hand comprehends the thing not because it 
touches it on all sides at the same time…but because it is no longer a 
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sense-organ, pure enjoyment, pure sensibility, but is mastery, domination, 
disposition—which do not belong to the order of sensibility” (TI 161/135). 
Levinas aims to designate possession as a practico-ontological affair, one 
that assuages the insecurity brought on by our exposure to the elemental: 
“Possession masters, suspends, postpones the unforeseeable future of the 
element—its independence, its being” (TI 158/132). Despite its attachment 
to ontology, however, Levinas refuses here to call labor a violence. This is 
because “it is applied to what is faceless, to the resistance of nothingness” 
(TI 160/134).
All of this—from individuation to dwelling to labor—involves and 
influences the genesis of the body of the subject who dwells and labors. 
First, the hand substantializes things, outlines their contours and draws 
them out of the pure quality of the element. Things are not first there, 
waiting to give themselves to consciousness.325 Second, Levinas argues 
that the subject is originally influenced by its affective commerce with the 
element. It is “the product of the medium.” The lived body is no more 
active than it is passive, no less affective than perceptive. This is not an 
endorsement of the duality of the body (lived body/objective body), but 
of its “ambiguous” nature, which Levinas identifies with consciousness 
(TI 165/139). Consciousness, he says, is not an incarnation, but a 
“disincarnation,” a “positioning of the corporeity of the body” which 
emerges in the “concreteness of dwelling and labor” (TI 165-166/140). 
Consciousness, then, arises out of the body’s pulsations in labor. The rhythm 
of labor, and the tension involved therein, give rise to consciousness. He 
thus provides an account—part phenomenological, part speculative—of 
the birth of subjectivity in the body. One is reminded here of Nietzsche’s 
remarks on the origin of consciousness in On the Genealogy of Morality, 
where the inhibition of physical human activity gives birth, in a folding 
back upon oneself, to the “internalizing of man”—conscious reflection.326 
Only after the fact of embodiment do reflective and representational activity 
become possible. Appreciating the ambiguity of the body’s relation to the 
other, Levinas writes:
In its deep-seated fear life attests this ever possible inversion 
of the body-master into body-slave, of health and sickness. To 
be a body is on the one hand to stand [se tenir], to be master 
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of oneself, and, on the other hand, to stand on the earth, to 
be in the other, and thus to be encumbered by one’s body. 
But—we repeat—this encumberment is not produced as a 
pure dependence; it forms the happiness of him who enjoys it. 
(TI 164/138)
The body’s capacity to work on things acts as a consolation for its inability 
to rend itself from being to enjoy a degree of autonomy and accumulate a 
stock of resources that may be shared with the needful Other. Consciousness 
relieves the body—gives respite, allows it to stand out— from the physical 
realm, helping to postpone the disintegration and death proper to material 
life. At the same time the body remains prey to the Other who “paralyzes 
possession” (TI 170, 171/145).
The Rhythm of Sensation
Levinas’s prioritizing of sensibility over the grasp and comprehension works 
as a critique of Merleau-Ponty, in particular the latter’s insistence that our 
basic modus operandi involves an initial hold on things that increasingly 
converges upon an even better hold. While Levinas certainly appreciates that 
our practical relations with things, our treatment of them as implements, 
is our primary means of handling the world, he insists that below the 
equipmental and perceptual levels lies the inscrutable level of sensation. 
Sensation is not part of perception. Perception belongs to the intentional 
sphere, the realm of consciousness, whereas sensation anonymously 
haunts the edges of perception. The affectivity of sensation functions 
transcendentally; it is virtually real. Perception actualizes representations.327 
“The very distinction between representational and affective content is 
tantamount to a recognition that enjoyment is endowed with a dynamism 
other than that of perception,” writes Levinas (TI 187/161). He realizes 
that such claims stretch the limits of phenomenology, but he aspires to a 
phenomenology of sensation nonetheless. His entire ontology of the sensible 
is built on the claim that the pure quality of existence is independent of us, 
anarchic, and ungraspable—and yet, it is given. No reversibility can exist 
between us and the purely sensible because it is in the nature of the sensible 
to exceed our representational and practical capacities; it is impossible 
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to “get a grip” on it. This leaves us vulnerable to its precarious future. 
At the heart of sensibility is a diachrony, or dehiscence, that interrupts 
the synchrony of body and world just as a caress of the skin defers the 
immediacy of contact indefinitely. “In a caress, what is there is sought 
as though it were not there, as though the skin were the trace of its own 
withdrawal, a languor still seeking, like an absence which, however, could 
not be more there. The caress is the not coinciding proper to contact” 
(OB 90/114).328
In “Reality and Its Shadow,” one of his most sustained treatments of 
aesthetics and art, Levinas explicitly argues for the diachrony of aesthetic 
experience. Here he is close to Deleuze in at least one respect: both thinkers 
see the effects of aesthetic “rhythm” as constitutive of aesthetic experience 
and, consequently, the integrity of the embodied subject. For Levinas 
rhythm is the means by which we are affected, against our will, by the work 
of art. This is how the work hits us. This affection, however, is different from 
that undergone when someone is faced with the il y a, which “lacks rhythm” 
(EE 62/111), suggesting that the pure encounter with being is outside 
aesthetics. Rhythm conducts the passive moment of sensing, the moment in 
which our active representation is converted into a passive reception:
Rhythm represents a unique situation where we cannot speak 
of consent, assumption, initiative or freedom, because the 
subject is caught up and carried away by it. The subject is 
part of its own representation. It is so not even despite itself, 
for in rhythm there is no longer a oneself, but rather a sort of 
passage from oneself to anonymity.329
This is applicable not only to music, but to poetry and painting as well. 
Rhythm is precisely that sensible form/content that detaches itself from the 
artwork and seizes upon sensibility, bypassing consciousness, folding the 
subject into the aesthetic event.330
To insist on the musicality of every image is to see in an image 
its detachment from an object, that independence from the 
category of substance which the analysis of our textbooks 
ascribe to pure sensation not yet converted into perception 
(sensation as an adjective), which for empirical psychology 
remains a limit case, a purely hypothetical given.”331
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Embedded in the figure and form of representational content lies the 
sensory content which informs the rhythm of the aesthetic. Granted, we 
may not always apprehend the rhythm of sensation phenomenologically, 
but that is just the point: the function of sensation is to affect sensibility 
directly and render the viewer/listener captive. This is why Levinas says that 
sensibility is “realized only by the imagination.”332 Only the imagination of 
the painter, poet, musician, for example, can represent the aesthetic event 
with which sensibility comes into contact, that is, pure sensation detached 
from representation. The audience can attempt the same.
Sensation is an interpellation, a kind of imperative that cannot be dodged 
because its subtle force operates immediately on the body, below the level of 
both perception and apperception. Insofar as it engages us simultaneously at 
the level of perception and sensation, indirectly and directly on the body, the 
aesthetic dimension operates diachronically. It is, in short, out of step with 
the correlation of thought and being.333 Since the sensory event is always 
happening behind the scenes, animating the present representation but 
never rising to the level of representation, it remains forever in the past.334
Rhythm affects sensibility as a “distinct ontological event.”335 Deleuze 
has argued a similar point about the effect of some painting, specifically 
Francis Bacon’s. For Deleuze rhythm is fundamental to the “logic” of 
sensation; it is what animates/unifies the senses and their discrete content.336 
This logic does not belong to the physiological layout of the organic body, 
but rather it operates on the body “at the point where rhythm plunges 
into chaos, into the night, at the point where the differences of level 
are perpetually and violently mixed.”337 Because the body is not just an 
organized set of organs, but also an event (“at one and the same time I 
become in the sensation and something happens through the sensation…”)338 
whose integrity is constituted by thresholds and limits, the body becomes 
organized by the sensations it receives or gives off. It is not the stable 
form of the body that Bacon paints, but what sensation does to the body, 
the body as sensory event: “what is painted on the canvas is the body, not 
insofar as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced 
as sustaining this sensation.”339 As Panagia frames the problem: “Bacon 
is thus not painting figures, nor are his paintings merely grotesque; he is, 
rather, making invisible forces palpable; for Deleuze, Bacon confronts the 
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central problem of painting, the problem of rendering invisible forces.”340 
In a sense what Bacon paints is the “accumulation” of forces that makes up 
the identity of the body—its sensory fingerprint or signature, so to speak. 
This identity is, however, never fixed or properly personal: it belongs to the 
anonymous rhythm of the sensible and is always prone to the “violence” or 
“disfiguration” of sensations emitted by other bodies.341 It just happens.
Deleuze gives us a more radical expression of what sensation does 
than Levinas, although I think they are effectively on the same page about 
what sensation is. Although the two philosophers have many differences, 
taken together, Levinas’s and Deleuze’s analyses of aesthetic rhythm 
allow us to glimpse a dynamic, and somewhat paradoxical, conception of 
aesthetic identity. On this model identity is constituted by the imperceptible 
exchange of sensations between bodies in direct communication. Sensations 
accumulate in the body, giving it a particular figure or disfiguring it. Bodies 
are thus determined by the sensations they offer and receive from other 
bodies. They are, as Spinoza has it, capacities to affect and be affected 
aesthetically. Or, as Hume might have said, I am nothing more than the 
sensations which pass across and territorialize my body. I am little more 
than the sounds, smells, images, and so forth emitted from my body. I am a 
conspiracy of sensations.
Alimentation and Susceptibility
The significance of this conception of bodily identity is ramified in 
Levinas’s work because he regards sensation as foundational to both 
experience and selfhood. Levinas’s brief discussion of the “transcendental 
function” of sensation circles us back to the analysis of enjoyment and 
the immanent constitution of the subject by the other.342 We must always 
keep in mind that sensation, for Levinas as for Deleuze, is never just a 
matter of the “ambivalence” of feeling.343 With the explicit affirmation of its 
transcendental function we see Levinas appreciating the force of sensation 
significantly more than Merleau-Ponty, who, in Levinas’s view, overlooks the 
deep ambiguity and passivity of sensation.344 To achieve this appreciation 
Levinas must venture outside of phenomenology and into speculative 
metaphysics, affirming the reality of sensation not only as something that 
provides the content of cognition, but also as something that directly shapes 
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the structural integrity of the subject. Sensation, then, names a fundamental, 
if not radical, passivity of the subject.345 The subject, as embodied, finds 
itself from the start in a heteronomous position—affected and nourished 
by what is other than itself. Its first receptivity is its sensibility; it lives from 
sensations which provide the alimentary content of its representations. 
This alimentary layer of sensation “recovers a ‘reality’ when we see in it 
not the subjective counterpart of objective qualities, but an enjoyment 
‘anterior’ to the crystallization of consciousness, I and non-I, into subject 
and object” (TI 188/162).346 Sensation here names the experience of the 
body in immanence, but an immanence which is constantly broken up by a 
double temporality: the temporality of the represented and the temporality 
of the sensed.
No one has appreciated the alimentary or enabling dimension of 
sensation more than Alphonso Lingis. In fact, Lingis goes so far as to defend 
the ethical valence of the force of sensation. Prior to any formal imperative 
imposed on the intellect by reason is the imperative the body receive from 
the environment, which orders the body to adapt itself to the contour of 
the land, the shape of the tool taken up in our work, or the elements which 
envelop it.347 This contact with things is directly received as sensations which 
are assimilated into the posture of the body and its body schema. Or, to 
put it more radically, the body is schematized by the sensuous environment 
which accumulates in its flesh. Sensation and schematization name an 
identical process:
The imperative in our environment is received, not on our 
understanding in conflict with our sensuality, but on our 
postural schema which integrates our sensibility and mobilizes 
our motor forces. It is received on our sensory-motor bodies 
as bodies we have to center upon things that orient our 
movements, bodies we have to anchor on the levels down 
which our vision, our touch, our listening move, on which we 
station ourselves and move in the heart of reality. It orders our 
competence.348
Of course, we always negotiate with the layout of the environment as we 
make our way through it. But there is a sense in which our bodies are made 
to move in certain nonnegotiable,  imperative ways: reflexes and other 
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autonomic responses, debilitating and incapacitating ways necessitated 
by our materiality. Levinas speaks of how the face of the other does not 
compel me to accept its solicitation after I have considered it, but before: 
“In the proximity of the face, the subjection precedes the reasoned decision 
to assume the order that it bears.”349 Lingis finds this kind of subjection in 
sensation writ large, not just in the aesthetics of the human face.
Imperative responses cut straight to our sensibility and would be 
apprehended as pure sensations if perception did filter them through figured 
representations and the figure-ground structure. This is a speculative point, 
but one worth risking. We live from these responses because they enable 
our bodies to move through and work competently in the material world. 
However, we do not constitute them. They are the medium through which 
the world communicates to us. This is possible because our bodies are 
immanent to, and in many respects dependent upon, other bodies like and 
unlike our own. Radios, daffodils, street signs, and neighborhoods impress 
us and invest us with their diverse sensuous content. This is what it means 
to belong to an ecological community and to be a member of what Vivian 
Sobchack calls the “interobjective” realm. Interobjectivity describes the 
anonymous community in which our bodies, otherwise consciously, “exist 
with the common matter and potential of materiality that is mutually 
shared not only by intentional subjects but also by nonintentional objects.”350 
The passions we undergo in the interobjective realm inform us of what it 
means to be “not only an objective subject but also a subjective object whose 
intentionality and alterity can be sensed from without.” And, continues 
Sobchack, it is in the passionate suffering of interobjectivity that we gain 
“an enhanced awareness of what it is to be material” and an appreciation 
for “the material foundation of our aesthetic behavior toward the world 
and others.”351 To feel oneself as a material being that suffers and makes 
others suffer is to recognize at once that the aesthetic foundation of action 
is likewise the basis of the ethical. Ecological life is not just about flowers, 
furry critters, conservation, and cooperative living.352 There are darker sides 
of relational life that harbor their own power, as we will see later on.
In Levinas’s later work, Otherwise than Being, immanence takes on a 
graver tenor. As Stella Sandford notes, “Both stress the corporeality of 
the subject as sensibility, but in Totality and Infinity the emphasis falls on 
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pleasure, while in Otherwise than Being the keynote is suffering.”353 The 
heteroaffection of sensibility becomes a transcendental vulnerability and 
the animation of the subject is cast as the “body exposed to the other” 
(OB 69/87).354 The alimentary function of sensation, which is apparent 
throughout Levinas’s exploration of dwelling and enjoyment in Totality and 
Infinity, is displaced by a desire to articulate the way in which sensibility 
leads to the break up of identity, and is the means by which the subject is 
subjected to the diachrony of the sensible (OB 14-15/17-19).355 Levinas goes 
so far as to identify subjectivity with the vulnerability of sensibility (OB 15, 
50, 54/18, 65-66, 70). This vulnerability is given a carnal form, the skin, and 
a phenomenological interpretation that will serve to reground his theory of 
ethical responsibility.
Levinas once again points to labor, fatigue, and effort to reprise 
the embodied aspect of subjectivity. But the affection of the subject is 
interpreted now more emphatically as obsession, pain, and the interruption 
of enjoyment. Corporeality “is the pain of effort, the original adversity of 
fatigue, which arises in the upsurge of movement and in the energy involved 
in labor” (OB 54/70). Levinas has replaced the originary enjoyment of labor 
with an originary suffering: “As a passivity in the paining of the pain felt, 
sensibility is a vulnerability, for pain comes to interrupt an enjoyment in 
its very isolation, and thus tears me from myself” (OB 55/71). It is difficult 
to discern whether enjoyment or pain takes precedence now, or whether 
they are equiprimordial modes of existence. For instance, Levinas says that, 
“It is with savoring and enjoyment that the analysis of sensibility will have 
to begin” (OB 56/72), but this does not mean that sensibility is originally 
savoring and enjoyment. Nor does this statement outweigh what he says 
in defense of the primacy of pain in Otherwise than Being. Dennis King 
Keenan points out a similar ambiguity regarding Levinas’s position on 
sensibility. It is not clear, says Keenan, whether enjoyment of sensibility is 
an exposure to the other or a singularizing involution, or if our relationship 
with the other should “be characterized as enjoyment, menace/necessity, or 
responsibility, all of which are singularizing and exposure. Despite Levinas’s 
attempts in Totality and Infinity to establish and maintain a rigid distinction, 
there is blurring.”356 What is clear is that pain and enjoyment both belong 
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to sensibility, which in either case provides the body’s first opening 
onto its other.
Immediacy and materiality lend sensibility its constitutive susceptibility. 
Levinas writes of how matter “materializes” in enjoyment and satisfaction, 
which is first and foremost a seizing and a consuming (OB 73/92). The 
materiality of enjoyment is then correlated with the excess of meaning 
involved in alimentation, an excess that “conditions the very thought that 
would think it as condition” (TI 128/101; see also, TO 62-64/45-49). But, 
at the same time and paradoxically (not unlike Derrida’s pharmakon, if 
you like), what nourishes us is also what threatens the stability or integrity 
of our bodies. The material we come into contact with through sensibility 
contains a basic ambivalence: it enables us, but remains perpetually capable 
of disabling us. Sensibility, as a form of contact, is the reversion of our grasp 
on things into our being grasped by them, a situation which is described 
by Levinas “in the ambiguity of a kiss” (OB 75/94). This ambiguity is not 
equivalent to the reversibility that Merleau-Ponty sees in the handshake, 
because, in Levinas’s view, the supposed imminence of reversibility is 
precisely what remains in question and precarious, even if his diachronic 
structure of self and other is analogous to Merleau-Ponty’s.357 It is as 
though the ambiguity of the kiss, or the handshake, is what short-circuits 
or prevents reversibility, thus undermining Merleau-Ponty’s image of the 
flesh by installing an image of irreversibility. One never knows whether 
the encounter is reciprocal or oppositional; both are viable possibilities. 
“[Sensibility]” writes Levinas, “reverts from the activity of being a hunter of 
images to the passivity of being prey, from being aim to being wound, from 
being an intellectual act of apprehension to apprehension as an obsession by 
another who does not manifest himself” (OB 75/95).
Contact has a technical sense for Levinas; it names a precise situation. 
It is basic to the embodied subject and describes the absolute “proximity of 
the other” as “the immediate opening up for the other of the immediacy of 
enjoyment, the immediacy of taste, materialization of matter” (OB 74/94). 
Contact likewise describes the original exposure of sensibility to the other, 
that is, the transcendental aspect of heteroaffection. The subject who enjoys 
and is born from enjoyment is always already enjoying the other as element, 
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sensation, matter. Subjects live from the other, hence their responsibility for 
the other. Levinas gives contact/proximity a carnal signification:
Sensibility—the proximity, immediacy and restlessness which 
signify in it—is not constituted out of some apperception 
putting consciousness into relationship with a body. 
Incarnation is not a transcendental operation of a subject that 
is situated in the midst of a world it represents to itself; the 
sensible experience of the body is already and from the start 
incarnate. The sensible…binds the node of incarnation into a 
plot larger than the apperception of the self. In this plot I am 
bound to others before being tied to my body. (OB 76/96)
Proximity, then, is prior to the emergence of the subject who represents 
or whose body is an “I can.” It opens the subject to the approach of the 
other, which arrives “as though from an immemorial past, which was 
never present, began in no freedom” (OB 88/112). Our contact with 
the transcendental past is embodied in the skin, which Levinas, echoing 
Merleau-Ponty, calls “the divergency [l’écart] between the visible and the 
invisible” (OB 89/113). The skin is not a flesh in which each one of us 
participates, but a surface that at once keeps us separated and touching, 
substances who are in themselves yet nevertheless relate. Sandford captures 
the carnality of proximity, and recalls Benso’s remarks on breathing, 
when she writes:
It is the respiration of the skin prior to any intention, a 
being turned to the Other as a being turned inside out, a 
going beyond the skin, to the underside of the skin, a getting 
underneath the skin, an obsession, a nakedness more naked 
than any excoriation (dépouillement). This is proximity.358
The skin is a liminal site, “the gap [décalage] between approach and 
approached” where alterity is produced (OB 90/114; TI 26-27/xiv-xv). In 
Totality and Infinity (26-27/xiv-xv) Levinas explains that the idea of infinity—
which is synonymous with the revelation of the Other—is produced in me, “in 
the improbable feat whereby a separated being fixed in its identity, the same, 
the I, nonetheless contains in itself what it can neither contain nor receive 
solely by virtue of its own identity.” It seems to me that the skin, insofar 
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as it is receptive to an influx of sensory material which it could never hope 
to process completely, is the site where the depths of things—their matter, 
according to Levinas—is produced/revealed. That is, the skin is the place 
where the excess of our objectifying representations is produced.
The skin is naturally vulnerable because of its permeability. As Rudolf 
Bernet explains,
Even a tight and thick skin has small and large holes that one 
can adequately call “openings.” There are natural openings as 
well as artificial or forced openings called “wounds.” Natural 
openings are still subject, however, to being forced and 
wounded. The natural openings allowing for a passage and 
exchange between the inside and the outside of a body cannot 
prevent the violence of a traumatic intrusion or expulsion.359
Levinas must have something like this in mind when he argues that 
sensibility is vulnerability and exposure to the other. Bernet points out that 
the singular nature of the skins involved in a particular instance of contact 
lend their quality to the intersubjective encounter, and help to determine 
whether the encounter is friendly or violent.360 This means that the skin, or 
contact/proximity, cannot be deemed violent a priori. And if we are going to 
allow Levinas to say that the sensitivity of the skin—sensibility generally—is 
susceptibility, then this condition must be understood as ambivalent. Above 
all it should be maintained that my exposure to the other equally enables 
and disables, figures and disfigures my body. A priori this exposure is neither 
painful nor pleasurable.
Hopefully it is becoming clearer how and why the aesthetic dimension 
of existence is basic to Levinas’s ontology of the body. In fact, we could go 
so far as to affirm that aesthetics—understood as the ontology of aisthesis—
must be first philosophy for Levinas.361 The subject’s primary opening 
onto the other is the body’s sensibility—that is, its capacity to sense and be 
affected by the material it lives and dies from. Sensibility is the condition of 
possibility for enjoyment, discomfort, and pain, and therefore a condition 
of possibility for ipseity, or selfhood. It is this ipseity which is interpellated 
by the Other and called into question. But this ipseity must first be 
won through effort and labor before it can answer the call of the Other 
responsibly.
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We have seen that for Levinas sensation has an affective dimension, 
as is connoted in the French sentir, and also names a distinct ontological 
event. This event is marked by the passivity of the subject who undergoes 
sensations, on the one hand, and the objectivity of the sensation which 
comes from the outside and directs sensibility, on the other. Levinas’s 
disqualification of the view that sensation is purely subjective, something 
that happens inside the mind or only as a correlate of consciousness, 
commits him to a form of ontological realism. Unlike Kant or Husserl, 
whose methodological commitments should prevent them from speaking 
about what lies beyond the bounds of the phenomenal, Levinas breaks 
free from phenomenology to make metaphysical claims about the non-
intentional/transcendental realm of sensation. In fact, he openly admits that 
these claims are metaphysical and beyond the purview of phenomenological 
method. They are, however, not unintelligible: “This is the whole point,” 
says Sandford, of Levinas’s method:
Levinas’s philosophical method therefore consists in a series 
of metaphysical declarations apparently extrapolated from 
and further supported by phenomenological evidences. 
Metaphysical truths are revealed through phenomenology, 
both in the sense that phenomenology allows one to encounter 
them and that it functions verificationally after the event of 
disclosure. In this way, the strong claim for the intelligibility 
of transcendence is apparently based on, revealed through 
or justified by the appeal to the phenomenology of the ethics 
of affect.362
It is precisely because sensations come from outside that Levinas can 
characterize sensibility as vulnerability. Indeed, he requires the externality 
of sensation, and the corporeal vulnerability this implies, in order to 
prioritize ethics over any other branch of philosophy. Or, as David Michael 
Levin has said, “The embodiment of the categorical imperative cannot 
be understood…until our way of thinking about the body undergoes a 
radical revision.”363 If the ambivalence of sensibility is recognized—as I have 
argued—then the exigency of ethics becomes bound to the ontology of the 
body, and it becomes less clear which branch of philosophy enjoys primacy. 
Levinas would have us believe that our bodies are constantly under attack 
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from the outside, and at times it seems as though he were arguing that 
intercorporeal encounters are essentially violent. He speaks of our openness 
to exteriority as “the vulnerability of the skin exposed, in wounds and 
outrage” and of sensibility as
a nakedness more naked than that of the skin which, as form 
and beauty, inspires the plastic arts, the nakedness of a skin 
presented to contact, to the caress, which always—even, 
equivocally, in voluptuousness—is suffering for the suffering of 
the other. Uncovered, open like a city declared open upon the 
approach of the enemy, the sensibility, prior to all will, action, 
declaration, all taking up of positions, is vulnerability itself.364
Like a faithful phenomenologist, Levinas notes that this susceptibility is not 
reducible to the physiological body’s causal relations. No, this susceptibility 
is a passivity “more passive than every passivity,” which is to say, a radical 
transcendental passivity. “It is the aptitude…‘to be beaten’, ‘to receive 
blows’. … In vulnerability there then lies a relationship with the other which 
causality does not exhaust, a relationship antecedent to being affected by a 
stimulus.”365
It is one of the virtues of Levinas’s analyses that they fully appreciate the 
reality of violence. He keenly recognizes that an adequate account of alterity 
is needed in order to render this reality intelligible. A conception of alterity 
which acknowledges that some of our experiences do not submit to our 
representational capacities, that some experiences resist what we can know 
or think about them, is required to explain the inevitable encroachment of 
bodily degeneration and death, for instance. Death comes from elsewhere, 
and too quickly to register its face. Levinas writes in Totality and Infinity 
(224/199-200):
The notion of a mortal but temporal being, apprehended in the will…
differs fundamentally from every causality leading to the idea of the causa 
sui. Such a being is exposed, but also opposed to violence. Violence does 
not befall it as an accident that befalls a sovereign freedom. The hold 
that violence has over this being—the mortality of this being—is the 
primordial fact.366
There is no need, however, to accept the susceptibility of the body as a 
fundamental vulnerability. Of course, it is that too. But it is also a capacity 
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to be affected with joy or pleasure and to have the body enabled, in its 
posture and kinaesthetic responses, by the sensations it receives from the 
other. It is a capacity to be challenged by the outside, incited to exceed its 
limits and gather strength or power. In short, the sensitivity of the body is 
ambivalent a priori.
Our bodies are simultaneously constituted by ambivalence and alterity. 
This lesson is in Levinas as well as Merleau-Ponty. “Merleau-Ponty,” writes 
Dan Zahavi, “can describe embodied self-awareness as a presentiment of 
the Other—the Other appears on the horizon of this self-experience—and 
the experience of the Other as an echo of one’s own bodily constitution.” 
For Merleau-Ponty, the Other can be received as such because its exteriority 
mirrors my own exteriority for me. “The reason I can experience Others 
is because I am never so close to myself that the Other is completely and 
radically foreign and inaccessible. I am always already a stranger to myself 
and therefore open to Others.”367 It is not necessary for alterity to be a 
matter of pure transcendence—a transcendence, it must be said, whose 
alignment with humanism, anthropocentrism, and a particular religious 
tradition excludes the nonhuman from ethical consideration368—for it 
to command ethical consideration. That our relation with otherness is 
ambivalent, and that we can be enabled as well as disabled by that which we 
rely upon for our very being, is enough to give us pause.
It is true that Levinas gives a richer, more complex description of 
alterity than Merleau-Ponty. As well, he does much, contra Cartesian and 
Kantian forms of subjectivity, to give a corporeal form to the self and, 
consequently, the ethical imperative. Moreover, he gives us an account of 
the immanent genesis of the subject that rivals that of Deleuze. But in the 
process he sacrifices the actually ambivalent experience of embodiment in 
the name of a transcendental responsibility whose hyperbolic foundation 
leads to extreme claims about the vulnerability of the subject. This 
hyperbole respects the reality of sensation while at the same time betraying 
the plasticity of our sensibility. To avoid the ethical exclusivity of Levinas’s 
anthropocentrism, which is most pronounced in the moral privilege he 
grants to human others, and to remain true to the ambivalence of our 
sensuous existence, it is advisable for us to develop a more mundane and 
faithful immanent form of the imperative, situating its force in the sensuous 
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economy in which existents, objects, elements, and environments interact.369 
For this we need a conception of embodiment that avoids the excesses of 
both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. That is, we need an adequate account of 
the plasticity of the body.
Chapter 5
On Aesthetic Plasticity
…we should try to discover how it is that subjects are 
gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted 
through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, 
materials, desires, thoughts, etc.
Foucault, “Two Lectures”
…sensation is the master of deformations, the agent of bodily 
deformations.
Deleuze, Francis Bacon
The argument so far has followed two general, intertwined trajectories: 
one critical, the other constructive. The critical thread has argued that the 
two visions of embodiment offered by Merleau-Ponty and Levinas are 
inadequate for thinking how our bodies actually interact with the material 
world. The constructive thread has assembled evidence which suggests that 
both phenomenologists were cognizant of the function that sensation plays 
in the constitution of experience and identity. The nature and function of 
sensation, along with its difference from perception, has been adduced. In 
this chapter I build upon the analyses of sensation and sensing given by 
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Merleau-Ponty and Levinas in order to develop an account of embodiment 
that reconciles the extremes of their respective views. Instead of reversibility 
and susceptibility, my view features the plasticity of the body and argues 
that the dynamism of plasticity is more true to the aesthetic dimension of 
existence and the transactional nature of intercorporeal encounters.
Methodologically speaking, there is more than one way to defend 
the body’s plasticity. Because the notion of plasticity is tacitly at work in 
poststructuralist philosophers like Foucault and Deleuze, and increasingly 
visible in the work of embodied cognition theorists, a wholesale assault on 
the phenomenological body could be launched from a number of non-
phenomenological camps. An antagonism of this sort could be construed 
as a clash between modern and postmodern views of the body.370 Such a 
neat division, however, does not do justice to the degree of overlap which 
obtains between phenomenological and non-phenomenological accounts 
of embodiment. This is why I have chosen for my defense of plasticity to 
synthesize the insights of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas with a number of 
non-phenomenologists, from Spinoza, James, and Dewey to Mark Johnson, 
Manuel DeLanda, and Catherine Malabou. It should also be noted that 
what I find most productive in the phenomenologists is not always what 
they produce from a phenomenological perspective. In fact, as I have 
noted in earlier chapters, it is often the phenomenological method itself 
which constrains some of the most fertile insights stumbled upon by 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, and what troubles any attempt to synthesize 
phenomenology with other approaches to embodiment. Oftentimes it is 
when these two thinkers are on the verge of transgressing the strictures 
of phenomenology that their thinking takes off in metaphysically 
daring directions.
The Meaning of Plasticity I
What does it mean for a body to be plastic and why is it necessary to 
conceive the body in this way? The term has a popular aesthetic meaning, 
as when we talk about “plastic surgery” or the “plastic arts.” But I am 
not specifically concerned with either of these meanings. When I speak 
about plasticity I intend the meaning that is now common currency in 
the discourse of contemporary neuroscience, as well as cognitive and 
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evolutionary theory. I first ran across the term in a text closer to my home 
discipline, that is, while reading the philosophical psychology of William 
James, who writes in The Principles of Psychology that plasticity broadly 
“means the possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, 
but strong enough not to yield all at once. Each relatively stable phase of 
equilibrium in such a structure is marked by what we may call a new set 
of habits.”371 Plasticity in James’s sense not only provides a useful means 
of imagining the dynamics of brain and body, it also offers a way to think 
the dynamic structural integrity of the embodied subject. When I use 
the term “integrity” I do not mean it in the moral sense, but as someone 
who says, “The integrity of the building has been compromised by the 
earthquake.” The analogy between bodies and buildings is deliberate here. 
It is meant to suggest the reciprocal determination of body and building, 
and the structural homology of individual and environment. Assuming 
with Merleau-Ponty that we simply are our bodies, we are absolved from 
positing a self-identical core of subjectivity which would remain untouched 
throughout any and all intercorporeal engagements, be they social, physical, 
or cultural. Plasticity helps us work through many of the questions that arise 
when we identify the subject with the body. In the end the plastic body gives 
us a fully immanent version of subjectivity without compelling us to grant 
the body an indeterminate fluidity that would make it difficult to explain 
how stability emerges and is maintained.
There are empirical and practical reasons for favoring plasticity over 
reversibility or susceptibility as the defining feature of the body. First, the 
body disintegrates, decays, and dies. Its relation to other bodies—and 
sometimes to itself, as in the case of autoimmune disorders—is often 
violent, as I have argued. Innumerable examples of irreversible situations 
can be given. These are defined by the powerlessness of human beings in 
the face of a materiality which burdens or exceeds them. As Ronald Bruzina 
expresses it, “human powerlessness is fundamentally that of being subject 
to structures around and within itself that are not of a human individual’s 
own doing.”372 A piano is pushed out a window and crushes someone on 
the sidewalk below. An airplane plunges into the ocean and is obliterated 
along with all of its passengers. These are situations wherein the bodies 
involved are not on the verge of reversal: the person on the sidewalk has no 
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chance of becoming the crusher, nor will the piano become the crushed, 
although it will suffer some damage upon impact. Perhaps only the sidewalk 
will suffer negligible harm, its capacity for resistance being greater than 
the unfortunate bystander or instrument. The airline passengers will have 
their perceptual capacities extinguished, and in a sense their bodies will 
die, but the material reality which destroyed them will remain. Perhaps the 
perceptual situation is reversible, but asymmetrical physical contact between 
bodies powerful and powerless is certainly not. Our bodies, I would contend, 
sense this asymmetry in themselves and build upon it when forming bonds 
with other bodies.373
Now, I am not so foolish as to think that the images of falling pianos 
and plunging airplanes alone stand as refutations of constructivist idealism 
or correlationism. They are offered here, in one respect, as a metaphor of 
the intractability of the material world. Additionally, they work to unsettle 
our comfort with an idealism or phenomenology whose conventional 
images portray an inquisitive observer gazing intently on some medium-
sized domestic object. Objects, however, are not always so wieldy. And if 
Meillassoux’s argument for the necessity of contingency holds, neither 
are the very laws governing the existence of these objects.374 In short, we 
have reason to distrust the stability of appearance and the synchrony of 
body and world.
Considered from a different angle the body is indeed a resilient thing. 
It resists disintegration by nourishing itself, defends itself from assault, and 
deftly assembles resources which help it postpone death. It fashions clothes 
and designs shelters, devises means of repairing itself when wounded, and 
takes measures to prevent further wounding. It gathers these resources from 
its environment and from others; it is enabled by otherness just as much as it 
can be disabled by it. It is certainly true that tragedy may befall the body at 
any moment, so it is indeed a susceptible entity. But given the extraordinary 
nature of tragedy, the threat of violence cannot be the ground upon which 
the body is defined as a body. It is much more than a passivity: it preserves 
itself and pushes itself to become more powerful; it adapts and evolves, 
yes, but it also destroys and imposes form. These are Nietzsche’s lessons.375 
That the body is threatened by violence and prone to disintegration, but at 
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the same time enabled by what resists its efforts and movement, leads us 
necessarily to consider the ethics and politics of plasticity.
A body whose integrity is plastic is definable by its thresholds. This 
means, as we saw with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of style, that its identity is 
constantly shifting and constituted by an indefinite and fragile disposition. 
This disposition will either display typical effects, or the potential for these 
effects will be virtually present, harbored in the body and actualizable under 
the right conditions.376 Shifts in identity or the compromising of bodily 
integrity will be induced by a breakdown in the body’s own maintenance 
or by pressures exerted on its constitution by an external force. In both 
cases what gets compromised is an alliance maintained between a collective 
of bodies functioning together as a singular body (a friendship, political 
demonstration, or soccer team) and conspiring together to reciprocally 
determine each individual body’s identity. Such a view of identity obliges us 
to imagine the substance of identity as fleeting and dependent rather than 
enduring and self-sufficient. Individuals enjoy only a transitory autonomy, a 
limited immunity from degeneration. As Mach asserts, “The ego is as little 
absolutely permanent as are bodies. That which we do much dread 
in death, the annihilation of our permanency, actually occurs in life 
in abundant measure.”377 The meaning of death is likewise reoriented 
by this definition of identity, which is why the hypothetical victims of the 
plane crash example can be said to die only “in a sense.” One may die 
without actually becoming a corpse, but one may become a corpse without 
technically dying.378
Composite Bodies
Spinoza employs the term ratio to describe the dynamic alliance that 
composes corporeal identities. He speaks of identity thresholds as ratios 
of motion and rest, speed and slowness.379 The body is not merely a figure 
or style, but a system of relations governed by a specific principle of 
relating, or ratio. Following on his heels Deleuze and Guattari elaborate 
the Spinozan conception of bodily identity with concepts like assemblage, 
machine, multiplicity, and body without organs. These concepts provide 
an understanding of bodily identity that makes no appeal to an immutable 
organic (biological, physiological, neuronal) structures; they leave the body 
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fully open to deformation and reconstitution, and therefore to the aleatory 
and to alterity. Spinoza begins to build the plastic body, while Deleuze and 
Guattari draw out its complexity.
A body, for Spinoza, is never purely individual in an atomistic sense, for 
an individual is always a composite or collective of bodies. What individuates 
a body from the single substance (God, or Nature) in his monistic ontology 
is the body’s effects, which are determined by its singularity. Spinoza defines 
a singular thing as a thing that has a finite, determinate existence. “If several 
things concur in one act in such a way as to be all together the simultaneous 
cause of one effect, I consider them all, in that respect, as one individual.”380 
In short, an individual is a singularity. A body, then, is individuated as this 
body by what it can do or what it can effectuate materially (efficient causes), 
psychologically (affects), politically (uprisings, policings), and so forth. 
The capacity of the body to create a singular effect, or what we can call the 
body’s power, is always variable and vulnerable to disintegration because 
this power only subsists so long as the collective of bodies working together 
to create a singular effect maintain their particular ratio of motion and rest. 
Spinoza writes:
When a number of bodies of the same or different magnitude 
form close contact with one another through the pressure of 
other bodies upon them, or if they are moving at the same or 
different rates of speed so as to preserve an unvarying relation 
of movement among themselves, these bodies are said to be 
united with one another and all together to form one body 
or individual thing, which is distinguished from other things 
through this union of bodies.381
Now, this ratio is not precise: it is plastic, which is to say its identity is 
marked by a precarious formal variability, or threshold of integrity.382 The 
form is not what determines the body ultimately, it is the kinetics of the 
body’s composition that constitutes its individuality. “The important thing,” 
Deleuze tells us, is to see individuality “as a complex relation between 
differential velocities, between deceleration and acceleration of particles.” 
This is what Deleuze calls Spinoza’s “kinetic proposition.”383 Let’s call it the 
ecological account of bodies.
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Deleuze distills the Spinozan problematic of bodies into the question, 
What is a body capable of? He poses the problem in this way in order to 
suggest two things: (1) to know what a body does is to know what it 
is; and (2) the power of the body is unknown to us, so we are far from 
fathoming the possibilities for action, change, and enhancement that new 
technologies and new modes of collective existence have in store for us. I 
am thinking in particular of human-machine interfaces, participatory art, 
prostheses, genetic manipulation, and the whole range of what Deleuze 
and Guattari call “unnatural participations.”384 Deleuze’s question also 
pinpoints another ontological claim advanced by Spinoza: bodies just are 
their capacity to affect and be affected. Deleuze writes, “a body affects other 
bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and 
being affected that also defines a body in its individuality.”385 This notion of 
individuality yields a new method of classifying things, one whose principle 
of differentiation is produced immanently. What a body is becomes less 
important than what it can do.386
This new method prefers a genetic or evolutionary conception of 
form to the ancient hylomorphism. It regards the genesis of form as 
initiated by contact between heterogeneous material elements, which 
results in multiplicities that endogenously give rise to singular bodies.387 
In this ontology the “structure and genesis [of the body] are in principle 
indiscernible.”388 Dewey’s definition of aesthetic form is representative 
here: “Form may then be defined as the operation of forces that carry 
the experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own integral 
fulfillment.”389 It is crucial that this formulation acknowledges the priority of 
circumstance over teleology in the determination of structure, and locates its 
genesis in the materials and energies that compose an aesthetic event. The 
event, at bottom, is rhythmic.390 Similarly, Deleuze writes of how
relations of speed and slowness are realized according to 
circumstances, and the way in which these capacities for being 
affected are filled. For they always are, but in different ways, 
depending on whether the present affects threaten the thing 
(diminish its power, slow it down, reduce it to the minimum), 
or strengthen, accelerate, and increase it: poison or food?—
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with all the complications, since a poison can be a food for 
part of the thing considered.391
The point here is that the maintenance of corporeal identity is not only a 
matter of intersubjective/intercorporeal relations. Identity is also dependent 
on environmental conditions and the nourishment they provide (or fail to 
provide)—the ambivalence of the environment is recognized as fundamental 
to corporeal power and action.
One of the advantages of working with the Spinozan definition of 
bodies endorsed by Deleuze is that it frees us from entrenched binaries like 
artificial/natural, animate/inanimate, organic/inorganic, sentient/insentient. 
For Spinoza and Deleuze all bodies belong to the same ontological 
plane and can be evaluated in terms that do not force us to distinguish 
between, say, the human and nonhuman or living and nonliving. This is the 
advantage of a “flat ontology” of bodies.392 As a consequence of undoing 
old binaries we are free to imagine new composite bodies and, therefore, 
new possibilities for collective experience and bodily identity. Hybridity and 
community become the norm. As Elizabeth Grosz puts it,
[Deleuze and Guattari] provide an altogether different way 
of understanding the body in its connections with other 
bodies, both human and nonhuman, animate and inanimate, 
linking organs and biological processes to material objects 
and social practices while refusing to subordinate the body to 
a unity or a homogeneity of the kind provided by the body’s 
subordination to consciousness or to biological organization. 
Following Spinoza, the body is regarded as neither a locus 
for a consciousness nor an organically determined entity; it 
is understood more in terms of what it can do, the things it 
can perform, the linkages it establishes, the transformations 
and becomings it undergoes, and the machinic connections 
it forms with other bodies, what it can link with, how it can 
proliferate its capacities….393
The model of embodiment described by Grosz regards the body, in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s language, as a “machinic assemblage.” This concept is 
democratic insofar as it counts a wide range of phenomena as bodies and 
refrains from privileging one kind of body or relation over another. There 
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is nothing special about a naturally occurring body; human bodies are not 
elevated above their vegetal counterparts. Any body type can join forces 
with a different body type and initiate new identities, new effects. Corporeal 
difference is a matter of degrees of complexity: what matters most is the 
effects and affects produced by the body, irrespective of its compositional 
heritage. The concept of assemblage has far-reaching consequences for 
ecological thinking.
Assemblages and Machines
There is an assemblage theory of bodies available in the literature on 
embodied/enactive cognition. Take the work of Andy Clark. In Being 
There Clark develops the concept of “scaffolding” in order to demonstrate 
that our minds are not locked in our heads, but extended throughout the 
interobjective environment. The external environment provides support, 
scaffolding, for the body in countless forms, from simple implements like 
pencils, paper, and photographs to languages and digital storage devices. 
This way of thinking is common to the “extended mind” hypothesis. “These 
external structures function so as to complement our individual cognitive 
profiles and to diffuse human reason across wider and wider social and 
physical networks whose collective computations exhibit their own special 
dynamics and properties.”394 Noë includes a helpful discussion of virtual 
representation that relies on something like scaffolding when he writes, “Off-
loading internal processing onto the world simplifies our cognitive lives and 
makes good engineering and evolutionary sense.”395 Scaffolding serves as the 
network within which individuals work out solutions to problems, but from 
what we have said so far, it would be misleading to regard it as “external” 
to the body. And this is Clark’s point: individuals cannot be understood as 
standing apart from the scaffolding that supports their behavior—they are 
extended throughout, and in a real sense emerge out of or are the scaffolding 
of their environment.396 The mind’s plasticity is what allows the body to 
adaptively integrate and design scaffolding that aids in problem-solving. 
Understanding how our brains design and inhabit the vast assemblage of 
networks, institutions, societies, and myriad dynamic systems in society is 
the present task of cognitive science.397
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The assemblage theory of bodies forms the basis of what Jane Bennett 
calls “distributive” or “confederate” agency. In her view agency in an 
assemblage is “distributed across an ontologically heterogeneous field, 
rather than being a capacity localized in a human body or in a collective 
produced (only) by human efforts.”398 Agency is here equivalent to efficacy. 
Any efficacious thing qualifies as an agent, which means that any thing 
whatsoever that makes a difference in the world possesses agency, even if 
that thing cannot be cited as the source of its agency. Since every thing 
makes some difference, however small, every thing bears the mark of 
agency.399 Bennett writes in Vibrant Matter:
This understanding of agency does not deny the existence 
of that thrust called intentionality, but it does see it as less 
definitive of outcomes. It loosens the connections between 
efficacy and the moral subject, bringing efficacy closer to the 
idea of the power to make a difference that calls for response. 
And this power, I contend along with Spinoza and others, is a 
power possessed by nonhuman bodies too.400
This radically democratic theory of bodies disintegrates the plausibility 
of classical liberal autonomy and disperses responsibility across the entire 
field of being.
Assemblages are essentially multiplicities whose identity is determined 
by the unified effects they produce. Their identity is in their plurality. If 
bodies are assemblages, then they are less like fixed structures and more like 
heterogeneous events that derive their consistency/integrity from a certain 
threshold for change. This threshold is governed by the active conjunctions 
which make up the assemblage. Assemblages are always provisional, non-
hierarchical, and precariously organized.401 They subsist only as long as they 
actively maintain their constitutive ratio of motion and rest, that is, their 
intensity.402 Following my unorthodox reading of Levinas in the last chapter 
I would insist that this process occurs at the level of sensibility. An intensity 
is a bodily event—a passion, affection, sensation—directly related to the 
“capacity to enter into relations of movement and rest,” as Massumi puts 
it.403 Intensity differentiates the body’s power, makes it stand out, and allows 
it to take up a position. Intensity can be generated in myriad ways and 
with a variety of inorganic and organic components. Whatever accumulates 
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can increase in intensity. Think of a wolf pack or a school of fish darting 
through the sea. These are natural events, and as such would seem to be 
understandable only as governed by fixed natural law. As assemblages, 
however, this is not necessarily the case. Assemblages are dynamic unities, 
immanently organized and constructed ad hoc—haecceities.
Deleuze and Guattari conscript the medieval concept of haecceity 
because it allows them to think identity and individuation in terms of events, 
intensities, and becoming. A haecceity, in short, is a specific “accidental 
form.”404 That is, it is a historically emergent and singular form. It contrasts 
clearly with the notion of substance, substantial form, person, subject, thing, 
and so forth, each of which is held to be self-contained and in some sense 
necessary unto itself. Thinking along with Spinoza they explain how one 
defines the body as a haecceity, here presented in cartographic terms:
A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor as a 
determinate substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses 
or the functions it fulfills. On the plane of consistency, a body 
is defined only by a longitude and a latitude: in other words 
the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under 
given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness 
(longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable 
of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude). Nothing 
but affects and local movements, differential speeds.405
The concept of haecceity enables us to think of individuation, and therefore 
identity, as a completely contingent intercorporeity, or event of plasticity. 
It helps us escape the substance-ontological view that sees historical 
emergence as inessential to identity. It also aids us in articulating a theory 
of identity which balances the fluid as well as (meta)stable elements of 
the body, and refers these elements to the immanence of cosmological, 
evolutionary, and human history.406 Following Spinoza, Deleuze and 
Guattari provide a number of resources for thinking corporeal plasticity, 
although at times they push the fluidity of their notion of a “body 
without organs” to an untenable extreme. Even though the body can 
attempt to escape its organic constitution, it is never completely devoid of 
organization or, at least, a minimal set of habits. The body without organs 
remains an ideal.
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Whether or not a body without organs is achievable, what we have seen 
open up so far in this chapter is the potential meaning of “individual” and 
“body.” What a body is, as well as what it can do, all of a sudden becomes 
radically open questions. The body’s power becomes free to proliferate, and 
the individual free to develop, but always under the precarious and singular 
ecological conditions regulating the assemblage of bodies. The practical 
consequences of conceiving the body in this way will become clearer as 
we progress.
Equally important to the Deleuzean/Guattarian development of the 
composite body, or assemblage, is its machinic feature. In Anti-Oedipus 
a machine is defined as what introduces interruptions into otherwise 
continuous flows of material (hyle): a machine is “a system of interruptions 
or breaks.” The orifices of our bodies are machines because they interrupt 
the flow of air (mouth) and the flow of sound (ear) and the flow of feces 
(anus).407 The sensory apparatus of our bodies can be seen as a complex 
machine insofar as the senses function as a multifaceted device for cutting 
up the manifold of sensory material flowing through the body. At the same 
time as it cuts the machinic body is apt to create new linkages, that is, new 
assemblages composed of intensive relations and affective transactions. 
Again, these linkages are ad hoc, a form of bricolage that potentially, if 
Clark is correct, opens our bodies to “episodes of deep and transformative 
restructuring, in which new equipment (both physical and ‘mental’) can 
become quite literally incorporated into the thinking and acting systems that 
we identify as minds and persons.”408 In explicating his assemblage theory 
of society Manuel DeLanda includes a helpful illustration of the formation 
of personal identity. If territorialization denotes a process that increases the 
internal homogeneity of a person’s corporeal identity, then identity “may 
be deterritorialized not only by loss of stability but also by augmentation of 
capacities.” The following images bring to life the transformative potential of 
the machinic body:
When a young child learns to swim or ride a bicycle, for 
example, a new world suddenly opens up for experience, 
filled with new impressions and ideas. The new skill is 
deterritorializing to the extent that it allows the child to 
break with past routine by venturing away from home in a 
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new vehicle, or inhabiting previously forbidden spaces like 
the ocean. New skills, in short, increase one’s capacity to 
affect and be affected, or to put it differently, increase one’s 
capacities to enter into novel assemblages, the assemblage that 
the human body forms with a bicycle, a piece of solid ground 
and a gravitational field, for example.409
Machines engage in transactions that assemble “disparate elements.” 
This means that they carve into and interface with material from diverse 
ontological domains. Think of a soldier with a titanium prosthetic arm or a 
person with an online avatar. Think of a kid whose pleasure is generated by 
an imaginary friend or videogame. Think of a guy whose masochistic desires 
require leather or stone or plants for him to reach sexual satisfaction.410 
These people are machines; their identity, materially composite. There is 
a certain technique or artisanship to the machinic process, one which the 
body already possesses insofar as it effortlessly hooks into environments 
that produce natural, artificial, physical, linguistic, imaginary, and abstract 
effects.411 Since the body is never without a nourishing environment 
composed of disparate elements, or prostheses/tools, we could reasonably 
assert that it takes no stretch of the imagination to see that the human 
body just is a complex machine, if not in La Mettrie’s sense, then definitely 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s. Its machinic infrastructure is constructed by 
a team of physical, phenomenological, and ecological agents united by a 
principle of individuation proper to neither domain in particular. Although 
they recognize the machinic potential of the body, it seems to me that both 
Levinas and Merleau-Ponty refuse to endorse the view that the body is 
nothing more than a complex machine. Both phenomenologists recognize 
that subjects are partially constituted by their sociolinguistic, historical, and 
physical milieus, but the thesis affirming that the structure of the subject is 
completely dependent on a field of material forces that literally assemble the 
identity of the body is missing from their texts.412
The Meaning of Plasticity II
Before going any further I want to gather a fuller account of the meaning 
of plasticity and suggest some of its implications for embodiment and 
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identity theory. This will enable us to understand the machinic body in its 
plasticity and see how the integration of body and environment is critical to 
understanding corporeal plasticity. Additionally, it will prepare us to see how 
the body’s plasticity is determined by its aesthetic constitution, that is, the 
history of its sensory apparatus.
If it is at least plausible to claim that the modern account of embodiment 
is marked by the view that there is a substantial core or immutable structure 
to the body, whereas the postmodern account is characterized by a desire 
to see the body vanish into an anonymous field of desire, pleasure, and flux, 
then the concept of plasticity belongs to neither historical period.413 Given 
this historical partition it would seem that Merleau-Ponty belongs in neither 
the modern nor postmodern camp, for he downplays bodily anonymity just 
as much as he contests the modernist’s substance ontology. Regardless, he 
does not deliver us a plastic body. The dynamic of his reversible body is 
more akin to the mechanics of elasticity. Elasticity can be understood by 
considering a rubber band. The rubber band is flexible and deformable, 
but in the absence of resistance or external force it tends toward a specific 
formal state. Accordingly, elasticity does not properly describe a structure 
open to permanent deformation. Permanent deformation means breakage 
and the elimination of the precise disposition which constitutes the rubber 
band’s elasticity. The disappearance of its elasticity is equivalent to death 
for the rubber band. In other words, its structure is not identical to its 
historical genesis. From the perspective of elasticity the band’s structure 
is prescribed by the rubber band type. Similarly for Merleau-Ponty’s lived 
body: its structure tends toward a certain coherence that is prescribed 
by the lived body type. Insofar as the lived body is flexible within certain 
normative limits, the Merleau-Pontyan body is best conceived on the model 
of elasticity.
Merleau-Ponty’s lived body possesses a number of structural features 
which exhibit a dispositional elasticity, and whose absence would entail the 
impossibility of subjectivity. These include the features of consciousness 
(for instance: intentionality, perspectival perception), the body schema, the 
movement of transcendence or ability (the “I can,” which effectively operates 
as a transcendental norm and therefore makes inability a derivative mode 
of comportment), and the general tendency toward convergence attributed 
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to perception.414 Throughout each of its engagements with the world, other 
bodies, alterity in general, the reversible body maintains its relative stability 
with a number of quasi-transcendent, admittedly malleable, structures. 
They are not indefinitely malleable, however: this is what would render 
them plastic. If anything, their malleability is always seeking to return to the 
equilibrium point which we defined earlier as body-world synchronization. 
Whereas plasticity, on the other hand, pursues no such telos. This view of 
embodiment is accomplished only by quarantining the objective body and 
suspending the question of how its physiology and materiality interfere with, 
as well as support, the lived body’s phenomenological world of perception. 
As I have been arguing, what threatens to undo or undermine the body’s 
elasticity is the sensory field’s immediate contact with the autonomic system, 
along with the material composition of the body more generally. In other 
words, the anonymous aesthetic life of the body is the locus of deformation 
and disfiguration, or what Panagia calls a “zone of indistinction.”415 This is 
not to say that Merleau-Ponty lacks any notion of plasticity. On the contrary, 
both style and habit (perhaps the body schema, too?) display a marked 
plasticity. My point is that his text runs the risk of pathologizing plasticity 
and normalizing elasticity, and this in the interest of drawing a distinction—
fundamental in his view—between the lived body and the objective body. We 
must take care to recognize the plasticity of the phenomenal, as well as the 
material, levels and not to regard these two levels as regulated by different 
ontological principles.
Plasticity contrasts, and is designed to replace, both pure malleability 
and substantiality. It is, at bottom, neither stability nor instability, 
but a metastability. Remarking on current brain research, Catherine 
Malabou writes that
the word plasticity has two basic senses: it means at once the 
capacity to receive form (clay is called “plastic,” for example) 
and the capacity to give form (as in the plastic arts or in plastic 
surgery). Talking about the plasticity of the brain thus amounts 
to thinking of the brain as something modifiable, “formable,” 
and formative at the same time.416
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This conception of plasticity is not meant to suggest that the brain is merely 
flexible, for as Malabou goes on to show, the brain is at once prone to 
historical deformations and capable to effecting historical deformations.
To be flexible is to receive a form or impression, to be able 
to fold oneself, to take the fold, not to give it. To be docile, to 
not explode. Indeed, what flexibility lacks is the resource of 
giving form, the power to create, to invent or even to erase an 
impression, the power to style. Flexibility is plasticity minus 
its genius.417
The brain is docile to a degree, but this docility is at once a matter of 
tolerance and creation, taken together as a single trait: creative tolerance. Our 
brains are, to an extent, evolutionarily determined, but it is this inescapable 
determination that allows for “a possible margin of improvisation” that is 
at once singularly determined and historically singularizing.418 Every body’s 
experience will likewise be singular, which means that no two bodies are 
capable of the same encounters.
Plasticity describes the simultaneous determinacy and indeterminacy of 
morphogenesis. In other words, it names the potential of the body to have 
its initial determination transformed indefinitely.419 Even if it is granted that 
the human brain displays a universal anatomy, or that its physical makeup 
is structurally invariable, learning and memory—history in general—
guarantees that no two brains will be the same. In their history “repetition 
and habit play a considerable role, and this reveals that the response of a 
nervous circuit is never fixed. Plasticity thus adds the functions of artist 
and instructor in freedom and autonomy to its role as sculptor,” argues 
Malabou.420 The singular identity of an individual brain emerges from that 
gap opened up between freedom and determination, which is to say, in the 
space of history. The constitution of the individual is determined by how the 
body’s mechanisms are transformed by the experiences it enacts or suffers. 
Plasticity is the “eventlike dimension of the mechanical,” which
between determinism and freedom, designates all the types 
of transformation deployed between the closed meaning 
of plasticity (the definitive character of form) and its open 
meaning (the malleability of form). It does this to such a 
degree that cerebral systems today appear as self-sculpted 
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structures that, without being elastic or polymorphic, still 
tolerate constant self-reworking, differences in destiny, and the 
fashioning of a singular identity.421
Our brains are machines, but machines that repair themselves and 
reprogram themselves according to information they receive from their 
surroundings. The identities they achieve strike a balance between passivity 
and activity, infinite possibility and finite determination. At the end of the 
day, however, their constitution gives way to the exigencies of the material 
world, leaving only the trace of their singular destiny and returning to the 
anonymous material of being.
A similar line of thinking is pursued in Foucault’s work on history 
and embodiment. He chooses “docility” to describe the body invested 
with power and disciplinary techniques, but the manner in which he 
is thinking docility resonates with the concept of plasticity. The docile 
bodies populating Discipline and Punish seem, on the one hand, merely 
pliable, or “flexible” in Malabou’s sense. They are made to take on a pre-
programmed form, rendered automatic or mechanical (territorialized) by 
the machinations of state power or biopower. Foucault writes of how
the soldier has become something that can be made; out 
of formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can 
be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated 
constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, 
mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning 
silently into the automatism of habit.422
But this is only half the story. The body would not take on this apparent 
automatism were it not for its capacity to take on any number of historically 
determined forms. When Foucault says that the body has to be broken 
down and rearranged, he is acknowledging that disciplinary techniques 
must grapple with corporeal determinations that offer resistance and harbor 
their own power. Oksala has pointed out, against Butler and others, that 
it is the body as formed which offers its own resistances to reformation.423 
In Foucault’s words, “Discipline increases the forces of the body…and 
diminishes these same forces…. In short, it dissociates power from the 
body” and transforms the body into an “aptitude” or “capacity.”424 Recalling 
James’s definition of plasticity, the disciplined body is given a structure 
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strong enough to resist power, but weak enough to yield to a sufficiently 
technical and more intense power. 
The event-like structure of the body is given further expression in 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” where Foucault explicitly rejects the view 
that the body is an ahistorical, physiologically determined entity: “The body 
is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms 
of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating 
habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances.” Put negatively, its history is 
“without constants.”425 Formulated positively: the body is plastic. This does 
not mean that the body is reducible to a series of oppressive events, or that 
the forms it assumes do not constitute real dispositions or determinate 
capacities for action. It means that any particular disposition is contingent 
and susceptible to change, whereas dispositional plasticity is structurally 
basic to embodiment.426
Malabou’s investigation of plasticity implicitly follows, in the 
philosophical tradition, the naturalistic insights of James and Dewey. She 
rarely, if ever, writes about either thinker. She discovers plasticity in Hegel; 
I have been arguing that it is basic to Spinozism too, a point she notes in 
Ontology of the Accident.427 What she says about the brain can be profitably 
broadened to describe the constitution of the body. This does not lead 
to a reductive physicalism. Phenomenology, and the phenomenological 
sympathies of the pragmatists, help us avoid that course. For instance, 
Bernard Andrieu, following Francisco Varela and others, is undertaking 
a program called “neurophenomenology,” which focuses on the material 
genesis and plasticity of cognition while considering equally legitimate the 
phenomenological and neuroscientific descriptions of this process. Central 
to this “dynamic materialism” is an updated notion of Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of flesh, which Andrieu says “defines the historic construction 
of the nervous system through the interaction of the body with the world 
and the progressive embodiment of these incorporations.”428 The temporal 
dimension of the construction of the body is linked to the principle 
of plasticity, which says that the body “must first be understood as an 
interaction with its environment because it is itself the receptive matter both 
informed and informing.”429 Merleau-Ponty may not have been willing to 
subscribe to this materialist program for the flesh, but his thinking does 
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exhibit sympathy for the kind of mutual formation described by Andrieu 
and Malabou. Once again, this is evident in his conception of habit.
Habit, Circuit, Territory
Recall that for Merleau-Ponty habits are like the body’s original prostheses. 
The idea that habit is first nature is in fact a point found in James, although 
the American is not Merleau-Ponty’s source. Habits offer a metastability 
to the body without fixing it absolutely. They render the body automatic 
to a degree, but this automatism is never complete. There is some room 
left for freedom, but what this freedom entails is left for discussion in the 
following chapter. The body is not born with a set of specific habits, but 
almost immediately adopts habits which endow it with a specific integrity 
and allow it to negotiate its situations with relative ease. Habits belong 
among the historical a priori which condition perception and action; they 
arrange and rearrange the body schema, while leaving the body open to 
receive new habits.430 Habits are not just passively received, however: they 
are projected out into the environment as actions whose repetition wears 
down the environment in specific ways. Conversely, repetition wears upon 
the actor. The possibilities for habituation are limited by the effects of 
habit introduced into the layout of the environment. As Casey writes, the 
“power of orientation” (Merleau-Ponty) we call our habitus is correlated 
to the kinaesthetic situation we call our habitat.431 Now, I think a general 
conception of habit is essential for understanding corporeal plasticity. 
In fact, we might say that habit is emblematic of plasticity, but it is not 
sufficient to keep our discussion of habit at the level of perception, without 
serious consideration of its material aspect. Otherwise, habit becomes a 
structure of the body that deals with material conditions, while remaining 
immaterial itself. We saw in our earlier discussion that an account of habit 
is provided by the pragmatists and we turn to them now to consider habit 
from a naturalistic perspective, one which is not incompatible with, but 
rather supplemental to, the phenomenological.
In James’s The Principles of Psychology habituation takes hold in the 
neural network of the brain. And it is precisely this network’s plasticity that 
enables the body to acquire habits. The physics of plasticity, in this case, 
implies that the nervous system is susceptible to a series of habit sets which 
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lend it its structure at a given historical point. Each successive phase of the 
system’s development contains a specific integrity which resists alteration 
while at the same time remaining susceptible to environmental influence.432 
The influence of the body’s sensory life carves pathways into its nervous 
system, predisposing it to particular patterns of behavior which correspond 
to these pathways.433 We now know that these pathways are the locus of 
the body schema, which Clark describes as “a suite of neural settings that 
implicitly (and non-consciously) define a body in terms of its capabilities 
for action….”434 The plasticity of the neural network is what enables the 
body schema to change over time as it genuinely incorporates, and not merely 
uses, the instruments that “dilate” (Merleau-Ponty’s term) the body-
subject’s world.
Habits, then, exhibit internal/physiological and external/environmental 
aspects.435 Neither of these can be reduced when considering the identity of 
the body. On the one hand, the neural pathways which are recorded in the 
material of the body physically determine the range of actions and passions 
the body is capable of at any given time. On the other hand, the range of 
behaviors which the body exhibits at a specified point in its life determine its 
style and make it recognizable as the individual it is. The variability of this 
style—which may result from self-reflection or environmental changes, for 
instance—introduces a degree of indeterminacy that can effect an alteration 
of the body’s habit set.
Allowing for the reality of creativity, we must not overestimate the 
power of the will to alter the body’s habits. When the will is set against the 
force of habit as the agent of rehabituation—and this is even more the case 
when habit is localized in the brain—one runs the risk of reinforcing the 
dualism of master mind and servant body. Carlisle leans in this direction 
by suggesting “awareness” as the remedy for undesirable habits. She 
writes, “Habits carry a momentum that must be countered by an opposing 
medium.”436 Awareness involves attending to the transitive sensations left 
unremarked in habitual action. It contains “the power to unconceal habits, 
and so to weaken and eventually unravel them.” But if sensations actually 
operate below the level of perception, or attention, then the possibility of 
bringing them to attention becomes suspect, if not impossible, as does the 
freedom to choose between awareness or obliviousness to “one’s living, 
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breathing experience.”437 The covert nature of sensation leaves consciousness 
in a state of perpetual unawareness. The option of bringing sensation, and 
the habits it informs, to consciousness is therefore removed.
Just as the neural network is a kind of circuit along which habits flow, 
the behavioral aspect of habits can also be regarded as circuits. Doing so 
allows us to see how the habits each one of us adopts can come to constitute 
who we are at the most fundamental level. Habits economize our actions by 
locking us into certain behavioral patterns, while also releasing our attention 
to explore new modes of action. James’s description of habitual circuits 
of behavior is as mechanical as it is phenomenological. “In action grown 
habitual, what instigates each new muscular contraction to take place in its 
appointed order is not a thought or a perception, but the sensation occasioned 
by the muscular contraction just finished.”438 The idea here is that habits are 
chains of sensations and muscular responses, set in motion by a single 
impulse. The sensations occur below the level of conscious attention, but 
this does not mean that they are not registered by the body. Indeed, they are 
situated somewhere between the physiological and phenomenological: “that 
they are more than unconscious nerve-currents seems certain, for they catch 
our attention if they go wrong.”439 Quoting a certain Schneider, James dubs 
habits “processes of inattentive feeling.”440 We might call them circuits of 
inattention.
Favoring a more holistic representation of the habitual act, the 
phenomenologist will want to downplay the imperceptible and auto-
reflexive elements of James’s description of habit. Interestingly, it is the 
phenomenologist who would provide us with an expansive description 
of the series of sensations and muscular contractions which comprise a 
given habitual behavior. The key difference between the mechanical and 
phenomenological accounts of a circuit of behavior rests with the latter’s 
insistence on the intentionality motivating the circuit and the former’s 
insistence on sensation as the motor of action. There is no reason why 
we cannot regard habits as motivated by intentional aims but proceeding 
mechanically, however. To do so we must admit a certain autonomy—
that is, a degree of unconscious activity—to the sensations propelling 
the mechanism.
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James’s account of habitual circuits leads us to see that our corporeal 
identities, insofar as they are comprised of sets of habits, are made up of 
a series of responses correlated with a series of sensations. In other words, 
our body’s integrity is partially determined by the sensory circuits to which 
it responds. These circuits have aesthetic, phenomenological, affective, and 
unconscious elements. They constitute the largely anonymous substratum 
of our everyday lives. Of course we carve out some of our own circuits, 
but we just as often adopt them from the rituals and routines of culture. 
We may commute, dine, and shop like everyone else, but we might also 
invent, collaborate, and produce like no other. These rituals and routines 
find themselves recorded in the musculature of our bodies and driven 
by the mundane sensations of everyday life. These circuits coalesce into 
a system that subtracts from the abundance of incoming sensations and 
outgoing efforts required to sustain life. They make up what Schneider calls 
our “body’s attitude”441 and provide an analogue to what we have called 
proprioception. As Massumi shows, the “habitual autopilot” of our daily 
navigation is linked to the body’s proprioception, and is predominantly a 
non-cognitive orienting.442 Our body’s attitude, individuality, orientation—in 
short, its very animation—emerges from its habitual economy. Everything 
hangs on whether the impetus of this economy is intentional, non-
intentional, or a combination of both.
To better capture the complexity and diversity of our identities, the 
notion of circuit can be generalized and applied to all aspects of our 
existence. We can speak of political and moral circuits, for example, which 
might include the patterns of thought, action, and speech typical of a 
particular political ideology or moral framework.443 These circuits, as plastic 
structures, display a relative stability. An analysis of any social circuit would 
have to include consideration of its sensory and affective content, for these 
are what regulate individuals and keeps them attached to the circuit, even 
when their attachments result from a diminished or indifferent concern for 
the circuit’s value. It is arguable that, although we are quasi-automatically 
attached to our habits, we remain attached to them only insofar as they 
retain a degree of importance for us. Importance can come from the 
understanding, yes, but ultimately importance can only dictate our actions if 
we are passionate about it.444 What we are passionate about is what gives our 
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body incomparable pleasure and draws it near, or what infests our body with 
frustration, rage, or pain, thus repelling it. In short, our affective responses 
keep us locked into a circuit of behavior or induce us to switch to another 
circuit. Affects are a currency traded in the habitual economy.
In contrast with the phenomenological notion of an existential “field” we 
can think of the totality of the circuits which orient our individual lives as 
defining our territory, while considering each individual habit as a milieu.445 
These terms work in tandem and derive from the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari. A territory is roughly demarcated and abides by a specific set of 
laws; it is a stratified and policed assemblage. Habits are stratifications of 
the body, while its automatic aspects are symptomatic of its “territorialized” 
or “coded” disposition. As DeLanda explains, territorialization is a process 
which increases the internal homogeneity of an assemblage. It can be 
accomplished through exclusion, profiling, segregation, regulation, and 
so forth. Coding is a second reinforcement of homogenization and can 
be witnessed in our genes and in our language.446 A milieu, by contrast, is 
defined by its instability and liminality: a milieu occurs between two clearly 
defined spaces, like a border or threshold, and maintains only a relative or 
fleeting stability. While dependent on the homogeneity of its environment, 
a habit is like a milieu in that it is susceptible to deformation or 
deterritorialization. Habits maintain their integrity by virtue of the stability 
of environmental conditions, but they are not fully determined by them.
Deleuze and Guattari consider milieus in terms of rhythm and haecceity, 
two concepts we have dealt with already. The unfamiliarity of the concept 
of milieu can be mitigated here by comparing it with Dewey’s theories of 
form and growth. Together they give us a non-phenomenological way of 
understanding the sensory link between body and environment. Dewey’s 
theory focuses on the qualitative and aesthetic dimensions of embodiment 
and, not unlike Levinas, offers an account of the alimentary function 
of sensation. 
Considering how they invest the bodies populating them, we see that 
territories, or “territorialities (habitual constellations of affects and patterns 
of movement),” are not very different from what we have been calling 
circuits.447 A territory lays down laws or codes which organize and render 
obedient the bodies inhabiting their space. The affective component of 
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territoriality is, in John Protevi’s words, “inherently political: bodies are part 
of an ecosocial matrix of other bodies, affecting them and being affected by 
them; affect is part of the basic constitution of bodies politic.”448 This is why 
we must always ask whether the affective circuits of territories (or bodies 
politic) increase or decrease the power of the bodies that inhabit them. What 
feels important inside the territory?
Territories gain strength when the qualities of a milieu, or its rhythm, 
are forced to express the marks/coordinates of the territory, when the 
nomos of the body politic is embodied in the ethos of those bodies which 
constitute it. This is a performative act, the signature of the territory.449 
Territorialization occurs when an otherwise non-signifying set of qualities 
(milieu) is made to signify or represent a particular style: “One puts one’s 
signature on something just as one plants one’s flag on a piece of land.”450 A 
birdsong, or refrain, works in this way. The birdsong delimits a territory by 
marking the sonic boundaries of the bird’s property. This is accomplished 
by a “little tune” or “melodic formula” (a meme) whose performance enacts 
the territorialization. In the same way, our bodies come to function by 
innumerable cultural refrains, some of which we enact for ourselves, like the 
frightened child who, “gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under 
his breath.”451 Like any body whose posture or gesture reproduces the body 
language of a particular cultural setting, the child builds a little space of 
comfort around him with a familiar sound. The sound shelters him from the 
indeterminacy haunting his imagination.
Despite the fixity of territory, bodies and spaces display characteristics 
which oppose and undo territorial codes. Improvisation, for instance. 
Improvisation, or any chance encounter, is made possible by the “cracks” 
in territories which Deleuze and Guattari call milieus. A milieu is like the 
unstable and indistinct, but not inconsistent, qualitative dimension of a 
territory. In a word, it is the territory’s heterogeneity. Just as territorialization 
must enlist the qualities of milieus, milieus must rely upon territories for 
the formal expression of their individual styles. The dialectical relation 
here is not pure, however, because milieus take ontological priority over 
territories. “The territory is the product of a territorialization of milieus 
and rhythms.”452 Milieus bear within themselves rhythms which produce 
their identities. The rhythm of a milieu is its own code.453 It must, however, 
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be noted that—given what has been said about assemblages—this rhythm 
is never proper to a milieu, but resonates between two or more milieus. 
The rhythm is a haecceity, an intensive threshold which is constantly 
produced and reproduced—by a movement of involution—by the difference 
or in-between that constitutes the milieu. It is this “difference that is 
rhythmic, not the repetition, which nevertheless produces it.”454 Milieus 
present the transactional space or passage between two heterogeneously 
coded stabilities, “the interior milieu of impulses and the exterior milieu of 
circumstances,”455 for instance. As a threshold between inside and outside, 
a body operates as a milieu and is prone to the same kinds of instability, 
determination, co-optation, and coding.
The “Precious Part of Plasticity”
The difficult conceptuality of Deleuze and Guattari can be substituted, at 
the risk of oversimplification, with the naturalistic presentation given in 
Dewey’s work on habit. Following James, Dewey defines habit as a process 
that is, in a word, plastic. Dewey explicitly presents two phenomena that are 
for the most part only implied by the phenomenologists: material dependence 
and material growth. It is true that Levinas gets at these aspects of existence 
in his notion of living from…, but his analysis fails to consider dependence 
from the perspective of natural life and is virtually silent, as is Merleau-
Ponty, on the growth of the body.456
In Human Nature and Conduct Dewey speaks about the “plasticity of 
impulse,” whereas in Democracy and Education he considers growth in terms 
of plasticity as well as dependence. In the former text, plasticity prima facie 
denotes a state of complete indeterminacy, as though our impulses were 
an unrestrained chaos of drives waiting to be channeled into deliberate 
behavior. But we quickly learn that plasticity signifies for Dewey an “original 
modifiability” that is initially determined by its interactions with the 
environment. Plasticity, then, signifies neither pure novelty nor pure docility, 
neither activity nor passivity: “the most precious part of plasticity consists 
in ability to form habits” which are (1) flexible and (2) able to modify 
sedimented customs and institutions, which for Dewey are just embodied 
habits.457 Impulses are creative in that they instigate the renewal of habit, 
which is itself an ability and an art.458 Habits “are adjustments of the 
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environment, not merely to it. At the same time, the environment is many, 
not one; hence will, disposition, is plural.”459 Our habits are as diverse as the 
environments to which they respond. Environments take on the dispositions 
we impart to them, while habits are symptomatic of how environments have 
compelled us to adapt.
Much of this sounds like Merleau-Ponty, and we might have to concede 
that some aspects of the lived body bear the mark of plasticity. Especially 
with regard habit, style, and postural schema, there are traces of plasticity in 
Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject. The growth and disintegration of the body 
in its materiality is not a focus of his study, however, and unless we want to 
institute a new dualism of objective and subjective corporeality, the structure 
of the lived body must be seen as fundamentally material, and therefore 
liable to generation and degeneration. Even in “The Child’s Relations 
with Others” the body is presented as mature and capable. Its habitual 
relations are presented as regulated by “a single global phenomenon,” (i.e., 
perception). As Merleau-Ponty writes, “the internal characteristics of the 
subject always intervene in his way of establishing his relations with what 
is outside him. It is never simply the outside which molds him; it is he 
himself who takes a position in the face of the external conditions” (Child 
108/17). Put otherwise, the existential field solicits and suggests responsive 
behavior, it does not determine it. Absent here is the physical growth of 
the child, which determines the manner in which he or she receives and 
processes—or fails to do so—environmental information. And while it is 
true to say that this physical development is never simply a matter of the 
outside “molding” the inside, it must be admitted that the internal relation 
between subject and object entails, at least initially, an asymmetrical relation 
of dependence whereby the subject (child) is deeply susceptible to outside 
influence. This dependence signifies the need for growth as well as a state 
of immaturity. Neither of these terms should be interpreted negatively, 
however. Dependence and immaturity, as Dewey shows, assert their own 
productive forces.
Human bodies develop. After development, disintegration. Both stages 
can be given positive treatments, provided they are taken on their own terms 
rather than dialectically. The child’s body is exemplary. Immaturity is not 
simply an absent or nascent maturity: immaturity is a power, the capacity 
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to grow. This capacity is at once dependent and plastic for Dewey. Plasticity 
here indicates the “specific adaptability of an immature creature for growth.” 
This is not equivalent to “a capacity to take on change of form in accord 
with external pressure,” but means the “power to modify actions on the 
basis of the results of prior experiences, the power to develop dispositions. 
Without it, the acquisition of habits is impossible.”460  Dewey locates the 
subject’s plasticity below the level of disposition and habit, thus assigning it 
a transcendental aspect. But this aspect is nothing more than the volatility 
of organic processes. It is not that biology is prior to culture, but that 
corporeal structures are emergent, resilient, and pliable. In other words, 
the condition of possibility for habit acquisition is experimentation, or the 
indeterminate determinacy of a socially embedded impulse and instinct. 
Growth comes with the acquisition of habits, which enable independence 
and maturity. “Maturation,” as Noë writes, “is not so much a process of 
self-individuation and detachment as it is one of growing comfortably into 
one’s environmental situation.”461  Independence comes with increased 
control of the body, which includes integration and cultivation of the 
environment, as well as orientation within it. And it is only when our habits 
become mechanized routines, when we get locked into circuits of behavior 
or when our bodies become territorialized, that our plasticity is paralyzed. 
The tendency toward decreased plasticity, the dissolution of the power to 
grow, quickens with age. It is not just a matter of inattention, it is a physical 
necessity. This is why James instructs that, in education it is imperative 
that we “make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy.” As the 
power to efficiently and effortlessly think and act decreases, the exigency 
of adaptation and habituation—“the effortless custody of automatism”—
increases.462 
Dewey explicitly links the habituation of the subject to its qualitative 
surroundings—the aesthetics of the environment. Our growth depends 
on the sensations our bodies exchange with others like and unlike our 
own. Like Levinas, Dewey holds that we live from our sensations. We are 
organisms whose habits serve to increase “susceptibility, sensitiveness, 
responsiveness.” An individual’s capacity to exist, or their power, is directly 
determined by the exchange of old habits for new sensations:
204 Chapter 5
Thus even if we think of habits as so many grooves, the power 
to acquire many and varied grooves denotes high sensitivity, 
explosiveness. Thereby an old habit, a fixed groove if one 
wishes to exaggerate, gets in the way of the process of forming 
a new habit while the tendency to form a new one cuts 
across some old habit. Hence instability, novelty, emergence 
of unexpected and unpredictable combinations. The more 
an organism learns—the more, that is, the former terms of 
a historic process are retained and integrated in this present 
phase—the more it has to learn, in order to keep itself going; 
otherwise death and catastrophe.463
Given that sensitivity here entails a capacity to take on and annihilate 
form, which is to say, indicates a certain plasticity, increased exposure to 
different sensory environments can lead to the sedimentation or explosion 
of an individual’s ethos (habituated identity, the law of the individual). It 
is not so much that life itself is inherently explosive. It is the power of the 
organism that is explosive. This power is dictated by the disposition of the 
organism, including its set of habitual circuits, state of physical maturation, 
and possibilities for experimentation. It is fascinating to note that Dewey 
regards death here as the inability of an organism to continue learning. In 
other words, death is the extinction of growth, or the absolute slackening of 
plasticity. Life, by contrast, is the force which encourages novelty by learning 
how to replace old habits with new ones.
Aesthetic Animation
In The Meaning of the Body Johnson shows how important the aesthetic 
dimension is for the body in making sense of its environment. He argues 
that the aesthetic is usually downplayed in our discussions of experience. 
This happens because we take a certain limitation in our knowledge of 
qualitative experience to indicate a limitation of experience itself. Put 
otherwise, we disregard the qualitative dimension of experience because it 
belongs to the difficult-to-articulate affective register, rather than the less 
unruly perceptual and cognitive. The present rehabilitation of sensation is 
motivated by a desire redraw the limits of experience. Even phenomenology, 
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Johnson notes, “has a hard time with the qualitative dimension, for it is 
easier to describe the structural aspects of experience than it is to describe 
felt qualities. The tendency is thus always to look for the constituting 
structures of experience, at the expense of the actual experience of 
qualities.”464 Following Dewey, Johnson shows that qualities—as liminal 
events occurring between bodies, as milieus—are felt and, as such, allow 
the sentience of the body to discern immanently the meaning of events and 
objects. “Once we are struck, caught up, seized,” writes Johnson, “only then 
can we discriminate elements within our present situation.”465 Sensations 
are responsible for instigating and giving meaning to the dialogue between 
subject and object.
What is it that discriminates? Our bodies. Its sensorimotor and neural 
makeup, both the products of material growth, “determine what stands 
out, for us, from a situation or scene. Therefore, how we ‘take’ objects 
would change if our bodies, brains, or environments changed in some 
radical way.”466 Rarely radical in act, our bodies are constantly adapting 
to the aesthetic provocations of their surroundings. Only upon this 
instigation (sens) are they moved to adapt and make sense of things. As 
Johnson concludes,
we are living in and through a growing, changing situation that 
opens up toward new possibilities and that is transformed as 
it develops. That is the way human meaning works, and none 
of this happens without our bodies, or without our embodied 
interactions within environments that we inhabit and that 
change along with us.467
Our bodies take on the qualitative meanings of their environments. Their 
integrity depends on these meanings which first register on their sensibility. 
Sensibility regulates their capacity to be formed and deformed by the 
aesthetic dimension, for better or worse.
It must be noted that a similar idea is available in Casey’s invaluable 
work on place. Casey writes of the disorienting effect of wild places or 
wilderness on the body. Built places, by contrast, serve to orient and 
sustain the properly human dimensions of the body.468 Disorientation in 
wild or natural places is, he writes, “often radically independent of human 
corporeal intentionality, to the point of challenging and undermining this 
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intentionality.”469 This point is precisely what we indicated as deficient 
in Merleau-Ponty’s analyses, particularly with respect to his treatment of 
violence. What we realize in the wilderness, for Casey, is that body and world 
are only reversible in familiar, manageable places. Everyday places. And 
yet, the radical independence that wild places present to us is only radical 
as an excess of intentional content, as a surplus of meaning. That is, their 
independence is only relative to the reach of everyday phenomenological 
experience, which means that the source of their disorienting effect can 
only be inferred from within the subject-world correlation. Are they really 
wild, or do they just appear so? Wild places tell us that the intentional arc 
of our bodies does not constitute the world, but the phenomenology of wild 
place stops here. It fails to tell us what the excess of intentionality consists 
of, what savage power is capable of disorienting the intentional arc.470 As 
we have seen, this excess is aesthetic, a surplus of sensations. But this is an 
excess that resides in even our most familiar places; we simply fail to notice, 
precisely because they are familiar. “Wilderness” is all around us.
Places are liable to orient us as much as disorient us. This is just as true 
of built places as wild ones, and it is precisely what makes architectural 
design so important, and why specialists are needed to carry out this design 
work. Otherwise, disorienting places are more likely to be constructed. My 
claim at this point is that disorientation as well as orientation spring from 
the sensory environment, not just the sphere of intentionality. Our bodies 
receive and respond to environmental directives that cannot become the 
object of intentionality. Or, if they can, it is only upon reflection. Because 
they contact the body’s sensibility directly, they animate us automatically, 
and this animation—of which reflection is a part—is always one step 
ahead of our intentions. It is in this sense that they exceed the phenomena 
of perception and elude our volition. These directives, what Lingis calls 
imperatives, are ambivalent. They are volatile. Every place, I would argue, 
harbors a volatility because every place is constituted by an aesthetic 
dimension with the potential to affect us in ways that accommodate and/or 
diminish us.
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Environmental Imperatives
Sensations are imperatives. Following Kant’s distinction, we could ask: do 
sensuous imperatives command hypothetically or categorically?471 As we 
pursue our practical aims environmental aesthetics offer numerous scenes, 
settings, and pathways, each with its own sensory atmosphere. In most 
cases I am able to choose from a finite set of routes to my destination. I 
leave my house to buy groceries. There is a busy street with cars, buses, 
and pedestrians that leads to the market; there is a quieter residential street 
that also leads to the market. I must take some street, but the specific one 
I choose is up to me. Or at least it seems that way. Perhaps I am lured 
in a particular direction by the promise of a singular set of sensations, 
so I choose it because of what it promises me? This is the hypothetical 
dimension. Now, once I am committed to a single route (is it one of my 
habitual circuits?) I find myself inserted in a sensory milieu that makes 
unique claims on my body’s sensory apparatus. My body is commanded 
categorically by the sensations comprising the milieu because it cannot but 
receive and respond to these sensations, which are “not reactions to physical 
causality nor adjustments to physical pressures, nor free and spontaneous 
impositions of order on amorphous data, but responses to directives.”472 
Our carnal sensibility obeys environmental commands as they are given, 
but not necessarily as a form of subjection. Sensibility, because it is of the 
same environment to which it responds, is precisely what enables the body 
to get along in that environment. Sensibility is the body’s freedom, but a 
freedom bestowed upon it from without.473 The sensory imperative is a 
heteronomous imperative.
Elaborating on the imperative, Lingis takes up Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
the levels of perception. Lingis writes of
the level of light which our gaze adjusts to and sees with as it 
looks at the illuminated contours that surface and intensify, 
the level of the sonority our hearing attunes to as it harkens to 
sounds and noises that rise out of it, the level of the tangible 
our posture finds as our limbs move across the contours and 
textures of tangible substances….”474
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What makes the levels different from the objects of perception is that the 
former are decidedly ungraspable. Their adumbrations cannot be explored 
or enumerated, for they have no profiles. Our bodies cannot pursue a better 
hold on them, cannot enter into a dialectical relation which slowly converges 
on their essence. To engage a level, the body “adjusts to it, is sustained by 
it, moves with it and according to it.”475 In a word, the body is animated 
by the aesthetic of the levels. A place, or the world taken as the totality 
of places, is composed of a nexus of levels. Its style is determined by this 
nexus which cannot be “survey[ed] from above.” The style of a place is 
something our bodies “catch on to by moving with it.” It is not given to us 
in perception, but engaged as an imperative whose force comes from the 
“sensorial patterns” which order intentionality.476 If perception wants to 
perceive things, it must adjust itself to the levels in which things are situated. 
To pursue the profiles of objects, the body must subject itself to the shifting 
qualitative dimension of the levels. The levels are elemental and, therefore, a 
kind of depth in which the world is immersed. It is because we are immersed 
in this depth, not set over against it, that it cannot be grasped by perception, 
only yielded to or traversed.
From an aesthetic perspective we can conceive the identity of a place as 
composed of an indeterminate series of sensations, the nexus of levels that 
gives this series its specific dimensions, and the circuits of behavior they 
engender. The body’s identity is susceptible to the imperative force of each 
of these environmental aspects. And insofar as these aspects are perpetually 
shifting and prone to a range of sensory variations, we could say that a 
place’s sensory identity is never fixed in its form, but maintains the integrity 
of an haecceity—a metastable and coherent, yet precarious, aggregate of 
sensory qualities. Of course we can say that this aggregate points us toward a 
unified object, but does that not unnecessarily reduce the complexity of the 
sensory content to a simple substance or telos? Or rather, can we not think 
of the object as radiating its complex of qualities outward, and therefore as a 
multiplicity exploding its apparent unity? To imagine this would be to think 
from the perspective of the object, or to take an object-oriented approach 
embodiment. Given that the bodies that populate a place are partly 
responsible for that place’s sensory content, whose directives command 
bodies to respond in particular ways, the identity of the bodies situated 
On Aesthetic Plasticity 209
within a place will also have the character of a haecceity. The integrity and 
intensity of the place gets reflected in the body. Consequently, the range of 
sensations and affects the body is capable of gets determined by the range 
of sensations and affects it receives from its environment. At any given time 
the singular constitution or dispositionality of a body is made possible by 
its plasticity.
Metabolism
The critical takeaway here can be illustrated with an appeal to the biological 
concept of metabolism. In our consideration of the aesthetics of place, the 
identity of bodies, and the alimentary aspect of sensation, we have worked 
toward a philosophical encounter with metabolism. Biologically speaking, 
metabolism is a fact. Ontologically, it describes the genesis of form and 
exemplifies the plastic nature of bodies, both organic and inorganic. Organic 
bodies are aggregates of matter and void, “void mostly, crisscrossed by 
the geometry of force,” as Jonas puts it.477 Through the metabolic process, 
the organic body trades its matter with the matter of its surroundings. 
This exchange gives rise to a “living form” whose matter is never the 
same from one moment to the next. No identical core persists through 
the metabolic process, which means that an organism is not the same as a 
machine understood in the usual sense. As Jonas says, “Metabolism thus 
is the constant becoming of the machine itself—and this becoming itself 
is a performance of the machine: but for such performance there is no 
analogue in the world of machines.”478 Writing of the body-world interface, 
Andrieu strikes a similar note about the non-mechanical individuation of the 
metabolic process:
As an interface, the body doesn’t remain passive: it doesn’t 
obey the orders of the nervous system in a servile manner, 
neither is it an objective reflection of the world. Failing to 
be this recording chamber, according to the mechanical 
metaphor, the human body is the way in and out, through 
which the inside communicates with the outside (and vice-
versa). This crossing is subjectifying in the sense that the 
matter of the body is the result of this building up interaction. 
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By “subjectifying” I mean the movement which singularizes 
each human body by successive incorporations. Subjectivity 
is a result, in continuous movement, of adaptation and 
regulation.479
From the perspective of biological metabolism the organism is a material 
event, a function of metabolism, not the converse.480 From the ontological 
perspective metabolism offers us a conception of identity as active self-
integration and renewal, as the integration of a fluctuating multiplicity. On 
the one hand, the material exchange that bodies conduct with the world 
replenishes their form. On the other hand, our perceptual dialogue enables 
us to maintain our balance in the phenomenal world; it helps keep the world 
intact, manageable. The individual on this materialist view—which Andrieu 
describes as “dynamic” and Bennett calls “vital”—develops a certain degree 
of freedom in its form, but it remains bound to the environment by and 
for its matter. In Jonas’s words, the individual is “needfully free.”481 Our 
freedom is our ability to negotiate the determinate indeterminacy offered 
by the world.
The biological concept of metabolism applies only to organic, living 
beings. It need not be so limited in application, however. The concept can 
be profitably co-opted by the carnal ontology under development here, and 
extended so as to describe inorganic relations. As Bennett writes,
The activity of metabolization, whereby the outside and inside 
mingle and recombine, renders more plausible the idea of 
a vital materiality. It reveals the swarm of activity subsisting 
below and within formed bodies and recalcitrant things, a 
vitality obscured by our conceptual habit of dividing the world 
into inorganic and organic life.482
To illustrate the aberrant materialism exemplified by this metabolic process, 
we turn to Yukio Mishima’s autobiographical meditation on identity, Sun 
and Steel, a text which allegorizes the plasticity of the body. Sun and Steel 
recounts Mishima’s turn away from words and toward the body, namely, his 
initiation into the world of bodybuilding.
Mishima recognizes the human tendency toward automatism of mind 
and body. But he also sees that habits are not destinies: they can be molded 
and redirected, not just intentionally but also materially. We are not actually 
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automata. As Bergson has shown, following Félix Ravaisson (1813-1900), 
habits link us into the mechanisms of nature and often act as efficient 
responses to the directives contained therein.483  The sun provides a directive 
for Mishima.484 Its rays are absorbed into his body and incorporated into 
the surface of his skin. In a similar fashion the steel of the weights he lifts 
gets incorporated into his musculature. These are not metaphors. Mishima 
writes: “Little by little…the properties of my muscles came increasingly to 
resemble those of the steel. This slow development, I found, was remarkably 
similar to the process of education, which remodels the brain intellectually 
by feeding it with progressively more difficult matter.”485 Mishima does 
not literally ingest steel, although his body certainly does take in the 
vitamins provided by the sunlight. Nevertheless, Mishima’s body lives from, 
metabolizes the steel no less than the sun. His body engages organic and 
inorganic matter and, enacting an unnatural participation, converts both 
into muscle. According to Lingis’s description,
In the coupling of organism with steel, the vital substance 
with the extreme condensation of night and death, there was 
not competent intentional force shaping inert substance into 
implements, but transference of properties. The properties that 
came to compose the excess musculature came from the steel 
and were its own properties. In the contact with the substance 
of steel, Mishima found a body become ferric substance.486
This muscle not only gives him strength, it provides his form as well. The 
form emerges from the circuitous relation which obtains between body and 
milieu, both of which must be regarded as organic/inorganic composites.487
The idea that Mishima metabolizes sun and steel is more than metaphor. 
His body is sculpted and polished by repetitive exposure to metal and 
solar energy. Sun and steel territorialize his body and augment his vitality. 
He exchanges for this his sweat, vitamins, calories, pallor. In his words, he 
transforms “the silence of death into the eloquence of life.”488 His writer’s 
body, with its distinctive habits and traits, is molded into the body of a 
weightlifter and begins to signify differently, in the code of the bodybuilder. 
This signification is transmitted through a new set of sensations. The 
bodybuilder’s circuit of training lends Mishima’s body its stability, its 
integrity—its power. The circuit enables him to cut into certain material 
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flows and generate a new form. Mishima is a machine, but not in the 
mechanical sense. The organic/inorganic metabolism of Mishima’s body 
demonstrates the machinic process and allows us to see that insofar as each 
one of us metabolizes materials from the natural and social environment—
including affects and sensations, signs and gestures, rituals and 
mannerisms—our corporeal identity is literally formed by what we inhabit. 
Metabolism exemplifies plasticity just as well as any other process.489
Bodies/Buildings
Some architectural theorists think about body/building relations in a similar 
way. They consider the sensory design of a building to be fundamental to 
the experience of place precisely because the body’s sensibility is susceptible 
to the qualities endemic to a particular building. There is both an aesthetics 
and an ethics of design at work in sentiments of this kind. In Atmospheres the 
architect Peter Zumthor writes about how the “atmosphere” of a building 
is its rhythm, which we pick up “through our emotional sensibility.”490 He 
elaborates a series of points about how to generate atmosphere, which 
include sensory and material considerations:
It’s like our own bodies with their anatomy and things we can’t see and 
skin covering us—that’s what architecture means to me and that’s how I try 
to think about it. As a bodily mass, a membrane, a fabric, a kind of covering, 
cloth, velvet, silk, all around me. The body! Not the idea of the body—the 
body itself! A body that can touch me.491
In his meditation on atmosphere, he exhibits a distinct sense of how the 
body is immediately affected by the building it inhabits, and how the body 
demands certain architectural qualities for its well-being. He considers 
temperature: “It is well-known that materials more or less extract the 
warmth from our bodies.”492 Atmosphere, I would argue, is just another 
name for the singular sensory structure of a space.
Juhani Pallasmaa writes in “An Architecture of the Seven Senses” about 
how our bodies adopt the structure of buildings in their skeletal structure 
and bodily sensations.493 He argues that “Every touching experience of 
architecture is multi-sensory; qualities of matter, space, and scale are 
measured equally by the eye, ear, nose, skin, tongue, skeleton and muscle. 
Architecture involves seven realms of sensory experience which interact 
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and infuse each other.”494 The identity of a space is distinct and can be 
apprehended by the senses. Hollow spaces resonate with emptiness, whereas 
furnished spaces will have an aural identity specific to the arrangement, 
quantity, and quality of the furnishings.495 He summarizes how the identity 
of architect and building merge in the design process, and how this identity 
is passed on to the building’s patrons:
an architect internalizes a building in his body; movement, 
balance, distance and scale are felt unconsciously through the 
body as tension in the muscular system and in the positions 
of the skeleton and inner organs. As the work interacts 
with the body of the observer the experience mirrors these 
bodily sensations of the maker. Consequently, architecture is 
communication from the body of the architect directly to the 
body of the inhabitant.496
Pallasmaa’s phenomenological convictions win the day, however, and he 
concludes that while sensations engage the physical body, “the generative 
force lies in the intentions.”497 I would contend that while intentions do 
indeed propel our engagement with places, it is the directives embedded in 
places—built and natural—that initially strike the body. It is strange that 
Pallasmaa does not concede this point, for his analysis emphasizes the role 
of the skin in the experience of architecture. The skin, it seems to me, only 
takes on an intentional aspect when it directly contacts some object, not 
when it senses an atmosphere. And even then it is questionable whether 
or not it is intentional in the sense that vision or imagination is. I would 
claim, following Levinas, that the skin is precisely that sense organ which 
testifies to the primacy of sensation over perception because it is constantly 
processing environmental information that never rises to the level of 
conscious representation.
Our bodies are of the environment, but not identical to it. Merleau-
Ponty says the same thing about the flesh, but his exposition leaves us 
wanting a fuller account of how bodies are individuated from and eventually 
annihilated by the flesh’s general element. The concepts of metabolism 
and growth offer us a picture of the individual as at once attached to and 
independent of its environment. This is not a relation of reversibility, but 
one of volatile transaction. The transaction can go off well or it can go 
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badly. The individual is not fully determined by its situation, although it is 
fundamentally enabled by it. Who is this individual? It is the body which 
refers to itself as “I” and understands itself as a singular locus of sensations, 
passions, and actions, and which feels itself limited by and attached to a 
particular set of material, cultural, and linguistic circumstances.
Following up this view of individuation, we can conceive body as a 
singular locus of sensations (haecceities), or as a specific conspiracy of 
environmental impressions which define an exact position, a longitude and a 
latitude.498 A body can be anything, but it will always be defined or mapped 
according to the ratio governing it as a composite of simple bodies and the 
affective, anonymous forces traversing the composite at a given moment.499 
On this reading sensations are neither mere epiphenomena produced in 
the mind nor content merely inferred from perception. They are productive 
of clearly demarcated bodily responses, what we might call, with Dewey, 
experiences: “An experience has a unity that gives it its name, that meal, that 
storm, that rupture of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted 
by a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of variation 
of its constituent parts.”500 This quality need not be simple. Indeed, most 
experiences are differentiated by a multiplicity of qualities that we identify 
as a singularity. That bodies undergo or suffer experiences implies that 
experiences are objectively given and generate their own form. That we 
metabolize the qualities which pervade experiences—that experiences shape 
who we are and what we can do—means that we become who we are along 
with our experience. Subjectivity is produced as this qualitative becoming.501
Qualities are neither atomistic nor indeterminate. They do not derive 
their form from a thing or lose their autonomy just because they are 
“attached” to a thing, but rather they give rise to the forma and qualitative 
identity of the thing as an assemblage of potential sensations. This idea 
is found in Mach as well as James: “Thing, body, matter, are nothing 
apart from the combinations of elements—the colors, sounds, and so 
forth—nothing apart from their so-called attributes.”502 The same can 
be said of space, as well as the bodies that populate that space. As James 
writes, “Space means but the aggregate of all our possible sensations.”503 
Consequently, the body becomes the site of these sensations, each and 
every one of which leaves a trace that makes it impossible for the body to 
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undergo the same impression twice.504 Its disposition is constantly changing 
with its environment. In this way bodies are at every moment individual 
aesthetic events whose power to produce sensible effects is constituted by 
the aesthetic experiences they suffer. Power, then, is a plastic disposition—
autonomous in effect but relational in constitution. Death, on this view, 
is simply the exhaustion of the individual’s power, or the transgression of 
the threshold that defines the individual’s power at a particular moment. 
When your body ceases to produce the sensations that defines you, you have 
become something else. You begin to produce new sensations, engender 
a new power, however enfeebled or strengthened. Your matter continues, 
reincarnated, in an infinite succession of new metabolic events. This is your 
immortality.
The Principle of Aesthetic Individuation
There is no reductionism involved here. What I have attempted is to 
render life and individuality in aesthetic terms, and to do so according 
to a corporeal ontology that avoids, if I have succeeded at all, both 
transcendent principles and anthropocentrism. This is not in the interest of 
homogenizing the diversity of life, but in affirming the singular complexity 
of each individual and flattening the field of being. One of the primary 
benefits of shifting the discourse of embodiment to the aesthetic level is 
that it allows us to displace the problems of environmental philosophy—in 
particular the animality/humanity, artificial/natural, and nature/culture 
debates—onto a different plane. This opens new non-anthropocentric 
avenues for interrogation and new possibilities for solving old problems. 
It might be objected that such a shift of emphasis leads to a reduction 
of the complexities of our experience and is an attempt to translate the 
myriad qualitative aspects of life into quanta of stimuli. On the contrary, it 
affirms the complexity found in every corner of material life and challenges 
the hierarchical ontologies that anxiously defend the sanctity of only 
one form of life—the human. It also affirms that sensing is not at all a 
mechanical process.
Toward these ends I have adduced a theory of corporeal plasticity which 
is both phenomenological and materialist, and derived from this theory 
an immanent form of the imperative as well as a principle for valuing the 
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diversity of aesthetic experiences. We can call this the principle of aesthetic 
individuation, which runs as follows: since a body’s sensory identity is 
determined by the sensory blueprint of its environment, that body’s 
power to affect and be affected will only be as complex as the totality of 
its aesthetic experiences. Since this principle has relied on an unorthodox 
conception of sensation (which I have developed piecemeal in each of my 
chapters), I would like to reprise sensation’s several aspects.505
Aspects of Sensation
First, sensations are objective. An object, for instance, is recognizable as an 
aggregate of qualities apprehensible by our senses. We imagine that even 
when we are not there to apprehend it the object retains a real power (or 
disposition) to produce roughly the same aggregate of sensations. In some 
cases—pain, for instance—we feel ourselves attacked from outside by 
sensations. They lead an autonomous life; this autonomy is evinced in the 
resistant aspect of a plastic body, its capacity to hold a form, even if only 
for a moment. Autonomy derives from the form assumed by sensations 
conspiring to produce bodies and bodies conspiring to produce complex 
corporeal systems like dust clouds, forests, traffic patterns, schools, and 
flocks—however fleeting or precarious these conspiracies may be—for it is 
their form that allows them to stand out from, stand up to, connect with, 
and attract other objects. The objective (autonomous) aspect is needed 
to explain where disruptive and violent sensations come from, or how, as 
Levinas puts it, sensation breaks up a system.
Second, sensations are relational. They only affect, or make sense, when 
they come into contact with bodies. Their effects are a matter of contrast, 
as James notes.506 Put otherwise, we could say that the meaning of a 
sensation is diacritical; its effectiveness depends on the field of sensations it 
is embedded in. As diacritical, a sensation’s effect will be neither intrinsically 
nor extrinsically determined. Its effect will be determined between subject 
and object, or object and object. This leads us to a more democratic view 
of bodies, one that maintains that sensations are traded between any and 
all bodies (inanimate as well as animate). The odd idea that two inanimate 
bodies can exchange sensations is not unprecedented. As Heller-Roazen 
explains: “Even in Greek psychological writings, the meaning of the term 
On Aesthetic Plasticity 217
[aisthesis] was fluid, and it could stray very far from the field of human 
perception. At times, it was even employed to mark the affections of the 
inanimate, in punctual opposition to the animate: a fifth-century treatise in 
the Hippocratic corpus, for example, has the verb aisthanesthai characterize 
the effects of the wind on lifeless things.”507 This is a conception of sensation 
that is not available in Aristotle, for whom even plants—let alone inanimate 
objects—cannot sense because they lack the sensitive part of the soul. That 
is, they lack aisthesis. I wish to retain the Hippocratic idea that all things 
are moved by sensation, and this because sensation does not happen in the 
sensing being, but rather on them, and is not restricted exclusively to beings 
with souls.508
Third, since sensations harbor the potential to enable or disable 
bodies, they are said to be ambivalent. This aspect has particular import 
for the ethics of embodiment. The volatility of sensations must be taken 
into consideration when designing buildings and public spaces, or when 
considering the preservation or destruction of a natural environment, for 
example.509 An ethics based on the plasticity of the body as I have described 
it will necessarily be a kind of environmental ethics. It will pay specific 
attention to the aesthetic scaffolding of the environment and the way in 
which aesthetics fosters and diminishes our body’s power to exist. Generally, 
it will be concerned with the sensory aspect of places, although a theory of 
art could also be envisaged. Above all, given how the body’s composition 
relies on the composition of its environment, the concept of integrity will be 
central. The principle of aesthetic individuation dictates this.
Fourth: sensations are alimentary. We live from our sensations, but we 
also die by them. Since they are also ambivalent, they need to be regarded as 
both nourishment and poison. Their intensity and affectivity will determine 
whether they enable or disable our bodies. Our corporeal plasticity remains 
needfully vulnerable to them.
Fifth, sensations belong to nothing and no one: their liminality, 
objectivity, and ambivalence entail a certain detachment or anonymity. When 
we say that we “have” sensations, what we describe is a particular bodily 
response to a sensation. The response operates below the perceptual level 
which would determine it as “mine,” as personal. Once we have noticed it, 
the sensation has already seized us. When we project sensations from our 
218 Chapter 5
bodies, they can be attributed to us only to a degree. Try as we might, we 
cannot regulate completely our own aesthetic signification. And insofar as 
our bodies are a composite of sensations, and we are nothing more than our 
bodies, there is no substantial “person” to which the sensations attach as 
properties. Sensations affect a body; they produce this body. Never is this 
body or its aesthetic properly one’s own.
Finally, sensation belongs to the past. Although they are actualized in the 
present, their presentation is always delayed. And this delay is absolute. 
The body’s receptivity always lags behind the efficacy of sensation. The 
body, once it takes notice of its sensory input, has already had its plasticity 
activated. If sensation can be said to exist or reside anywhere, it is in the past 
which has never been present, the virtual past.
I have here presented an image of the body as plastic and adduced 
evidence for preferring it over the theories of embodiment offered by 
Merleau-Ponty (reversibility) and Levinas (susceptibility). This image 
could not have taken shape without certain insights ascertained by the 
phenomenologists, however. I take my efforts to have balanced their 
perspective with supplemental evidence from non-phenomenological 
theorists, and to have outlined a new theory of sensation that may serve 
as a program for future work on sensation. My purpose in the final 
chapter is to draw some of the practical consequences of the theory of 
corporeal plasticity.
Conclusion
Plasticity and Power
The palace is the body of the king. Your body sends you 
mysterious messages, which you receive with fear, with 
anxiety. In an unknown part of this body, a menace is 
lurking, your death is already stationed there; the signals that 
reach you warn you perhaps of a danger buried in your own 
interior. The body seated askew on the throne is no longer 
yours, you have been deprived of its use ever since the crown 
encircled your head; now your person is spread out through 
this dark, alien residence that speaks to you in riddles. But 
has anything really changed? Even before, you knew little or 
nothing about what you were. And you were afraid of it, as 
you are now.
Calvino, “A King Listens”
Assemblage, fold, eddy, haecceity; sensory, behavioral, and habitual 
circuits… Throughout this book an entire vocabulary has accumulated to 
describe and defend the immanence of the body so that, in spite of Paul 
Klee’s epitaph, the body is indeed “caught in immanence” (EM 188/87). 
But what about transcendence? What about freedom? To be sure, the 
phenomenologists never leave these questions out of their equation. So it 
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would not be unfair to object that the foregoing account of embodiment 
is slanted to the extent that it suppresses the dimension of transcendence 
operative in Merleau-Ponty and, crucially, in Levinas. It has, as a result, said 
relatively little about the freedom afforded by transcendence.
Post-dualist Freedom
If I have passed over freedom in silence, it is because I think freedom is 
something only the committed dualist has to worry about. Post-dualists 
have turned to the body precisely to discard such concerns. Or, put 
differently, what the post-dualist means by freedom may be difficult for 
the dualist to recognize as freedom. But just because we have evacuated 
the interiority of the subject (classical locus of free will) and given up on 
liberal individualism, however, does not mean that we must resign ourselves 
to some vulgar determinism. That much should be apparent at this point. 
The challenge to be met by philosophies of immanence is to account for the 
“freedom” of the body in terms of “corporeal surfaces, in terms of rotations, 
convolutions, inflections, and torsions of the body itself,” as Grosz puts it.510 
In other words, to transcribe the freedom of the lived body into the power 
of the body as a dynamic materiality. Toward this end it is worth unpacking 
(with the aid of Spinoza) the following lesson from Merleau-Ponty: the 
power of the body is an expression of the system of appearances it encounters. Put 
otherwise, the body is—not unlike the electrified Rugendas of Aira’s novella 
of the landscape painter—the radiant center of a sensory economy.511
Along the way I have sometimes drawn a distinction between the 
ontological and practical power of the body, implying that there is a real 
difference between what the body is and what it can do. Against Levinas I 
suggested that ontology is, indeed, prior to ethics. Here I want to plainly 
assert that this only a nominal distinction. The power of the body to exist 
and the power of the body to act are in fact metaphysically equivalent. *This 
principle I adopt from Spinoza, who writes in the Ethics that “the power or 
conatus by which [a thing] endeavors to persist in its own being, is nothing 
but the given, or actual, essence of the thing.” Furthermore: “since the 
ability to exist is power, it follows that the greater the degree of reality that 
belongs to the nature of a thing, the greater amount of force [vis] it has 
from itself for existence.”512 A thing’s essence is its internal necessity, the law 
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ordering its nature, which is always composed of a number of bodies acting 
together as an individual. In the language I have developed here, the power 
of the body is equal to the disposition of its plasticity. To see how this might 
be borne out in Merleau-Ponty we must distinguish between his theory of 
freedom and his theory of power.
The phenomenological portrayal of freedom makes up the entire closing 
chapter of Phenomenology of Perception. True to form, Merleau-Ponty’s 
interrogation of the nature of freedom splits the difference between absolute 
determinism and absolute freedom. To discard the former he affirms that 
it is evident through reflection that I am not a thing; I do not find myself 
objectified by a situation, I take a position in it, so I must therefore be more 
than a thing. I am a consciousness too. Sympathetic to Sartre’s Kantian 
defense of the absolute freedom of the ego, Merleau-Ponty identifies 
consciousness as our “power of escape” from the causal relations which 
obtain between mere things (PP 434, 435/496, 497). From one angle we 
find that the limitations placed on action are self-imposed by the projects 
we choose to undertake. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “there are no obstacles 
in themselves” (PP 441/503). A fallen tree blocking the street is only an 
obstacle if I desire to travel down that street. What I can and cannot do is 
dictated by the synchrony achieved between my practical intentions and 
the existential field opened up by those intentions. Unlike things, I possess 
the power of transcendence. That is, I am free to move beyond the given. 
Things, for lack of consciousness, are condemned to immanence.
The practical intentions I seek to fulfill can only come to fruition within 
a field of behavior inflected by social, historical, physical, cultural forces. 
My conscious body is invested with these forces, and must make sense of 
them, in order to act. Freedom depends upon this field for its meaning 
and, therefore, its possibilities. The field is instrumentally necessary to 
the movement of transcendence enacted by freedom, but it is also what 
gets transcended by consciousness. Conscious action generates its own 
obstacle course, although it does not completely control it. The autonomy 
of the course is revealed by the fact that my body suffers intentions it does 
not choose (PP 440/502). Descartes, Berkeley, and others used a similar 
argument to prove that sense experience is produced by something other 
than the sensing subject, that the world is not merely my illusion, but ruled 
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by something other. The “autochthonous significance” of the existential 
environment presents a system of appearances that the body must adapt 
itself to in order to thrive. To be free is to be able to confront competently 
the obstacles engendered by one’s projects and to understand how 
intentional action squares with the resistances of the given. “Our freedom 
does not destroy our situation, but gears itself to it: as long as we are alive, 
our situation is open, which implies both that it calls up specially favoured 
modes of resolution, and also that it is powerless [impuissante] to bring one 
into being by itself” (PP 442/505). The immanence of the subject does not 
restrict freedom; rather, it obliges the subject to garner adequate sets of 
habits and styles of living that will allow it to escape from immanence and 
recreate its horizon of action (PP 443-444/505-507). An able body acquires 
its freedom through a dialogue with the existential field. A balance of 
creation and conformity determines the nature of this freedom:
What then is freedom? To be born is both to be born of the 
world and to be born into the world. The world is already 
constituted, but also never completely constituted; in the 
first case we are acted upon, in the second we are open to 
an infinite number of possibilities. But this analysis is still 
abstract, for we exist in both ways at once. There is, therefore, 
never determinism and never absolute choice, I am never a 
thing and never bare consciousness. (PP 453/517)
The subject’s identity is decidedly not given; it is achieved. Partly a matter of 
facticity, partly a matter of coping, its genuinely indeterminate possibilities 
are open, yet limited.
One of the key problems with the exoteric account of freedom found in 
the Phenomenology is its faith in body-world synchronization (reversibility), 
which was criticized in chapters one and two. This kind of faith contains 
remnants of a liberal individualism, as Dewey points out.513 However, 
when we consider that Merleau-Ponty regards freedom also as a matter 
of tolerating the environmental conditions that determine what it can and 
cannot accomplish, the residual individualism begins to fade away. “Taken 
concretely, freedom is always a meeting of inner and outer…and it shrinks 
without ever disappearing altogether in direct proportion to the lessening of 
the tolerance allowed by the bodily and institutional data of our lives” (PP 
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454/518). By shifting our attention away from how the subject overcomes 
his or her situation, and concentrating on how this situation imposes 
itself, resists or does violence to the subject, we come to see the power of 
embodiment in terms of determination instead of freedom. The advantage 
of this shift in perspective is that it allows us to abandon the language of 
inner and outer, consciousness and transcendence, without succumbing to 
absolute determinism. That is, it allows us to think the immanence of body 
and environment without completely giving up the notion of freedom, which 
is arguably what Merleau-Ponty aspired to when he gave up the dualism of 
his early text for the monistic ontology of the flesh.
How can we understand freedom as tolerance? One strategy would be 
to recast the weakness or vulnerability of the body as its power.514 Another 
would be to extol the virtues of resignation and acceptance. These two 
options are ontologically and morally unattractive, precisely because we 
really want to figure out what our bodies can become, not just what they are. 
What then is the virtue of tolerance? In a word, necessity. Since an embodied 
subject never exists outside of an entanglement of bodies, understanding 
and affirming how these bodies enable and/or disable it is tantamount to 
realizing its freedom. Their determining composition, as we have seen, 
informs the disposition of each individual body involved in it. And it is the 
disposition of a body, or the specific state of its plasticity, that defines the 
range of what it can tolerate and accomplish in that state. Tolerance is thus 
governed by a threshold of power which expresses the dispositional plasticity 
of the body. For Merleau-Ponty this threshold is delimited by the body’s 
habituation to environmental aesthetics. To draw the practical consequences 
of this point let us now consider tolerance from the perspective of aesthetics, 
or what I have called the principle of aesthetic individuation. I will argue 
that the body’s capacity to suffer and respond to appearances is closely 
tied to the diversity and intensity of appearances comprising its aesthetic 
environment, along with the habits it has accumulated in response to these 
appearances.
The Spinozist aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of freedom is scattered 
throughout the Phenomenology’s analyses of space, sensing, and things. 
It is not quite esoteric, but it is less visible than his phenomenological 
account. It accompanies his remarks on appearances [apparences] and is 
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contained in his discussion of how to view objectively an object or painting. 
Phenomenologically speaking, it is the case that the true identity of a 
painting appears to the viewer when he or she achieves the “privileged 
perception” necessitated by the painting—the point at which the painting 
reveals a maximum of clarity and richness. Articulated in spatial terms, 
“For each object, as for each picture in an art gallery, there is an optimum 
distance from which it requires to be seen” (PP 302/348). There is an 
imperative here: the viewer must situate herself in a specific location, 
dictated by the painting or object in question, if she is going to acquire “the 
power [puissance] of achieving a certain spectacle.” Power in this scenario is 
determined by, writes Merleau-Ponty, “a certain kinaesthetic situation” to 
be negotiated by the body, which is permanently and constantly “enveloped” 
by a set of appearances that direct it to get a hold on the world (PP 
303/349). Now, since the body is an object and a perceptual phenomenon 
as well, what is said here about how objects and paintings are to be rightly 
viewed and identified pertains as much to the body, insofar as the body 
is itself a work of art, or a collection of sensations commanding its own 
perceptibility (PP 150, 451/176, 514; CD 16/27).
Attempting to open up new avenues for ethical thinking, Foucault 
eventually asked about how we might fashion our own lives as works of art. 
“But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or 
the house be an art object but not our life?,” he asks.515 As always, Foucault’s 
question aims at discerning the limits of disciplinary regimes and the 
experiential prospects of disciplined bodies. Imagining Foucault’s problem 
from the environmental angle, Merleau-Ponty prompts us to envisage 
the emancipatory potential of aesthetics, where the practical purpose of 
aesthetics would be to promote experiences that sculpt our sensibility and 
intensify the body’s capacity to act. The Phenomenology consistently equates 
this capacity with our ability to negotiate the appearances that populate 
the environment. At many places in the text Merleau-Ponty denotes this 
capacity as our power (pouvoir, puissance), leaving us to distinguish the power 
of aesthetics as well as the aesthetics of power entailed in his metaphor of 
the body as work of art.
The question of corporeal power is necessarily a question of 
performance. The body acquires tools and prostheses, learns adaptive skills 
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and behaviors, arranges and rearranges its repertoire of actions in order 
to act efficiently in and expand its world. Since I am my body, I am this 
performance, and my identity is glimpsed in the spectacle I stage. Just as 
my gait can be deciphered by a friend too far away to make out my face but 
close enough to see me walking, my bodily kinaesthetics betray who I am. 
In large measure this results from the cultivation of habit and, consequently, 
the arrangement and rearrangement of the body schema. Each 
rearrangement better equips the body with the “power [pouvoir] to respond” 
to the general field of action. This is not a power of understanding achieved 
through intellectual synthesis: it is a correlating of the habituated form of the 
body with the corporeal significance of the field of action (PP 142-144/166-
169). Tools and implements enrich our power to act by expanding the range 
of our technique and increasing our range of action. Habit is the general 
tool that allows us to enter into relations with the people, animals, cooking 
utensils, and vehicles that comprise the assemblages to which we belong. 
“Habit expresses our power [pouvoir] of dilating our being in the world, or 
changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments” (PP 143/168).
Merleau-Ponty is articulating what Bennett, after Spinoza, calls 
distributive agency. Distributive agency is the expression of a heterogeneous 
confederation of animate and inanimate bodies, supported by a network of 
scaffolding or infrastructure that supports it. A distributed agency gathers 
its power from sources local and distant, and concentrates this power into 
a singular effect.516 Power here, once again, names the body’s capacity to 
produce effects, to do what it is capable of doing. For Spinoza this capacity 
is equivalent to the singularity of bodily composition determined by the 
ratio of “motion and rest, quickness and slowness” a body maintains with 
other bodies, whether near or far.517 The freedom of the body, then, is an 
expression of how it is (ontologically) determined within an assemblage or 
distributed agency.
The body’s senses hold a power of their own. This power results from 
the sensations the senses take in and determines how they will tolerate 
future sensations. Colors, qualities, figures, and so forth present themselves 
to the power (puissance) of the senses, soliciting from the body a “type 
of behaviour” that is conditioned by habit and sediments into a habitus. 
These qualities come in from everywhere, all the time. The aesthetic is 
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never turned off. It is worth recalling here an earlier citation: “The subject 
of sensation is neither a thinker who takes note of a quality, nor an inert 
setting which is affected or changed by it, it is a power [puissance] which 
is born into, and simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, 
or is synchronized with it” (PP 211/245). The subject is produced by a 
singular set of perspectives taken in by the aesthetic environment. It is 
likewise produced as a singular set of perspectives that it gives back to the 
environment. This metabolic process is reflected in the practical competence 
the body uses to orient itself in its habitat.
A competent body is one that knows how appearances will determine or 
affect its disposition as this body at this location (PP 302/348). A powerful 
body is one that can and will, additionally, fashion its habitat to intensify 
its habitus. Power synthesizes stability and productivity into what we might 
call creative tolerance. It is in this sense that the body is a work of art, 
that is, a unified composition that radiates a singular set of sensations and 
necessitates a particular perspective for its identity is to be apprehended. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s words, the body is a “mosaic of given sensations” (PP 
249/288). In the same way, Deleuze and Guattari, insisting on the autonomy 
of the work of art, cast the work of art (the thing and the body) as “a bloc 
of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects.”518 Under this 
definition the integrity of the body admits of a set of aesthetic and affective 
limits that cannot be transgressed if it is to remain the particular body it is; 
beyond these limits it becomes an altogether different body. Its aesthetic 
variability and the phenomena it stages admit of no underlying agency, just a 
vital materiality that I am calling the plastic body.
An Explosive Form?
From her inquiry into brain plasticity Malabou sketches a number of 
political implications, some of which I have alluded to already. Among 
them, three call for commentary. First, the identity of an individual is to 
be situated somewhere between the twin processes of taking on form and 
annihilating form.519 This is basically the definition of plasticity we have 
been working with all along. Second, individuals are to some degree capable 
of “self-fashioning” their identity. This is possible, on the one hand, because 
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plasticity no longer subscribes to a substantial conception of the self and, on 
the other, because
the plasticity of the self, which supposes that it simultaneously 
receives and gives itself its own form, implies a necessary split 
and the search for an equilibrium between the preservation 
of constancy (or, basically, the autobiographical self) and 
the exposure of this constancy to accidents, to the outside, 
to otherness in general (identity, in order to endure, ought 
paradoxically to alter itself or accidentalize itself).520
The auto-constitutive function of the subject is caught between its creative 
and adaptive impulses. It feeds off of the contradiction embodied in its 
simultaneous resistance to conformity and its desire to maintain itself by 
reproducing the norms of culture and remaining “flexible” to the demands 
of labor, citizenship, and so forth.521 Malabou’s paradoxical idea of exposure, 
which we also met very briefly in Foucault’s notion of limit experiences, is 
critical to drawing the political consequences of plasticity.
Plasticity, however, is not flexibility. Flexibility is plasticity evacuated of 
its vitality and reduced to pure adaptation. The third point Malabou makes 
is that the vitality of plasticity entails the detonation of form, explosiveness. 
Plasticity is naturally explosive, and it is this explosiveness that transforms 
nature into freedom. She writes:
On the one hand, the coincidence between formation and 
disappearance of form is diachronic: a past form cedes place 
to a new form, and one thus changes identity of “self” in the 
course of time. On the other hand, form is synchronic: the 
threat of the explosion of form structurally inhabits every 
form. All current identity maintains itself only at the cost of 
a struggle against its autodestruction: it is in this sense that 
identity is dialectical in nature.522
The dialectic of formation and explosion is meant, it seems to me, to 
salvage a conception of agency that respects the gap existing between the 
homeostatic impulse (self-preservation) and the creative impulse (self-
production).523 I hesitate to endorse the idea of explosiveness because it 
seems to me that, while plastic explosives are, of course, designed to blow 
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things up, this does not mean that explosiveness is implicated in the concept 
of plasticity itself. At least, I would not wish to implicate it. I would instead 
prefer to avoid the problem of how a plastic body would reach the point of 
destroying its own form—what Malabou calls autodestruction—by ascribing 
the destructive force to the other. Her analyses of brain damage and the loss 
of identity that accompanies it seems to point us in this direction, but she 
also seems to be committed to the idea that plasticity is inherently capable of 
autodestruction.
Habits and body schemata, in the absence of violence, work to stabilize 
the integrity of the body. Radical transformation does not belong to 
plasticity as such, which is why it seems that Malabou’s autodestruction 
requires further (psychoanalytic) elaboration.524 This is not to say that 
plasticity tends naturally toward fixity or suspension, rather than creativity, 
but rather to assert that the material conditions of identity require that a 
number of disparate forces, foreign and domestic, must conspire for change 
to occur. Plasticity should therefore not be regarded as an impulse of any 
kind, creative or destructive, but instead as the generalized disposition of 
material bodies such as ours. A remark in Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing 
better captures the temperance of plasticity. “Plasticity,” writes Malabou, 
“characterizes a regime of systematic self-organization that is based on the 
ability of an organism to integrate the modifications that it experiences 
and to modify them in return.”525 These modifications are germane to 
intercorporeity. Now, it is true that Nietzsche said, “I am no man, I am 
dynamite.”526 But saying that the nature of life is to discharge its power, as 
Nietzsche does here, is not the same as saying that life seeks to annihilate 
itself. Unless what Malabou means by autodestruction is analogous to what 
Freud meant by the death drive, in which case the power of self-destruction 
lies not in the plasticity of the brain but in something else inside us.
 Malabou’s incorporation of explosiveness into her theory of plasticity 
responds to a worry, rightly voiced by Weiss, that the deterministic 
dimension of plasticity does not leave enough room for novelty and radical 
change, particularly the kind involved when unforeseen events compel us to 
revise our habitual circuits.527 There are actually two concerns involved here. 
The first is general: Weiss is unable to see how a deterministic ontology can 
account for the perceived novelty of experience. This supposes, of course, 
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that genuine novelty exists. The second, more specific, concern judges that 
the Jamesian version of plasticity “makes it difficult to see how significant 
individual and social change can ever really occur once the character of 
the individual or of a particular social class has been firmly established.”528 
For my part, I admit to skepticism about the kind of spontaneous, radical 
change invoked by Weiss. Or rather, if there is radical change, it is not 
spontaneous; it is always, at least in part, a yielding to what Michel Serres 
calls the “inconstancies and deviations” produced by “the agency of the 
storm that is the other.”529 In fact, if our condition as embodied beings is 
characterized by a fundamental plasticity, then spontaneous action would 
always be tempered by the material resistance of social and natural habits.530 
Which is not to say that there is no phenomenological evidence for the 
reality of chance or indetermination. Instead, it is to contend that “radical 
change or spontaneous innovation,” if it exists, must be accounted for at the 
ontological level in a way that plasticity does not.531 Otherwise, we need not 
assume that it actually exists.
Weiss is no doubt right to be on guard against plasticity’s tendency 
toward fixity. While theoretically open to infinite permutations, our habits 
often do seem to become rigid or, at the limit, petrified. Our desire for 
organization and functional efficiency promote this social danger.532 
The power of plasticity faces the constant threat of fixity, homeostasis, 
sedimentation, conservatism, dogmatism, intolerance. Even though it does 
lend a necessary degree of stability to our corporeal disposition, fixity also 
signals the arrest of plasticity’s capacity to yield to influences. Another name 
for this arrest is death. When the body can no longer tolerate transformation, 
whether because of illness, trauma, or structural disintegration, it has 
ceased to live. The challenge for the model of plasticity I am defending is 
to first conceive the plastic body’s ontology, its structure and prospects for 
alteration; and, second, to exhibit some of the practical measures available 
for preserving the suppleness of plasticity and increasing the body’s power 
to exist. The greater part of my effort has addressed the first prong of this 
challenge. Let us now distill some practical principles.
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In Praise of Suppleness:  
Censorship and the Virtue of Exposure
The body is an aesthetic phenomenon. Its aesthetic composition is arranged 
according to the sensations it metabolizes from the environment. In order to 
maintain a suppleness of composition, the body must not only avoid circuits 
of experience that arrest its plasticity, it must actively expose itself to percepts 
and affects that intensify its power by bolstering its tolerance, that enable 
it to radiate new sensations and pleasurable affects.533 This principle of 
exposure offers a counterargument to the defense of censorship inaugurated 
by Plato’s expulsion of artists from the Kallipolis, and his disparagement 
of mimesis on both epistemological and pedagogical grounds. Aesthetic 
exposure offers the antithesis of censorship and an antidote to intolerance.
Censorship is enforced sensory deprivation. It is deliberate resistance to 
aesthetic exposure, enforced upon one individual, who does not yet know 
what she can become, by another individual who already does know, but 
fears or rejects this potential. What gets censored is typically cited as painful, 
dangerous, or socially unsavory. The intention here might be admirable, 
especially when children are involved. But in order to be effective the censor 
must always presume to know what bodies can and will do. And yet, this is 
precisely the question which remains indefinitely open for each one of us. 
When we say that children are “impressionable,” we mean to say that they 
are easily influenced, that influences can stick, and therefore that we must 
think twice about exposing them to “explicit” material. In this we both 
recognize and fear the maximally supple plasticity which, as infants, requires 
environmental and interpersonal stimulation for the child to adequately 
connect with its surroundings.534
Given the advances of technology, evolutionary theory and genetic 
enhancement, as well as our posthuman aspirations and the pervasive desire 
to multiply the dimensions of the real, there is no precise way to calculate 
the possible transmutations of the body. The potential of the child is not a 
predetermined or natural fate, although it can be contrived to be so. The 
child possesses an internal force that Dewey identifies doubly as immaturity 
and plasticity, or the power to grow and develop dispositions that will enable 
the acquisition of new habits and, therefore, new powers to exist.535 The 
vitality concentrated in the body of the child horrifies us, not because it 
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is autodestructive, but because we cannot fathom what it may convert its 
impressions, explicit or otherwise, into. We cite its vulnerability to justify 
reinforcing our “regimes of perception,” when we could be encouraging its 
plasticity to unleash its unimaginable power to grow through education and 
experimentation.536
Because we are ignorant of the future of our bodies, there is no telling 
which individual, social, or ecological compositions will enhance our power. 
Our ignorance should compel us to remain open to whichever aesthetics 
our bodies can tolerate, not just the fine, innocuous, beautiful, or sublime, 
but also the sinister, gruesome, disgusting, horrific—the totality of the 
real. When the identity of individuals necessarily depends on a panoply of 
local and foreign populations, then political fights—for media exposure, 
for arts endowments and education, for environmental protection, for 
ergonomic working conditions—are inherently ecological. Our ecological 
life is an assemblage of objects, humans, animals, energies, elements, and 
dark forces beyond our ken. The alterity that summons our responsibility, 
our responsiveness, lurks immanently in the very plasticity of this ecology. 
“Plasticity,” writes Malabou, “designates the form of a world without any 
exteriority, a world in which the other appears as utterly other precisely 
because she is not someone else.”537 This world is not simply uncanny, it is 
eminently strange.
Embracing the principle of exposure requires a double affirmation. First, 
a Dionysian affirmation of “all that appears.”538 Second, an affirmation of 
chance encounters, of accidents that may or may not disrupt our tendencies 
toward fixity and intolerance. There is a pragmatic reason to face the 
obvious risks of exposure. We cannot know what encounters will yield, 
or what will become of us when faced with aesthetic forces that threaten 
to dismantle or reassemble our identity.539 Even if we could attune our 
perception to the minute intricacies of the aesthetic, we would still be 
incapable of comprehending the impact sensations have on our capacity 
to act and be acted upon. They are forever anterior to perception; they 
strike straight at the center of the body, like lightning. As Deleuze and 
Levinas have taught us, the body is immediately seized by the rhythm of 
sensation and forced to participate in its own representation. Aesthetic 
experience produces a “unique situation where we cannot speak of consent, 
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assumption, initiative or freedom, because the subject is caught up and 
carried away by it.”540 The aesthetic produces affects, and these affects 
individuate, but they do so anonymously and at the risk of disfiguration/
deformation. Such is the diachronic and dissensual nature of sensation.541
If our aesthetic responses remain, from this perspective, aleatory and 
anonymous affairs, then we cannot know what aesthetics can do for us—
or, better put, what it can do to us. We can only experiment to find out 
what works and where it takes us. This may come through self-fashioning, 
pushing the avant-garde, or constructing new environments and preserving 
the extant unique.542 The options are diverse and should focus as much on 
the everyday as the extraordinary, since, as Paul Ducum argues, “ordinary, 
everyday aesthetic experiences are more significant than experiences of high 
art in forming and informing one’s identity and view of the world beyond 
personal experience.”543 Experimentation keeps our plasticity supple, open 
to influences that can intensify our tolerance. It is amor fati, education 
by chance. As Dewey argues, the purpose of experimentation is to allow 
freedom to grow; education’s purpose is to exercise our plasticity and 
thereby position us to democratize our social organization.544 As goes the 
institution, so goes its subjects.
The principle of exposure should not be cast in a conservative light. 
It is not advocating that we, in the name of tolerance, expose ourselves to 
exotic experiences or new cultures or foreign agents merely for the sake of 
understanding the other. Nor is it echoing the humanistic ideal of exposing 
oneself to artwork in the name of moral edification. Its aspirations are more 
radical. When we expose our bodies to the entire domain of the aesthetic 
we effectively expose ourselves to deformation and welcome the possibility 
of reconfiguration, perhaps beyond recognition. And it is precisely our 
plasticity that would facilitate this potential deformation. The aesthetic 
harbors the potential to increase or decrease our power, or to transform us 
into something else altogether.
Diversification and annihilation compose the life of the environment. 
Some aesthetic experiences bring joy and pleasure, other pain and sadness. 
Trauma is a real possibility, but so is ecstasy. When we are affected our 
power is modified for better or worse. In either case affects exceed us at the 
same time as they individuate us, according to the dynamic nature of our 
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corporeal disposition.545 “Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they 
go beyond the strength of those who undergo them,” write Deleuze and 
Guattari.546 The paradox of exposure is that in order for a finite plastic body 
to stave off the inevitable compromise of its integrity (fixity or breakage), 
that body must risk exposure to deformation or death. It must be pushed to 
the outer limits of its threshold in order to figure out what it is and what it 
might accomplish. In Serres’ words:
If you want to save yourself, take risks. If you want to save 
your soul, do not hesitate, here and now, to entrust it to the 
variable storm. An inconstant aurora borealis burst forth in 
the night. It spreads, blazing and bleeding, like those footlights 
that never stop blinking, whether they are switched on or off. 
It either passes or doesn’t, but flows elsewhere in a rainbow-
coloured stream. You will not change if you do not yield to 
these inconstancies and deviations. More importantly, you will 
not know.547
Freedom is nothing other than the dispositional necessity of the body, or the 
capacity of the body to exist and act according to the law organizing its 
dynamic constitution. This necessity, which at once individuates the body 
as this singular individual with this singular threshold of power, is precisely 
what Spinoza calls the virtue and right of the body.548 As Balibar explains, 
“the individual’s right includes all that he is effectively able to do and to 
think in a given set of conditions.”549  As such, the power of an individual 
is necessarily limited by ecological factors: internally by the other bodies in 
the assemblage (friends), externally by those assemblages acting according 
to a different ratio of motion and rest (enemies). The freedom I call mine 
is a transient power, susceptible to the health and disease, joy and sadness, 
of the totality of animate and inanimate bodies with which I interact at 
any given time.
To be free is to understand as much as possible the myriad ways in which 
one’s body is acted upon, restricted or enabled, by the bodies composing 
it as an individual—in other words, how individuals are determined. In 
Deleuze’s terms, our power is mapped along the lines of longitude and 
latitude, intensities (affects) and extensities (components) that intersect 
our body.550
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We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other 
words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition 
with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that 
body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it 
or join with it in composing a more powerful body.551
Where Kant would offer a practical rationality immune to the 
contingencies of the corporeal world and its natural laws, Spinoza gives 
us a body whose freedom is necessitated by the field of causal encounters 
that engender its singularity. Insofar as we can diagram and negotiate these 
encounters—which could not have been otherwise than they are—we are said 
to be free.552
At any given moment we do not know what a body can do, or which 
encounters will intensify its capacity to affect and be affected. As Spinoza 
reminds us, “nobody as yet has determined the limits of the body’s 
capabilities; that is, nobody as yet has learned from experience what the 
body can and cannot do, without being determined by the mind, solely 
from the laws of its own nature insofar as it is considered as corporeal.”553 
One way to approach the transgression of these limits is to diagram all of 
the ways in which the body is etched, chiseled, painted, and polished by the 
aesthetic environment, and then to build and preserve sites that will work 
on us differently. Foucault named this work of emancipation the “critical 
ontology of ourselves,” which he advocated as “an attitude, an ethics, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the 
same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an 
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”554 There is no telling 
how a particular aesthetic will strike us or how our senses will react to its 
stimuli. Despite this uncertainty, if we desire to do more than simply dwell 
in environments that reveal to us what we already know about ourselves, or 
reinforce the complex of habits that automate our habitus, then we will find 
ourselves compelled to speculate about and produce aesthetics that enable 
our bodies to realize unimaginable performances.
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with the world, with others, and with our own life” (52).
112. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 1.
113. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, 12. Russell here echoes Berkeley on sensa-
tion (A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1982], §87): “Colour, figure, motion, extension and the like, considered 
only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing 
in them which is not perceived.” See Ayer’s The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge 
(New York: Macmillan, 1940) and J.L. Austin’s reply in Sense and Sensibilia 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962).
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114. The constancy hypothesis is a staple of direct realism, but it problematically 
situates perception in the mind and therefore sets up a questionable kind of cor-
respondence. Merleau-Ponty summarizes: “Hence we have in principle a point-
by-point correspondence and constant connection between the stimulus and the 
elementary perception” (PP 8/14).
115. “Externalism,” writes Rowlands, “is the view that no all mental things are exclu-
sively located inside the head of the person or creature that has these things.” See 
Externalism, 2.
116. Merleau-Ponty resists such a view when he writes in a working note of The Visible 
and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968), 250, that “the flesh of the world is not self-sensing (se sentir) as is my 
flesh—It is sensible and not sentient—I call it flesh nonetheless…in order to say 
that it is a pregnancy of possibles….” Even in this later text, which is often thought 
to overcome the latent dualism of the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
retains a dualism which separates being into two spheres, the human and the non-
human, but this division comes without explanation. Precisely how this division 
comes to be, if it actually exists, is a metaphysical problem that Merleau-Ponty 
does not work through.
117. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, abridged and edited by 
Kenneth Winkler (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 49.
118. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, §1. Of course, Berkeley found faith 
in mind-independent (but not God-independent) objects “repugnant,” but his 
conviction that objects are nothing more than collectives of qualities provides a 
true model of the theory of objects I am presupposing here and will elaborate in 
subsequent texts.
119. For objectivity, I follow for the most part the realist theory of objects developed 
by Graham Harman, principally in his Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics 
of Objects (Chicago: Open Court, 2002) and Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology 
and the Carpentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), as well Stephen 
Mumford’s Dispositions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Consequently, 
the ethics of things defended by Silvia Benso in her book The Face of Things: A 
Different Side of Ethics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000) is allied 
with my project.
120. The idea that objects possess capacities or “powers,” as well as the ontological 
status of these powers, is the subject of a debate in analytic philosophy, a short 
overview of which can be found in the introduction to George Molnar, Powers: 
A Study in Metaphysics, ed. Stephen Mumford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). Occasionally I will distinguish between the ontological and practical sense 
of “power.” The sense of the virtual I intend here is taken from Gilles Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), 208: “The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The 
virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual.”
121. See Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations, trans. C.M. Williams and Sydney 
Waterlow (New York: Dover, 1959), 5. Mach allies himself with the “philosophy 
of immanence” and cites Spinoza as his original predecessor (46), a point we will 
return to in our discussion of bodies, plasticity, and corporeal integrity. 
122. The language and ontology of dispositions I borrow directly from Mumford, 
Dispositions, vi and 5. Mumford’s ontology of dispositions appears to have many 
points of contact with Deleuze’s ontology of the actual and virtual, but this book 
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is not the place to delve into the comparison. See also Molnar’s five features of 
powers—directedness, independence, actuality, intrinsicality, objectivity—in 
Powers, 8-9.
123. Alva Noë, Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 143. On the 
effects of color contrast on the appearance of color, see Josef Albers, Interaction of 
Color (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
124. This formulation is more appropriate for the account of embodiment given in 
Phenomenology of Perception, where the consciousness-object duality is still at play. 
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the inadequacy of this model in The Visible and the 
Invisible, 200/253; a reformulation is evident in his searching discussion of the 
“two leaves” of the body (135-138/178-183). What exactly remains out of step 
with the world is open for debate, although good candidates are volition, imagina-
tion, and emotion.
125. The diacritical nature of perception is affirmed by Merleau-Ponty in The Visible 
and the Invisible, 213/267, and likewise in the chapter on “The Thing and the 
Natural World” in Phenomenology.
126. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2010).
127. Aristotle, De Anima, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic 
Press, 1981), 416b34-35. 
Chapter 2
128. I begin to explore the theme of sensory alimentation and its ethical potential in 
“Enabling/Disabling Sensation: Toward an Alimentary Imperative in Carnal 
Phenomenology,” Philosophy Today 52, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 99-115.
129. It must always be kept in view that when Merleau-Ponty, or any philosopher at 
all, speaks about perception, it is always human perception that is denoted. This 
makes it quite difficult, it seems to me, for an ontology grounded in human per-
ception to escape anthropocentrism.
130. Gary Brent Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty: A Search for the Limits 
of Consciousness (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1981), 7.
131. For an extended critique of the physicalist/neurobiological (“objectivist”) account 
of pain from a Merleau-Pontyan perspective, see Abraham Olivier, Being in Pain 
(Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007). Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior, trans. 
Alden Fisher (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963) is a book which 
demonstrates that positivistic approaches to psychology fail to adequately explain 
human behavior because they miss the phenomenon of structure identified and 
analyzed by Gestalt psychology. Following the Gestalt theorists as well as phe-
nomenology, Merleau-Ponty redefines behavior as a meaning-laden phenomenon 
that cannot be explained solely by reflex theories, but needs rather a “principle” 
that accounts for the “relevance” of stimuli (SB 99/109).
132. It is true that Merleau-Ponty calls the body the “third term” in the figure-ground 
structure specifically in the context of a discussion of spatiality. But if all percep-
tion is situated in a spatiotemporal horizon, and perception is the origin of both 
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determinate objects and objective thought, then we must consider the body as 
conditioning every horizon of experience.
133. M.C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, second edition (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988), Introduction.
134. On Merleau-Ponty’s idealism, see Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, 
32; Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon, 14ff.
135. Since the present chapter is concerned specifically with the ontology of the body, 
I will forgo discussion of the way in which the primacy of perception thesis cuts 
across traditional intellectualist/rationalist and empiricist epistemologies and refer 
the reader to the secondary literature, especially the books by Dillon, Madison, 
Hass, and de Waelhens.
136. Objects are not simply postulated as transcendent in order to account for the con-
tent of perception, their transcendence is evinced in the way they resist appropria-
tion and only ever present themselves to us incompletely or perspectivally. This is 
doubly true of other persons. See PrP 18/53; PP 322-323/372.
137. John Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1973), 30.
138. Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, 31. Merleau-Ponty maintains 
that the object, rather than the subject, remains “aloof” from perception, that it 
“remains self-sufficient” (PP 322/372). See also Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of 
Stratton’s experiment in PP 248-251/287-291. For an alternative reading of the 
Kantian subject as transcendentally embodied and therefore rooted in the world 
and capable of distinguishing “up” from “down,” see Nuzzo, Ideal Embodiment.
139. Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, 30.
140. Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, 34.
141. Merleau-Ponty also says, and this we will take up below to determine the priority 
of sensation, that sense experience “is the intentional tissue” that makes the world 
“present as a familiar setting of our life” (PP 52-53/64-65).
142. Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, 35, 36.
143. Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, 36.
144. Merleau-Ponty refers to the “silent knowing” and “pre-meaning” and “sediment-
ed meaning” of these “existentials”  [existentiaux] numerous times in the Working 
Notes of The Visible and the Invisible. They are the “unconscious” “articulations of 
our field” (VI 180/233-234) and seem to be analogous to what Heidegger intends 
by existentialia, or the ontological structures of Dasein, in Being and Time. See 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1962), §9.
145. Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, xi.
146. “Her corporeal schema is for itself—for the other—It is the hinge of the for itself 
and the for the other” (VI 189/243).
147. Consider Merleau-Ponty’s remark that “we are given over to the object and we 
merge into this body which is better informed than we are about the world, and 
about the motives we have and the means at our disposal for synthesizing it” (PP 
238/276).
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148. It is well known that Colin Smith’s translation of Phenomenology of Perception 
translates schéma corporel sometimes as “body image” and other times as “body 
schema,” which is problematic because these two terms signify disparate phenom-
ena. Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), has sifted through the plentiful literature on the body image and 
body schema in order to clarify their difference and standardize their reference. 
He proposes the following: “A body image consists of a system of perceptions, atti-
tudes and beliefs pertaining to one’s own body. In contrast, a body schema is a sys-
tem of sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity 
of perceptual monitoring” (24). Gallagher further notes that when Merleau-Ponty 
writes of the schéma corporel he intends “a system of dynamic motor equivalents 
that belong to the realm of habit rather than conscious choice” (20). Part 1 of 
Morris’s The Sense of Space unpacks Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body 
schema as an “ensemble” of habituated styles (39) and further insists that schéma 
corporel always be rendered as body schema when translating Merleau-Ponty. This 
is the best way to avoid mistaking the schéma corporel for something representa-
tional, personal, or explicitly intentional.
149. “Body-subject and world are ultimately mutually constituting despite all the 
emphasis placed just on the subjective constitution of the world in Phénoménologie 
de la Perception. Neither would be what it is without the other.” Stephen Priest, 
Merleau-Ponty (London: Routledge, 1998), 74.
150. Priest (Merleau-Ponty, 57) notes that “Merleau-Ponty’s originality lies in the idea 
that subjectivity is physical.” Neither materialism, idealism, nor dualism “includes 
the thesis that I am my body; that I am a subjective object or a physical subject.”
151. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, 146.
152. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, 146.
153. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, 147.
154. When I speak of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception as a “transcen-
dental philosophy,” it must be kept in mind that the transcendental in Merleau-
Ponty is never a pure a priori, but as M.C. Dillon has shown (“Apriority in Kant 
and Merleau-Ponty,” Kant-Studien 17, no. 3 [1987]: 403-423), neither a priori 
nor a posteriori. This neither/nor once again supports Barbaras’s claim that 
Merleau-Ponty remains caught up in old dualisms and can only situate himself 
negatively in the tradition he seeks to overcome. In any case, Merleau-Ponty’s 
transcendental is an historical transcendental, a concept we will come to grips with 
later. The historical transcendental will be reconstituted in terms of plasticity, 
with specific reference to Deleuze, DeLanda, and Spinoza, in chapter 4.
155. Merleau-Ponty’s view of time is undoubtedly intersubjective, as when he says that 
“‘events’ are shapes cut out by a finite observer from the spatio-temporal totality 
of the objective world” (PP 411/470). By “objective” here, he means intersubjec-
tive: time is the totality of events carved out of being by the totality of observers. 
Nearly the entire temporality chapter of the Phenomenology supports this subjectiv-
ist view of time, which is problematic from the realist perspective I am advocating 
here.
156. “This unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the 
back of our ‘consciousness’, but in front of us, as articulations of our field” (VI 
180/234).
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157. This is not to suggest that the Phenomenology does not contain an ontology. 
Indeed, after Dillon and others I am trying to bring out some of the ontologi-
cal dimensions of the theory of embodiment put forth in the Phenomenology. I do 
feel, however, that this ontology is hindered (if not contradicted) by the privilege 
afforded to the first-person perspective deployed in this early text. I reserve for a 
subsequent project my critique of phenomenology as a philosophical method for 
doing ontology.
158. See Heidegger, Being and Time, §16. For the ontological implications of this break-
down, see Harman, Tool-Being. See also Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, 
trans. J. Hoenig and Marian W. Hamilton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1963), 88.
159. Shaun Gallagher, “Lived Body and Environment,” Research in Phenomenology 16 
(1986): 152.
160. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, 139-150, dispels this notion by contrasting 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the lived body with Sartre’s ontological analysis of the 
body.
161. For the thesis that the “experiential absence” of the body is more fundamental 
than the “ambiguous presence” of the body, see Gallagher, “Lived Body and 
Environment.”
162. Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, 26.
163. David Morris, “The Logic of the Body in Bergson’s Motor Schemes and Merleau-
Ponty’s Body Schema,” Philosophy Today 44, SPEP Supplement (2000): 65, shows 
that “The logic of the body in Merleau-Ponty would have to be a cultural-histori-
cal logic, a logic of a body already infected with ‘exterior’ meaning, not just a logic 
of internal translations, repetitions, parts and wholes.”
164. Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, 26.
165. Morris, “The Logic of the Body,” 64. 
166. We again see Merleau-Ponty inserting a certain distance between the physical 
and lived bodies, and thus imposing a duality of embodiment. This allows him to 
denote the habit body as the “mediator of a world” (PP 145/169). The metaphysi-
cal problem that lingers here is that of how the lived body originally separates 
itself from its envelopment with the physical environment, or how an impersonal 
organism becomes the personal subject of perception. This problem is dodged 
by Merleau-Ponty when he posits that “by an imperceptible twist an organic 
process issues into human behavior” (PP 88/104). The problem is ramified in The 
Visible and the Invisible because Merleau-Ponty’s switch to a monist ontology puts 
him in the position of explaining the emergence and particularization of percep-
tual agents. Such a problem is sidestepped from a phenomenological viewpoint 
because the phenomenologist takes his or her point of departure from the facticity 
of existence and therefore begins his or her analyses from the perspective of an 
always already individuated subject. It is, however, in the courses published as 
Nature, trans. Robert Vallier (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003) 
that Merleau-Ponty takes on the question of the emergence of “spirit,” which he 
tells us “is not what descends into the body in order to organize it, but is what 
emerges from it” (140/188).
167. William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (New York: Dover, 1918), 114.
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168. James, Principles, vol. 1, 116-119. Proprioception describes the tacit ecological 
awareness that enables the body to maintain its postural equilibrium.
169. James, Principles, vol. 1, 105, emphasis omitted.
170. Edward S. Casey, “Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty,” Man and 
World 17, no. 3/4 (1984): 285.
171. Casey, “Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty,” 285.
172. On the freeing of perception and movement by the sedimentation of habit, see 
Félix Ravaisson, Of Habit, trans. Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair (London: 
Continuum, 2008), 49.
173. Casey distinguishes between the kinds of habits that can be cultivated “spontane-
ously” and the habits which are sedimented in the form of customs (“Habitual 
Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty,” 286-287). His notion of customary habits 
is comparable to the social habits that tie us to an economic class, as James identi-
fies (Principles, vol. 1, 121). Customary and class habits have an effect of contrac-
tion and should be contrasted with the “dilating” habits that Merleau-Ponty 
elaborates.
174. Clare Carlisle, “Creatures of Habit: The Problem and the Practice of Liberation,” 
Continental Philosophy Review 38 (2006): 23.
175. Casey, “Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty,” 290.
176. Alphonso Lingis, Sensation: Intelligibility in Sensibility (Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1996), 1. For Dewey’s account of how our originally “plastic” 
impulses get channeled into social forms of conduct, see John Dewey, Human 
Nature and Conduct (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1988), 69-75.
177. Alphonso Lingis, Body Transformations: Evolutions and Atavisms in Culture 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 57.
178. For the way affective circuits economize our actions and thereby give rise to the 
identities of our bodies, see Tom Sparrow, “Bodies in Transit: The Plastic Subject 
of Alphonso Lingis,” Janus Head 10, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 2007): 114-116.
179. For an ontology of mood, see Heidegger, Being and Time, §29.
180. Hass, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy, 78.
181. I detect here in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the physiognomy of color the seeds 
of an analysis of race relations, some points of which I will raise throughout this 
essay. However, a theory and critique of the “physiognomy of race” will have to be 
deferred for a subsequent study.
182. Cited by Merleau-Ponty in EM 188/87.
183. Gail Weiss, Refiguring the Ordinary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008), 79. Weiss points out that it is his loss of an intentional arc that disables the 
patient Schneider’s capacity to order his world into a coherent, meaningful whole. 
The more general point that Merleau-Ponty wants to stress with Schneider’s 
case is that his pathology cannot be fully explained by appealing to the physical 
disablement of a particular brain function.
184. In “Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation,” Hubert Dreyfus makes 
it clear that the intentional arc is not a representation of the world, but must 
be understood as the “feedback loop” of learning that is established as bodies 
Notes 251
interact with other bodies, things, etc. “The idea of an intentional arc is meant to 
capture the idea that all past experience is projected back into the world. The best 
representation of the world is thus the world itself.” Dreyfus’s paper is available at: 
<http://www.class.uh.edu/cogsci/dreyfus.html>
185. Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, 68.
186. This is perhaps most apparent in “The Child’s Relations with Others” (cf. 
108-113/17-23).
187. Shannon Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, 
Pragmatism, and Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 68.
188. “A situation becomes neutral when the immediate environment arouses no 
concern. An environment void of importance is something that also exists, and in 
such an environment, too, ‘stimuli’ are active,” writes Straus in The Primary World 
of Senses, 81.
189. See Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx, trans. R. James Goldstein and James 
Cascaito (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), 31-32.
190. Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins, 68.
191. Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins, 67, 68-69.
192. Alphonso Lingis, Libido: The French Existential Theories (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1985), 55-56. Lingis challenges Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation 
of Schneider’s sexual incompetence as a loss of the capacity to order his erotic 
world, via the intentional arc, into a meaningful whole. The libido, argues Lingis, 
is not a force that is ordered by perceptual structures; nor is it organized teleologi-
cally like body motility.
193. George Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 5. For the full account of whiteness as 
ambush, see chapter 7.
194. Black Bodies, White Gazes, 4, 5. Yancy writes: “Her body language signifies, 
‘Look, the Black!’ On this score, though short of a performative locution, her body 
language functions as an insult.” He goes on to say that, “The point here is that 
deep-seated racist emotive responses may form part of the white bodily repertoire, 
which has become calcified through quotidian modes of bodily transaction in a 
racial and racist world.”
195. Frantz Fanon, Black Bodies, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 111.
196. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 113.
197. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 112.
198. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 112.
199. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 111. Fanon is drawing off of Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
analysis of “the look” in Being and Nothingness. Yancy shows how the historico-
racial schema operates as part of what Foucault calls the “positive unconscious,” 
explaining that “My darkness is a signifier of negative values grounded within a 
racist social and historical matrix that predates my existential emergence” (Black 
Bodies, White Gazes, 3). Cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: 
Vintage, 1970), xi.
200. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 112-113. For a fuller account of how the black 
body is “hailed” by the white gaze, see Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes, 71-75. 
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For an account of interpellation as a material practice, see Louis Althusser, 
“Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other 
Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001).
201. Citing Iris Marion Young, Cathryn Vasseleu makes this point in Textures of Light: 
Vision and Touch in Irigaray, Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty (London: Routledge, 
1998), 57.
202. Sara Ahmed, “A Phenomenology of Whiteness,” Feminist Theory 8, no. 2 (2007): 
150.
203. Ahmed, “A Phenomenology of Whiteness,” 153.
204. Ahmed, “A Phenomenology of Whiteness,” 154.
205. Saito’s Everyday Aesthetics is devoted to instilling in the reader an appreciation for 
the kind of aesthetic (non-theoretical) attitude that can help uncover the sensu-
ous. While I affirm the cultivation of everyday aesthetics, I will also argue that 
even a detailed appreciation of the sensuous remains incapable of fully accessing 
the sensuous environment.
206. We will examine the motor physiognomy of sensations in the following chapter.
207. This is why Merleau-Ponty insists that “it is impossible completely to describe the 
colour of the carpet without saying that it is a carpet, made of wool, and without 
implying in this colour a certain tactile value, a certain weight and a certain resis-
tance to sound” (PP 323/373).
208. “The Earth is the matrix of our time as it is of our space. Every constructed no-
tion of time presupposes our proto-history as carnal beings compresent to a single 
world,” Merleau-Ponty writes in “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” in Signs, 
trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 
180/227.
209. Dillon, “Apriority in Kant and Merleau-Ponty,” 420.
210. Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 56.
211. Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 58.
212. Merleau-Ponty insists that expression and existence are “reciprocal,” that “the 
body expresses total existence, not because it is an external accompaniment to that 
existence, but because existence comes into its own in the body” (PP 166/193). 
This statement must always be tempered by Merleau-Ponty’s quasi-transcenden-
talism, which holds that we always already find ourselves within a sedimented, 
linguistic Lebenswelt that limits the range of available styles, and his claim that our 
behavior emerges from an animal Umwelt (Nature 208/269). The ontology of the 
body must be situated between “wild” and “sedimented” being (Nature 220/282). 
213. Bernhard Waldenfels, “The Paradox of Expression,” trans. Chris Nagel, in 
Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh, eds. Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 98.
214. Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 55.
215. Such a conception of identity becomes visible in the paintings of Cézanne as well 
as in those of the Impressionists, insofar as these artists exploit the thresholds of 
form. We have the feeling, for instance, when viewing a Cézanne landscape that 
its contours are on the cusp of dissolution and chaos, but that a reconfiguration of 
those contours could express the “same” landscape on the verge of a completely 
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different dissolution. Such is the fluidity of the sensory content which makes up 
the form of Cézanne’s subjects and, for Merleau-Ponty, our world.
216. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in Philosophical Essays and 
Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 110-112.
217. Linda Singer, “Merleau-Ponty on the Concept of Style,” in The Merleau-Ponty 
Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting, ed. Galen A. Johnson (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1993), 242.
218. Singer, “Merleau-Ponty on the Concept of Style,” 242.
219. Singer, “Merleau-Ponty on the Concept of Style,” 242.
220. Gallagher, “Lived Body and Environment,” 157.
221. Gallagher, “Lived Body and Environment,” 157.
222. Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), 83-84.
223. Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins, 65, 66.
224. Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 108. See also Iris Marion Young, Throwing Like a Girl 
and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1990).
225. Weiss, Refiguring the Ordinary, 4.
226. Emmanuel Levinas, “Sensibility,” in Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, eds. 
Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1990), 65.
227. In his discussion of “levels” (PP 253-254/293-294), Merleau-Ponty acknowledges 
a certain contingency and instability at the heart of experience, but does not 
explain where this instability comes from. By positing sensation as non-subjective 
and below perception, we can account for this instability. For more on levels, see 
Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 
25-38.
228. Nietzsche writes in The Will to Power (quoted in Deleuze, Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, 204, note 5), “In the chemical world the sharpest perception of the 
difference between forces reigns. But a protoplasm, which is a multiplicity of 
chemical forces, has only a vague and uncertain perception of a strange real-
ity.” This sentiment summarizes the general perspective taken up in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of the body: when he thinks the body he attempts to think it not at the 
level of consciousness or perception, but at the level of the material and physi-
ological. I do not feel that we should privilege this level, but we cannot neglect 
it or give it a derivative status. Indeed, the challenge is to reconcile the identity 
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